TASK FORCE RUSSIA -- INITIAL REPORT 17 JULY 1992 INITIAL [BIWEEKLY] REPORT

JOINT TASK FORCE RUSSIA (POW/MIA)

INITIAL REPORT TO THE U.S.-RUSSIAN JOINT COMMISSION ON POW/MIAs

17 JULY 1992

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Pages

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

GENERAL ANALYSIS

ANALYSIS

CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX C

APPENDIX D

Wasted Time on the Vietnam War issue

Number of interviews: sat in on interviews of Mahurin, Noble,

number of trips to archives: U.S. Army Central Security Facility Intelligence Records Repository, Ft. Meade (10), never to Suitland, or National Archives.

number of trips to other government agencies: Congress (2), DIA (10), CIA (3), ITAC (10), DOD CDO (2), DOD DASD (5), JSSA (1), US Army Casualty (5), never to State.

number of individual papers written: only a few, the major one, 6 pages long on the case for transfers of US POWs from Vietnam to the USSR, was never approved for release outside of TFR.

number of formal briefings given: none.

number of official papers written for the Russian side: none.

number of contributions to official papers, briefings: first report of TFR to the Joint Commission,

number of contacts with family members: Hrdlicka, Brown, George Patterson via Navy Casualty,

Number of contacts with journalists, other interested members of the public: Al Santoli, Mark Sauter, James Sanders, one other, Zbigniew Bzrzenski's secretary,

Number of entries into the TFR database: none so far.

Number of files in Word Perfect: a bunch.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This initial report by Joint Task Force Russia to the US/Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIAs consists of an "Introduction," which addresses the Task Force's mission and our approach to the tasks that this mission mandates; a "General Analysis," which provides a synthesis and overall assessment of the body of the report; "Analysis," which consists of the results of Task Force analysts' examination of all Russian archives received to date by the Commission; and a final section, "Conclusions and Recommendations," which contains some thoughts on the mission and how we might improve our operations. Finally, to assist the Commission in its work, we have included what we believe to be four useful appendices. These consist of the Joint Task Force Concept of Operations/Organization chart; a comprehensive and valuable series of reports concerning the Russian archives and archival research guidance prepared by Commission member Trudy Peterson; a 1992 US Joint Chiefs of Staff document, "Summary of Cold War Losses;" and a series of 1992prepared documents passed by the Russians to the Commission in support of our common task.

Handling Instructions

This report has been prepared for the use of the Commission in pursuit of our mission. While it is an unclassified document in accordance with Department of Defense classification guidelines for POW/MIA information, it nonetheless contains casualty-related information and should not be disseminated outside of Commission channels pending efforts by the Department of Defense Executive Agent to locate and notify as many next of kin as feasible.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. General:

a. This is the first in a series of reports prepared in support of the Joint US/Russian Commission on POW/MIAs (referred to hereafter as the Commission). The report has been prepared by the Analysis and Production Unit, Joint Task Force Russia (POW/MIA), Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, pursuant to the Army's role as the Department of Defense Executive Agent for POW/MIA affairs as they pertain to support of the Commission.

b. The mission of Joint Task Force Russia is to provide Department of Defense support to the work of the Commission and its goal of obtaining information on unaccounted for American servicemen on the territory of the former Soviet Union. To that end, the Task Force collects and analyzes information contained in Russian archives made available by the Russian government directly to the Commission or the Task Force, in conjunction with information volunteered by Russian citizens or other knowledgeable persons that is relevant to the POW/MIA issue.

2. Specific Objectives: Joint Task Force Russia conducts analysis of Russian archives and interview transcripts for two specific and interrelated purposes:

a. To support the work of the Commission by providing substantive analytical feedback to the Commission on the content of the information that has been obtained. This feedback is directed to the specific end of suggesting follow-on inquiries and archival search strategies that will contribute to the goal of accounting for specific POW/MIA cases.

b. To establish specific POW/MIA case files whenever possible and develop each such case to the maximum extent possible, whether this be the repatriation of living persons, the location, exhumation and repatriation of remains, or the confirmation, whenever possible, of what actually happened to American personnel even though it may not be possible to locate and repatriate remains.

3. Scope: The Task Force focuses our efforts on four wars ln the following order of priority - 1) Vietnam, 2) Korea, 3) The Cold War, and 4) World War II. The Cold War effort refers to those POW/MIA personnel whose status is related to incidents between 1945 and the present that were not directly related

to the hostilities of the other three wars. In addition, absent guidance to the contrary, we consider it within the spirit of our mission to address US citizen civilian detainee/internee cases when they surface, even though they are not technically "POW/MIA" cases.

a. Russian Archives: This initial report focuses on analysis of four batches of documents obtained by members of the Commission between February, 1992, and June, 1992, as follows:

1. Batch #1 - 36 pages of documentation given to Commission members Senators Kerry and Smith by General Volkogonov, chairman of the Russian delegation to the Commission, in Moscow, 13 - 17 Feb 92.

2. Batch #2 - 179 pages of documentation given to the US representatives by General Volkogonov during the first Commission working group meeting conducted in Moscow 28 May - 3 Jun 92.

3. Batch #3 - 82 pages of documentation given by General Volkogonov to US representatives in Moscow on 12 Jun 92.

4. Batch #4 - 20 pages of documentation. Fourteen pages of the total given by Mr. Barranikov (1st Deputy Chief of Internal Security) and General Volkogonov to Ambassador Toon, Chairman of US delegation; remaining six pages given by Mr. Kozlov, (Deputy Head of Russian delegation) to Ms. Peterson, Commission member. All documents received in Moscow, 26 Jun 92.

b. Interviews: Supplementing the information contained in the archives is information that may be obtained as a result of field interviews conducted in Russia of Russian citizens who might come forward to volunteer information relevant to the POW/MIA issue. Personnel assigned to Task Force Russia's Moscow office are conducting those interviews. Some Russian citizens volunteered information in response to a joint television appeal made by Ambassador Toon and General Volkogonov. Although a few reports have been filed on some of these interviews, we have not included that information in this report. Future reports will address information obtained from interviews.

c. US Archives: Whenever possible, specific information obtained from Russian archives or citizens has been reconciled with data available in US archives. These archives include available lists of unaccounted for personnel, as well as records of incidents (i.e., aircraft shootdowns) that might appear in the Russian archives and that may have produced POW/MIA personnel. Because the work of the Commission and its supporting Task Force has only recently commenced, and due to the condition of many records that are relevant to our mission, the degree to which we were able to incorporate this information into our analysis was limited. Much work needs to be done to bring existing US archives - particularly those pertaining to World War II and Korea - into a state whereby we can readily access them. Where we have not yet been able to cross-check Russian information with US files due to time constraints or other difficulties, this fact will be noted in the report and follow-on analysis will be included in subsequent Task Force reports.

4. Methodology:

a. Our analysts worked with copies of the original Russian language documents, as well as with English translations produced by US military translators in Washington, DC. The Task Force will field its own Translation Cell in the near future. The translation services for these initial archives were provided by the On-Site Inspection Agency's Linguistic Unit.

b. Analysts and translators were tasked to provide their assessment of the authenticity and credibility of the archives provided to the Commission, as well as a judgment of the comprehensiveness of the documents. In addition, attention was paid to any signs that might indicate sanitization, recently prepared summaries, or any other indicators that might provide insight into how the archives provided were selected or processed.

c. Task Force analysts then commenced their substantive analysis of the documents by batch number, determining which of the four wars the documents represented, and concentrating their efforts on identifying specific elements such as names, service numbers, aircraft tail numbers, dates, times, and

locations. The objective in this step of the process is the establishment of case files on individual POW/MIA personnel. Upon completion of current ADP procurement actions, we will create an extensive data base in support of our analytical unit.

d. Task Force analysts also devoted efforts to the reconciliation of the Russian account of events with available US information to determine which specific cases might have been satisfactorily resolved (i.e., the POW/MIA was identified and repatriated, living or dead, and no new information that should be passed to the next of kin has surfaced), and which cases should be regarded as open (i.e., there is an indication that the archives contain new information, even though repatriation took place, or the archives contain information on a POW/MIA who has not been accounted for to date.)

e. In addition, at each step of the analytical process, Task Force analysts developed follow-on questions for the Commission to pose to our Russian colleagues and recommended search strategies that might shed light on those cases contained in the archives.

f. Finally, a word on how the Task Force indexes and accounts for archives received from the Commission. We have assigned a sequential number to each batch of archives upon receipt. Batch #1 was assigned the identifier TFR 1; batch #2, TFR 2; batch #3, TFR 3; batch #4, TFR 4. The pages within each batch were then numbered sequentially, for example, batch #4 pages were numbered TFR 4-1 through TFR 4-20. Hence, as one reads the analysis in the body of the report, documents will be cited by their batch and page number. In addition, for ease of understanding, the specific document cited will also be described by title or content when possible. All references in the body of this report will be to the English language translations.

II. GENERAL ANALYSIS

1. General:

a. The 317 documents handed over to US authorities between February and June 1992 date from 1945 to 1992. The documents contain considerable, albeit fragmentary, information about US personnel, as well as citizens from other countries. Both the translators and our analysts believe the documents to be authentic. In only one or two cases have individual parts been altered or deletions made. When reference is made to the same person or event in multiple documents, the information is not contradictory. Materials range from documents marked Top Secret to others without classification. In some materials the originator and the date of the origination is clearly identified, in others it is not. In general, even though these initial batches of archives are incomplete and fragmented, they provide our analysts with a productive starting point from which we can begin to develop follow-on questions and suggest research strategies to assist us in building data bases to facilitate our task of accounting for POW/MIA personnel.

b. The documents of all four batches are somewhat lacking in comprehensiveness. In some cases it appears that specific parts of larger files or documents were selected rather than providing the complete document. Virtually all of the documents are clearly relevant to the work of the Commission.

c. The materials provided relate to WWII, the Korean War, the Cold War, and the Vietnam War. Specifically, 146 pages (46% of the total) relate to World War II, 43 pages (13%) to the Korean War, 106 pages (33%) to the Cold War, and 4 pages (1%) to the Vietnam War. The remainder of the documents are generic in nature or deal with multiple wars.

d. The information on Americans contained in these documents falls into several categories.

- American POWs and internees associated with World War II. These include American service members liberated by the Russians from German and Japanese POW camps. Quite a few documents deal with the specifics of the Red Army's efforts to account for, care for, and repatriate these personnel. In addition, some documents deal with American air crews who either crashed or landed in Russian territory after bombing raids, and what was done with them.

- American POWs during the Korean War, and the ground rules established by Moscow for Russian advisors to the North Koreans vis-a-vis interrogation of US POWs. The documents we reviewed indicate clearly that direct interrogation of Americans by Russian personnel was forbidden. However, further research is required before we accept this as fact.

- Americans shot down, forced down, or otherwise held by the Russians as a result of Cold War incidents. This includes desertion and defections. Concerning Cold War incidents, in support of the Commission's efforts, the US Department of Defense (OJCS J-S) identified on 10 June 1992 a total of 39 incidents of air and sea losses in proximity to Communist territory associated with the Cold War era, 1946 to 1991. (See Appendix C for complete document.) The Russian documents in our possession addressed seven of these incidents.

- Some data is also included on third country nationals (Allied personnel) interned in the Soviet Union in the wake of World War II.

- Some data on Americans who, during the Cold War, were arrested and imprisoned in the Soviet Union for espionage or criminal offenses.

- Almost no information on POW/MIA personnel from the Vietnam War. One document, prepared in 1992, relates a Russian attempt to cross-check a US-provided list of Southeast Asia POW/MIA personnel with their archives. It is included in Appendix D.

e. There was no information contained in the 317 pages of archives that would indicate to us that there are any living American POW/MIA personnel from any of the four wars in Russia. Further, there were no references in any of the documents to the transfer of any Americans captured in the Korean War or Vietnam War to Soviet territory. We note, however, that it would be premature to draw any definite conclusions on such matters based solely upon this initial, somewhat fragmentary acquisition of archives.

f. A preliminary analysis of the documents in our possession points to the possibility that there may be some unrepatriated remains of US personnel dating from World War II and the Cold War on Russian soil. However, we cannot so state conclusively until detailed follow-up is conducted with both US and Russian sources.

i. Finally, we note that the total number of legible names of US personnel that appear in the documents is 2,590, of whom 1,896 can be associated definitively with World War II, 154 with the Cold War, 540 with the Korean War, and none with the Vietnam War. (In addition, 41 American names were given to us by the Russians as being similar to names on a US provided list of Southeast Asia POW/MIA personnel.)

III. Analysis

Batch TFR 1.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION. This is a batch of 36 pages of documents passed in March, 1992, to Commission members. Two documents are illegible, one is a duplicate of another in the batch, eight deal with World War II, three with the Cold War, and two with Vietnam. Of particular interest are the two that relate to the Vietnam War. While neither document deals directly with American POWs, they suggest an interest on the part of the KGB to send a counter-intelligence officer to Vietnam on Temporary Duty on two occasions. Whether these trips were made and whether their purpose related to US POW/MIAs can not be determined from the documents. (However, a check of US records indicates that this officer has been located and recently interviewed by US authorities in Moscow. He has denied that his Hanoi travels were for the purpose of interrogation of US servicemen.)

1. TFR 1-1 and -2

a. Title: TFR 1-1 and -2 [My Dear General Molotov - dated 3 March] This is a letter from U.S. Ambassador Averill Harriman to V. M. Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister, inquiring as to the fate of

1,200 American servicemen who had been liberated from German prisoner-of-war camps and who were either at or on their way to Odessa for repatriation.

b. Observations: In addition to the inquiry described above, Ambassador Harriman also thanks the Soviet officials for their assistance, and requests other Soviet assistance in alleviating the plight of American POWs who remain in Poland.

c. Suggested follow-up: None.

2. TFR 1-3 through -4c

a. Title: TFR 1-3 through -4c [Report on the Organization of Transit Camps and a Transfer Point in the City of Odessa, Produced on 22 March 1945] is a description of a transfer point in Odessa for Allied soldiers liberated from German prisoner of war camps and awaiting repatriation. Support resources at the transfer point are described. There is also a list of the number of Allied soldiers awaiting repatriation as well as the number who have already been repatriated.

b. Observations: This is a situation report on the status of allied internees passing through the repatriation camps in Odessa as of 22 March 1945. The document provides a snapshot of the number of allied internees being processed. This document also listed the special facilities that were set up to look after the health and welfare of Allied servicemen, i.e. medical clinics, post exchange, etc. It also describes the food rations provided to the Allies, which were generous by Soviet standards. It does not mention the names of any US or Allied POWs.

c. Follow-up: None.

3. TFR 1-5 through -9.

These documents are illegible. We should request better copies from our Russian colleagues.

4. TFR 1-10 through -14e

a. Titles:

1. TFR 1-10 through -13 [Fax From Paul M. Cole, RAND Corporation, to Al Ptak, 18 February 1992] is a fax cover sheet and hand written translation of a Russian language document entitled "List of dead Americans." There is no indication of where the list is from or who the people are other than Americans. They all have German sounding last names and died in the 1944-1945 time period. There is a short assessment of the significance of the list, by Mr. Cole.

2. TFR 1-14a through 14e [3 February 1992 **Izvestiia** "Where is Robert Reynolds and His Comrades?"] is a xerox of an article from **Izvestiia** on the efforts of a woman to locate her husband who was shot down over the Baltic Sea in 1950.

b. Observations: The list of fourteen names is intriguing. It is not clear who compiled it or who the people are on the list other than "dead Americans". Since the names are German sounding and the men were of draft age, it seems possible that they may have been Americans who served in the German Army. They may also have been American servicemen liberated from German POW camps and subsequently persecuted by Red Army officials because of their German background. The 3 February 1992 article from **Izvestiia** chronicles the attempts of the widow of Lieutenant Robert Reynolds, USN to track down rumors that he survived a l950 shoot down over the Baltic Sea and subsequently survived in the Soviet gulag. The article, written in an objective, but sympathetic tone, describes efforts to find information on Lieutenant Reynolds in the Central State, Prison, MOD, GRU, and KGB Archives.

c. Suggested follow-up: The fourteen names listed as "dead Americans" should be checked against records of U.S. servicemen. It also may be necessary to check German archives to see if any of these

names match those who served in the German military during World War II. Judging by the evidence provided in the **Izvestiia** article, the case of Lieutenant Reynolds should be researched thoroughly in the archives and every effort made to determine whether he in fact survived the shoot-down of his aircraft and lived for years in the gulag.

6. TFR 1-15 and -16

a. Titles:

1. TFR 1-15 [20 November 1972, Document Number 153/12512] is a document dated 20 November 1972 and signed by KGB Lieutenant General Mortin requesting TDY orders to Vietnam for a KGB Lieutenant Colonel 0. M. Nechiporenko.

2. TFR 1-16 [7 February 1974 Document Number 153/12241 is a document dated 7 February 1974 and signed by KGB Lieutenant General Mortin requesting TDY orders to Vietnam for KGB Lieutenant Colonel 0. M. Nechiporenko.

b. Observations: Both of these documents appear to have been sanitized. The top part of both documents has been blocked off and a part of a sentence in the second document has been whited out. Furthermore, these documents do not make it clear whether Lieutenant Colonel Nechiporenko got permission to travel to Vietnam and the documents do not shed light on the colonel's mission. The documents do tell us, however, that Lieutenant Colonel Nechiporenko's trip was sponsored by the Foreign Intelligence Directorate. We note that the initial request (1972) was prior to the 1973 Paris agreements and repatriation of American POWs, whereas the second request post dates these events. We note that former KGB General Kalugin has alleged that KGB officers were dispatched on occasion to Hanoi to interrogate US POW personnel.

c. Suggested follow-up: Both Lieutenant Colonel Nechiporenko and Lieutenant General Mortin should be located and interviewed in order to ascertain the purpose of the proposed trip and whether in fact Nechiporenko went to Vietnam and, if he did, what he did there. (A check of US records indicates that Nechiporenko, but not Mortin, has been located and recently interviewed by US authorities in Moscow. Nechiporenko has denied that his Hanoi travels were for the purpose of interrogation of US servicemen.)

8. TFR 1-17 through -21

a. Titles:

1. TFR 1-17 through -18/19 [Received by Post 5 October 1949 Document Number 575] is a letter dated 4 Oct 1949 from Alan Kirk in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to Andrei Gromyko of the Russian Foreign Ministry. In the letter, Alan Kirk inquires about the fate of 31 Americans, mostly women, who have been held in Soviet labor camps since the end of WWII hostilities.

2. TFR 1-20 and 21 [List of American Citizens, Who are Held for Compulsory Labor in the Soviet Union] is a list of 31 American women being held in Soviet labor camps.

b. Observations: Most of the individuals listed are women with German sounding names. These women were probably not in the U.S. armed services. It is not clear from these documents what happened to them, i.e. whether they were repatriated or remained in the Soviet Union.

c. Suggested follow-up: US military records should be checked to ascertain whether these women were in the U.S. armed forces. Then a thorough check should be made of State Department records to determine whether any of these women were ever repatriated. Subsequently, if appropriate, we might query the Russians for additional information.

9. TFR 1-22 through -25

a. Title: TFR 1-22 through -25 [Secretariat of Comrade I. V. Stalin Attention Comrade A. N. Poskrebyshev] is a 24 March 1945 letter from Lieutenant General Golubev to Stalin's assistant outlining how many American and British prisoners of war have been liberated from German POW camps in Poland. The letter also reports on numbers of US POWs liberated in other areas.

b. Observations: This detailed report lists the names of American and British servicemen who were liberated from German POW camps in Poland and subsequently sent by rail to Odessa for repatriation. The fact that detailed data on a small number of American and British POWS was sent directly to Stalin's office demonstrates the importance that the highest Soviet officials placed on this issue.

c. Suggested follow-up: The names on this list should be entered in our data base and checked against official US records to determine if these soldiers in fact were repatriated. Discrepancies could then be reconciled with the Russians.

10. TFR 1-26 and -27

a. Title: TFR 1-26 and -27 [To Comrade I.V. Stalin from Comrade Zhurlev] is a report to Stalin from Army General A. Zhurlev on the number of Allied and foreign prisoners and citizens liberated from German camps as of 20 March 1945.

b. Observations: This report does not list prisoners by name. Rather it is a summary of the effort to repatriate Allied servicemen. The report notes that there are a total of 160 English and American prisoners. Of the 160, there are 86 in the hospital. The general states that all the prisoners will eventually be shipped to Odessa. Again the report indicates that the most senior Soviet officials, including Stalin himself, were deeply concerned that the repatriation process go smoothly.

c. Suggested follow-up: None.

11. TFR 1-28a through -30

a. Titles:

1. TFR 1-28a and -28b [List of Repatriated to the Homeland of Those Liberated From Prisons by the Red Army of American POWS and Internees in 1944-1946] is signed by Colonel Luchkin, Deputy Chief, Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense on 24 January 1992. The document summarizes information on the repatriation of US servicemen liberated from German POW camps.

2. TFR 1-29a -29b and -29c [Report No. 154 on 1 December 1946] The second document is in reality two documents. The left side of the page is a list of the number of Soviet citizens repatriated from the Allied countries and on the right side a list of Allied soldiers repatriated back to the Allied nations as of 3/1/46.

3. TFR 1-30 [Telegram from Roosevelt to Harriman Connection with the Article by Pearson about the Escape of American Pilots and Internees in the USSR] is a translation from English of a telegram that President Roosevelt sent to Ambassador Harriman regarding articles by columnist Drew Pearson.

b. Observations: We note that the chart in Document TFR- 1-29b depicts 22,479 Americans out 22,487 as having been repatriated, and lists the remaining 8 Americans as "in USSR territory and groups of forces."

c. Suggested follow-up: The case of the eight Americans who were not repatriated as of 1 March 1946 should be examined. Who were these eight servicemen? Why were they not repatriated? What was their fate? One could deduce that "in ... groups of forces" implies that some may have joined the Red Army, but we cannot conclude this or anything else without Russian clarification, which we should seek.

Batch TFR 2.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION: This batch of 178 pages of documents consists of a sampling of records

from various Russian archives that deal primarily with events at the end of and immediately following WWII, as well as with a variety of Cold War incidents. Two documents deal with the Korean War. Only one document in this batch deals with the Vietnam War, the certificate of Russian name trace results of a US-provided list of 3,752 personnel, US and foreign known to be missing in Southeast Asia. This document and others (included in Appendix D) were prepared in 1992 to respond-to queries by the Commission. Of particular interest is one undated document that describes the "Central State Special Archive" which contains documents of the "Main Directorate on POW and Internee Affairs (GUPVI), USSR." This document provides a general description of that archive's holdings.

1. TFR 2-1, through -4

a. Titles:

1. TFR 2-1 is addressed to "Comrade Fokin, No 551-MOP" and relates to the transfer of testimony of prisoner **FARLER**. It is signed "Boguslavsky" and can be dated between 2 and 5 November 1951. No additional information regarding the identity of Prisoner **FARLER.**

2. TFR 2-2, is addressed to Soviet Army General Staff, General of the Army, Comrade Shtemenko but is not dated. The document states: "On December 1 of this year, in the area of Oberzell (20km southwest of Eisenach) **HAZENSTAL, ROBERT**, from the 24th Police Squad, 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment, voluntarily crossed the line of demarcation into Soviet occupation zone of Germany". Hazenstal does not wish to go to Korea and requests political asylum.

3. TFR 2-3, is a list of American, British and French military personnel detained by organs of the Ministry of State Security. The document list four Americans by name who were detained during 1949. The documents imply that three of the four individuals were returned to US authorities. The document lists **HEWING, WILFORD**, born 1919, as a deserter from the US Army who was detained, but does not state that he was released to US authorities.

4. TFR 2-4, is correspondence from one "Razuvayev" to Comrades Shtemenko and Vasilevsky, dated 21 January 1951 reporting the capture of US Army General **DEAN** by the North Koreans. Comrade Razuvayev is apparently either in North Korea or in touch with the North Koreans, who have asked for Soviet advice on "how to deal with Dean". General **DEAN** was returned to US authorities at a later date.

b. Observations: The memo concerning General **DEAN** again raises the germane question of Moscow's policy toward captured Americans in the hands of their North Korean ally.

c. Suggested follow-up: Assuming US archives do not clarify these cases, we should query the Russians as follows: were **HAZENSTAL** or **HEWING**, returned to US authorities? If so, when and where? If not, what is their whereabouts? What about **FARLER**? Why was he imprisoned? Was he released or repatriated? What policy guidance or operational guidance was sent to Razuvayev concerning General **DEAN**?

2. TFR 2-5/6, 2-7, 2-8.

a. Titles:

1. TFR 2-5/6, is a report from the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 12/28/50, and signed by TSINEV, KOPTELOV. The report states **"ARTHUR JOSEPH DE ROCHE**, a U.S. Army soldier,... remains in the custody of Soviet occupation forces in Austria, having crossed to the Soviet occupation zone for the purpose of seeking political asylum with us." The document goes on to say that **JOSEPH DE ROCHE** had been in custody under guard since 24 September 1950, but does not offer any information on the denouement of this matter.

2. TFR-2-7, is a report from the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs that states in part, "American soldier **KERRICK, GUY**, born 1920, was detained on 8 February 1949 while crossing the line of demarcation to

the Soviet zone. He deserted from the U.S. Army and requests asylum." The report recommends that **KERRICK** be returned to Western occupation forces since he is of no interest to Ministry of State Security entities. However, there is not evidence that this was ever done.

3. TFR-2-8, is a report from the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, signed by ILICHEV and dated 8/3/53. The report stated, "On the night of 2-3 August of this year Private **JOHNSON, CARLOS**, of the U.S. military forces born 1927, from North Carolina, crossed the demarcation line and presented himself to the military command of the city of Uhrfar." The second paragraph of the report states, "He served in U.S. forces in Korea and was twice wounded. He arrived in Austria in late June of 1953. In July he completed a month-long course for military scouts." The disposition of the **JOHNSON** matter can not be determined from the document.

b. Observations: None.

c. Suggested Follow-up: Determine from US archives if the **DE ROCHE, KERRICK and JOHNSON** cases were ever resolved. If not do the Russians have documentation which will help determine what became of these three personnel?

3. TFR 2-9 and -10

a. Title:

1. TFR 2-9 is an unintelligible handwritten note.

2. TFR 2-10 is a "Secret" report to the CPSU CC, originated by A. Grechko and dated 28 Sept 1973.

b. Observations: TFR 2-10 addresses a **MICHEAL DOUGH/DOE**, who fell off the USS Blue Ridge, and was recovered by a Soviet naval ship on 28 Sep 73. Grechko states that the Soviets have given the American first aid and are ready to transfer him back to the US side.

c. Suggested follow-up: Check US Navy data bases for the US record of this incident.

4. TFR 2-11 through -21

a. Titles:

1. TFR 2-11 is a 6 July 1947 memo documenting the exhumation of the remains of US Army Air Force SGT **THOMAS E. RING**. TFR-2-135 is a duplicate of this document.

2. TFR 2-12 through -21 is entitled "List of Interned American Airmen." The date and originator of this document is not marked.

b. Observations: TFR 2-12 through -21 lists 38 different aircrews from US aircraft that were interned in the USSR from March, 1942, to July, 1945. A total of 299 names are listed. The further disposition of 289 of these individuals is not given. There are notes concerning ten individuals of the 289. In aircrew #3, one individual, SGT **THOMAS RING**, is listed as not interned with his fellow crew members. In aircrew #33, one individual, Sergeant 1st Class **PAVEL UTCHEK**, is listed as killed from B-25 No. 5336158. In aircrew #34, Corporal **MATTHEW GLADEK** is listed as killed from B-25 No. 43-36160. In aircrew #35, one aircrew of six individuals is listed as having perished on 10 Jun 1945. This crew included **EDWARD IRVING**, **HARRY LORD**, **NATHAN ANZER**, **FRED BENEY**, **LES DENTON**, and **ROLAND ERNEYER**. In aircrew #37, one individual, Sergeant 1st Class **ORWELLY K. DIADD**, is listed as drowned.

c. Suggested follow-up: Who is the originator of this list? Does this represent a comprehensive listing of all US aircrews interned in the USSR during WWII? Were all of the aircrews turned over to the Tashkent center for repatriation to the US? If not, then where? US Air Force data bases should be queried to

determine the status of the 299 aircrew members listed in these documents. If US data bases do not reveal the status of these individuals, then queries should be directed to the archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior, and the Committee for State Security.

5. TFR 2-22 through -30

a. Titles:

1. TFR 2-22: This is a Communist Party Central Committee draft decree, dated 15 Sep 1956, marked "Secret" and "declassified", in response to a note from the US Embassy dated 13 September concerning an American Military aircraft which went down in the region near the City of Yerevan. The decree tasks the KGB and the Ministry of Defense to make arrangements to repatriate the remains of 6 crew members who died in the crash. The below listed documents all pertain to this incident.

2. TFR 2-23 is an appendix, marked "draft", originated possibly by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and is undated, but after 13 Sep 58.

3. TFR 2-24/26 is to the CPSU CC, Entry No. 2596, Copy No. 9. and is originated by USSR MFA, Department of the Countries of America and is dated 7 Dec 1958.

4. TFR 2-25 is to the CPSU CC, Entry No. 1977, Copy No. 9. and is originated from the USSR MFA, Department of the Countries of America and is dated 16 Sept 1958.

5. TFR 2-27 is to the CPSU CC, Entry No. 1125, Copy No. 10 and is originated by the USSR MFA, Department of the Countries of America and is dated 18 May 1959.

6. TFR 2-28 is to the CPSU CC, Entry No. 1930, Copy No. 11. and was originated by the USSR MFA, Department of the Countries of America and is dated 18 Aug 1959.

7. TFR 2-29/30 is a letter to Dear Mr. Nixon, Draft, copy No. 2062/GS and was originated ostensibly by N. Khrushchev undated, but after 1 August 1959.

b. Observations: These documents relate to the crash of an American C-130 near Yerevan, Armenia, on 2 Sep 58. The Soviet notes mention that the US side claims that the plane was shot down by Soviet fighters, which the Soviet side denies. The Soviet notes mention finding and returning the bodies of six Americans. The Soviet notes mention US claims that an additional 11 Americans were on board, parachuted out of the plane, and remain unaccounted for by the American side as of 1 Aug 59. None of these Americans are named. This is incident # 27 as described in the 1992 JCS-prepared document on Cold War incidents, which states that only four bodies were recovered. The JCS summary indicates that 13 other crew members remain unaccounted for.

c. Suggested follow-up: We should determine the names of the 13 unaccounted for crew members and query our Russian colleagues for further information on this incident. In addition, we should resolve the discrepancy between the Russian version that six bodies were recovered and the JCS summary which indicates that only four bodies were recovered.

6. TFR 2-31 through -71

a. Titles:

1. TFR 2-31 is a single page, probably an archivist's control sheet, on which appears the following: "This is a list of foreign citizens repatriated via Odessa up to 1945/8 and Groups of Forces from the USSR Ministry of the Armed Forces. The document also states, "Begun: 7 March 1945, and completed 2 January 1947, on 370 pages." However, no list of 370 pages is attached.

2. TFR 2-32 is a statement by an officer of the Red Army Guard Command, Lieutenant Colonel

Skriknikov and the senior officer of the Allied Army POW Camp, American Colonel **N. C. PILET** dated 11 August 1945, that attests to the repatriation of 1,383 Allied personnel from Mukden to Darien by rail. No names are listed.

3. TFR 2-33 through -71 is a collection of rosters, typed in English, of various American and third country nationals who are listed by name as evacuated from Camp Hoten, Mukden, Manchuria, by air and rail in August and September of 1945. The source is unknown as well as the exact date of the origination of the document.

b. Observations:

1. TFR 2-31 above is apparently a cover sheet for the attached lists. Although TFR 2-32 mentions a 370 page attachment, TFR 2-33 through -71 is only 38 pages. The rosters contained on TFR 2-33 through -71 list personnel evacuated by air before 10 August 1945, and personnel "leaving by train - September 11, 1945." TFR 2-32 indicates that these personnel were repatriated to the US and Allied nations.

2. TFR 2-33 through -71 contains the names, ln English, of numerous American personnel categorized by date and method of departure from Mukden, by rank, and branch of service. Some individuals are noted as British, Australian, Dutch, or other nationality.

c. Suggested follow-up: Did the US personnel actually return to US control? Initial research on this document should concentrate on US files to identify which of the US personnel did not actually return to US control. Then, names of personnel who remain unaccounted for by US data bases should be passed to the Russians for further research. We should also consider passing copies of this document to representatives of other concerned governments, assuming the Commission's ground rules do not preclude this.

7. TFR 2-72 through -73b

a. Title: TFR 2-72 through -73b is a letter to D. A. Volkogonov from N. Petukhov, Chairman of the Military Board, Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, dated 29 May 1992. Petukhov reports that materials of the Military board were examined. The letter notes that a special commission created by a decree of the CPUS CC Presidium dated 15 April 1953, examined the issue of releasing foreigners incarcerated in the Soviet Union and repatriating them. The special commission concluded that it would be possible to free 16,547 foreigners, the majority of whom were German prisoners of war. Petukhov notes that according to the Military Boards records, as of 1 August 1953 there were 8 Americans in USSR prisons. He does not state whether Military Board materials reveal their ultimate fate. Petukhov also discusses the list of foreign citizens (41 individuals) [see TRF 2-152/153] identified in Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) archives, who have names resembling those on a list provided by the US delegation. Petukhov reports that a search of Military Board records reveal information on three persons who have names similar to those identified in the search of the MVD archives. We have included the report in its entirety in Appendix D.

b. Observations:

1. Three individuals are listed by Petukhov whose names resemble the names of unaccounted for Americans. The ultimate status of the individuals is not given. The names listed are: **THOMAS, ROBERT** - (appears on the American list as **THOMAS ROBERT J.**); **MEYER, BENO EDWARD** - (appears on the American list as **MEYER, ELTON BENNO**); and **ROPER, JOHN TOMASOVICH** (appears on the American list as **ROBERTS, HAROLD J.**).

2. Petukhov notes that Military Board records show that there were eight US citizens in USSR prisons in 1953 but he does not state whether or not they were repatriated.

c. Suggested follow-up: Our Russian colleagues should be queried as to the ultimate fate of the individuals listed by name. The location of the archives which contain documents pertaining to these

individuals may contain information on other Americans and should be the subject of further research. We should specifically request the identification of the eight Americans who were imprisoned in 1953 and an accounting of their status.

8. TFR 2-74.

a. Title: This is an undated list of files, signed by the Deputy Director, Korotaiev, maintained by the Central State Special Archive Preserve documents of the Main Directorate on POW and Internal Affairs (GUPVI) of the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) of the USSR.

b. Observations: This document possibly was prepared for the Commission. The document does not give a status of research in support of the Joint US/Russian Commission on POW/MIA.

c. Suggested follow-up: Our Russian colleagues should be queried as to whether they have checked these files for information concerning American POW/MIAs. We have included it in its entirety in Appendix D.

9. TFR 2-75 through -92

a. Title: This document is an undated, 18 page, "Certificate according to documents of the collecting facilities and transit camps directorate from 1945 to 1953 about the presence of POW and interned US citizens." It is signed by "LTC Goncharev, 5th Department Chief," and possibly prepared in 1992 for the Commission. The document lists by name:

1. Deceased - 3

2. Left Camp Without Authorization - 1

3. Sent For Treatment in Military Hospital - 51

4. Individuals sent to Other Facilities - 5

5. No Further Information Available - 25

b. Observations: It will require considerable effort to determine how much of the information on the 60 persons listed by name the US has been aware of. In addition, we note that the document states that the Russians have data on a total of 2,901 US persons who were internees from 1945 to 1953. We have included this document in Appendix D.

c. Suggested follow-up: Query the Russians for the names of all 2,901 individuals. Research US files/archives to determine if all persons on the list of 2,901 have returned to the US.

10. TFR 2-93

a. Title: TFR 2-93 is a report from the Ministry of Government Security, dated 25 June 1952 and is directed to Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs USSR, Comrade Zorin, V.A. The report states, "Concerning the note from the American Embassy dated 18 June 1952 #689, we report that on 13 June 1952 at 1735 hours a US B-29 plane was shot down [by] a Soviet Air Force MIG-15 over our territorial Sea of Japan waters south of Valentin Bay. The location of the unidentified US plane debris mentioned in the American Embassy note (41 degrees 39 min. long, 133 degrees 55 min lat) is 80 miles south of the Valentin Bay, 105 miles east of the city of Vladivostok." No U.S. military personnel were mentioned in the document.

b. Observations: This incident corresponds to entry #8 on the U.S. JCS document "Summary of Cold War Losses." According to U.S. records, the crew of nine aboard the RB-29 shot down 13 June 1952 was lost, with no remains recovered.

c. Suggested follow-up: Do the Russians have any additional information regarding the incident? Research US military records to identify the crew members of the missing B-29. Query the Russians, using names, for any additional information.

II. TFR 2-94 through -99

a. Titles:

1. TFR 2-94 is an undated letter to the American Embassy, Moscow, from the government of the Soviet Union regarding the downing of an American airplane. The correspondence states in part, "According to verified data, on 29 July 1953 about 0700 hrs Vladivostok time, a four engine bomber (B50 type) with US insignia violated the official USSR border initially in the area of Cape Gamov and continued to fly over USSR territory around Ascold Island near Vladivstok."

2. TFR 2-95 is a letter handed to Comrade A.A. Gromyko by Ambassador Bolen of the American Embassy, Moscow dated 31 July 1953. The ambassador lodges a protest of the downing of an American RB-52 aircraft over the Sea of Japan. One of the pilots of the plane was rescued by a US ship. The ambassador notes that other crew members who survived were picked up by Soviet vessels in the area of the crash. He requested information on the condition of these other individuals and their repatriation.

3. TFR 2-96/97 is a Russian language note dated 3 Aug 53 regarding the downing of an American plane B-50 type on 29 July 1953. No US military personnel were listed in the document.

4. TFR 2-98/99 is a memorandum conveyed by US Ambassador [probably Bolen] to V.I. Molotov on 4 [Aug] 1953, reference "information available to the U.S. government regarding survivors of the incident involving the B-50 aircraft."

b. Observations: No U.S. military personnel are named in these documents. The incident corresponds to incident #11 on the 1992 JCS Summary of Cold War losses. US records indicate that there were 17 crew members on the RB-50, that two were later recovered dead, one was recovered alive, one was not recovered, fate known, and 13 were not recovered, fate unknown.

c. Suggested follow-up: Do the Russians have any additional information regarding the incident? Research U.S. military records to determine the identity of the unaccounted for crew members of the missing B-50 and provide details to the Russians for follow-up.

12. TFR 2-100a and -100b

a. Title: TFR-2-100 is a letter, classified "Secret", to USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Comrade A.A. Gromyko, through Ministry of Defense, Chief Naval Headquarters, 8 August 1953, through, MFA-USSR, Department of USA, 10 August 1953, through MFA-USSR, Gromyko, 8 August 1953, and signed by Chief, Main Headquarters. The note states:

"The assertion contained in the U. S . note dated 5 August 1953 that on 29 July of this year 12 Soviet "PT" type vessels were observed in an area where the co-pilot of a US B-50 airplane had been found by an American surface vessel, and that these Soviet vessels were allegedly engaged in picking up the other members of the crew who survived the crash, has no basis in reality."

b. Observations: This note relates to the incident described in TFR 2-99.

c. Suggested follow-up: None

13. TFR 2-101

a. Title: TFR-1-100 is a note, classified "Secret", to Comrade A.A. Gromyko, and signed by G. Tunkin and V. Bazykin dated 24 November 1954. The note states:

"Enclosed please find drafts of memoranda in the CPSU Central Committee, Decrees and a note to the U.S. government in response to its note of 9 October 1954 regarding an incident involving an American aircraft that violated the national borders of the USSR in the vicinity of Vladivostok."

b. Observations: This document relates to the incident described on TFR 2-99.

c. Suggested follow-up: None

14. TFR 2-102 and -103

a. Title: TFR 2-102 and -103 is an information paper, classified "Secret" dated [no day] November 1954, regarding the note from the U.S. government, dated 9 November 1954, regarding the incident involving an American military B-50 airplane that violated the national border of the USSR in the vicinity of Vladivostok.

b. Observations: This document relates to the incident described on TFR 2-99.

c. Suggested follow-up: None

15. TFR 2-104

a. Title:

TFR 2-104 is a cover note, classified "Secret", covering the draft note to the US government which states "On a response to the US government note of 9 October 1954."

b. Observations: This document relates to the incident described on TFR 2-99.

c. Suggested follow-up: None

8 July 1992

ORGANIZATION AND CONCEPT OF OPERATION FOR FOR THE TASK FORCE TO SUPPORT THE JOINT US/RUSSIAN POW-MIA COMMISSION

1. The purpose of this concept paper is to describe the organization and operation of the Task Force to fulfill the Secretary of the Army's responsibility as the DoD Executive Agent for support to the Joint US/Russian POW-MIA Commission. The Task Force will have representation from all services and will operate under the direct supervision of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and the overall supervision of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). It will be located in the Washington, D.C. area, in space yet to be determined.

2. The organizational diagram of the Task Force is attached as Enclosure 1. The Task Force will consist of a Moscow office which will interview Soviet citizens having knowledge of US POWMIAs and collect relevant documents from the Russian archives. The Moscow office will also be required to provide support to the American delegation to the Joint US/Russian POW-MIA Commission when they are in Moscow. The Moscow office will consist of 10 personnel, as shown in Enclosure 2.

3. The remainder of the Task Force will be located in Washington and will be organized into a Translation Cell, an Analysis and Production Unit, a Collection Management Cell, a Correspondence Cell, and an Administrative Support Office. The organization will be manned by military and civilian personnel drawn from the three services and DIA. The initial strength of the Washington office will be 17 personnel, with growth to 30 personnel when required.

4. The Analysis and Production Unit will perform two Functions:

a. As material from interviews or archives is collected in Moscow, it will be returned to the U.S. where it will be translated (when required) and analyzed. Where sufficient identifying information pointing to specific MIA/POW cases exists, a case file will be established and assigned to an analyst. If sufficient information is not available for productive analysis, the material will be returned to the data base and re-examined periodically as additional information becomes available. The analyst will perform the detective work necessary to gather relevant information from all data bases in order to make a final determination in regard to the disposition of the case. The Collection Management Office will support the analysts by providing a conduit to all available agencies that can provide information in support of the effort. Researchers within the Analysis and Production Unit will also research U.S. Casualty archives to provide U.S. substantiation for each case as necessary. The services or other appropriate agencies will be queried for information as required. When the Task Force analytical effort determines that sufficient credible information exists that relates to a specific POW/MIA case, (and that all leads have been pursued and all necessary sources have been consulted), the information will be passed to the Casualty and Memorial Affairs Operations Center (CMAOC), PERSCOM for appropriate action, as well as to the ASD/ISA. Should Commission/Task Force efforts result in the location of U.S. remains, a CILHI element would temporarily augment the Moscow office of the Task Force to coordinate plans with their Russian counterparts to recover any remains identified by the Task Force.

b. The second function of the Analysis and Production Unit will be the preparation of reports as required to support the Commission members. Reports will include, but not be limited to, biweekly or appropriate periodic reports dealing with substantive results of the analysis, talking papers to support the periodic meetings of the Commission, and comprehensive reports summarizing the results of Task Force efforts (i.e., an annual report).

5. The Task Force must plan for the capability to process a potentially large number of documents that may be made available from the Russian archives. This will require a system which can image each document and also scan the document into a digital data base. Artificial intelligence software will be required to allow queries against the data base on the basis of names, places, key words and phrases, etc. The data base and the artificial intelligence software must have the capability to operate in both the Cyrillic and the English alphabets to allow immediate exploitation of documents before they are fully translated. The Task Force will require a high capacity local area network capable of moving large numbers of documents electronically between analysts, collection managers and the data base. The development and initial operation of this capability can be accomplished with the guidance and assistance of in-house, DA assets; however, some level of contractor support will be required from the onset. Similarly, while we will initially depend upon in-house translation capabilities, the volume of documents received from Russia could require contractor support.

6. Finally, we cannot rule out the possibility that the mission will outgrow this initial concept of organization. Most specifically, we have not included a field interview cell in the initial scoping of the Conus TF Headquarters, although it would seem likely that our efforts could quickly uncover numerous volunteers from among the U.S. Russian emigre community who might volunteer information that will require us to conduct interviews. For as long as feasible, we will use personnel from the Analysis and Production Unit to conduct such interviews.

/signed/ Encls. STUART A. HERRINGTON

COL, GS

Interim Director, Joint Task

Force Russia (POW/MIA)

Moscow Office:

Chief (1 COL)

Field Interviewers (3 MAJ)

Archivist (1 GS-16)*

Historian/Sovietologist (1 LTC)*

Senior Admin NOC (1 SFC)

Files/Admin Clerk (1 SGT)

Interpreter/Interviewer (1 CPT)

Secretary (1 LN)*

* Personnel will work at Russian office,

Joint Commission

Task Force Russia

Task Organization


TF HQ
(3)
CORRES.
CELL
(3)
MOSCOW
OFFICE
(10)
OPNS
OFF
(5)
CHIEF OF
SUPPORT
OPNS
NCO

TRANS	ANAL/	COLLECT	DATA BASE
CELL	PROD	MGMT	SUPPORT
(4)	(8)	(2)	(3)

16. TFR 2-105 and -106

a. Title: TFR-2-105 and -106 is a draft report regarding the circumstances surrounding the violation of USSR borders by an American B-50 airplane in the vicinity of Vladivostok on 29 July 1953.

b. Observations: This document relates to the incident described on TFR 2-99.

c. Suggested follow-up: None

17. TFR 2-107 through -114

a. Titles:

1. TFR 2-107 is a letter "To the Director of US Department of MID USSR Comrade Baxin from the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) dated 8 September 1955. It reports that US citizens: **HOPKINS FREDERICH-CHARLES, KUMISH WILFRED**, and **FIELDE MURRAY** also known as **FEINGERSH**, were released early from places were they were imprisoned by the order of [the] Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated 22 August 1955, to a US government representative, in Berlin on 05 September 1955.

2. TFR 2-108 is a report to the Deputy Minister of International Affairs (MID), V.A. Zorin, from the USSR Committee of Government Security(KGB) dated 28 October 1955. The report stated, "**BAUMEISTER**, also known as **BOMISTER-BOMEISTER WILLIAM, WILLY, GEORGE**, was not found to be among the arrested and serving terms on the USSR Territory."

3. TFR 2-109 is a letter to the Director of the Main Directorate of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR to Deputy chief, American Country Department dated 20 December 1955. The letter states, "The American Embassy in Moscow addressed the MID of the USSR with a new note containing a request for information concerning an American citizen named BAUMEISTER who was allegedly arrested in the Soviet Union. The note firmly states the BAUMEISTER worked at one of the foundries near the city of Kuibishev in 1949."

4. TFR 2-110 is a letter to Department Chief, American Countries Department, MID, USSR, from KGB under the Council of the Ministry of the USSR dated 21 December 1955. The letter states "As a result of conducting additional checks, **BAUMEISTER, WILLIAM** was not found to be residing in the city of Kuibishev or Kuibishev area."

5. TFR 2-111 through -112/3 is a note from the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 4 Feb 1956. The note states, in part, that the US citizens **CHARLES DEMMLER, WIRTH ELIZABETH THOMPSON**, [TN: this could be a woman named **ELIZABETH THOMPSON WIRTH**], **WILLIAM GEORGE BAUMEISTER, SERNI (OR JERI, CHARNI, CHERNI, CHENEY)** and **(KUSHMAN,**

KOCHMAN) are not located on the territory of the USSR. The note also states that US citizen **RICHARD S. WINTER** was not detained by Soviet authorities. The note also mentions that a decision has been made to release **SYDNEY RAY SPARKS** from prison and pass him to the American authorities.

6. TFR 2-114 is a letter, classified "Secret" to Deputy of Foreign Affairs, USSR, Comrade Gromyko, from the USSR, Ministry of Internal Affairs dated 22 February 1956. The letter reports that the **SYDNEY RAY SPARKS** was handed over to an American government representative on 17 February 1956 in Berlin.

b. Observations: Even though these Cold War era internal checks by the Soviet bureaucracy for the presence of specific U.S. citizens were negative, we should regard the new political climate as a favorable opportunity to re-query the unresolved cases.

c. Suggested follow-up: Research State Department and other appropriate files to determine which of the above personnel were located and which were not. Research Russian archives, using specific names of those who are unaccounted for to determine what became of those who were never located.

18. TFR 2-115 through -121

a. Titles:

1. TFR 2-115 is a "MEMORANDUM on the repatriation of military personnel and interned U.S. citizens from captivity by forces of the Red Army, 1944-1946", dated 24 January 1992, and signed by COLONEL LUCHKIN, Deputy Chief, Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense. It states, "As of 1 March 1946 a total of 1,016,588 individuals, including 22,479 U.S. citizens, were returned to their homelands." The document also refers to three transit camps in Odessa, #s 138, 139, and 186, that were used to process Allied POWs. No names or identifications of any US citizen were listed. The memo also states, "Photocopies of the archival records related to this issue are attached." We have included this document in its entirety in Appendix D.

2. TFR 2-117 thru 2-120 is a "Report on the organization of transit camps and a transfer point in the city of Odessa as of 22 March 1945." The report is dated 21 March, 1945. No names or identifications of any U.S. citizens were listed. The report was directed to Deputy Chief, Red Army, Rear Echelon, General-Colonel Vinogradov.

3. TFR 2-121 is a duplicate of TFR 1-29.

b. Observations: The 1992 summary document deals exclusively with the big picture of the Allied POW problem at the WWII.

c. Suggested Follow-up:

1. TFR 1-29/2-121 state that eight US citizens who were freed apparently remained either in USSR territory and in "groups of forces". What does this mean? Why did they not go home? Can the Russians provide a list of names of these 8 Americans and/or will they permit access to the archives to search for the identifies of these individuals?

2. Finally, we should attempt to located and access the archives of camps 138, 139, and 186, as well as determine the identities and location of other such camps.

19. TFR 2-122 through -123/124

a. Title: This document is a report Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade A.M. Vasilievsky dated 20 November 1951. The report describes the forcing down in Hungary of an American transport aircraft from the 85th Base Supply Group, 12th Air Army. The crew was to deliver a cargo from ERDING

airfield, 30 km northeast of MUNICH, to BELGRADE. The aircraft was commanded by **Captain HANDERSON.**

b. Observations: This incident corresponds to incident #5 of the US JCS "Summary of Cold War losses" document. The U.S. document confirms that a C-47 aircraft went down in Hungary on 18 November 1951 with 4 crew members on board, all of whom were repatriated.

c. Suggested follow-up: None.

20. TFR 2-125 through -129

a. Titles:

1. TFR 2-125 is a draft Top Secret DECREE of the PRESIDIUM of CPSU Central Committee regarding the possible release of US citizens **MARCHUK, VERDIN and NOBLE** in conjunction with the possible release by the US of a detained Soviet diplomat, Rastvorov. The date of the document was not given.

2. TFR 2-126 is a report from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, CENTRAL COMMITTEE, classified TOP SECRET, to Comrade MOLOTOV (MFA), dated 31 December 1954. The document authorized the transfer of the US citizens **MARCHUK and NOBLE** to US authorities in Berlin and the transfer of citizen **VERDIN** 2 to 3 weeks after **MARCHUK** and **NOBLE** were released.

3. TFR 2-127 and -128 is a secret report from V. Molotov, dated December, 1954 addressed to the CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU, regarding a U.S. memorandum dated 23 October and a US diplomatic note dated 29 December from the US Ambassador, Bolen, regarding the release of U.S. citizens **MARCHUK, VERDIN** and **NOBLE**.

4. TFR 2-129 is an undated decree of the CPSU Central Committee. It authorizes the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs to transfer **MARCHUK, VERDIN and NOBLE** to US authorities.

b. Observations: Based on the documentation, it appears that the Soviets intended to transfer **MARCHUK, VERDIN** and **NOBLE** were released to U.S. authorities early in 1955. However, no documents confirm that the transfer took place.

c. Suggested Follow-up: Check with the US Department of State. Were **MARCHUK, VERDIN** and **NOBLE** transferred to US authorities early in 1955 as the records imply? If not, pursue the matter.

21. TFR 2-130 through -142

a. Titles:

1. TRF 2-130 and -131 is a note dated 8 January 1947 from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR to the Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR. The note identifies the burial sites of three US airmen, **THOMAS RING, PAVEL UTCHEK,** and **MATTHEW M. GLADEK**, who were interned along with fellow crew members in the Soviet Far East. The document states that the other crew members were handed over to the Americans through the Tashkent internment camp. The document also states that crew members of B-25, 44-29148, which crashed on 10 June 1945, north of the Cape of Lopatka, are buried in Kamchatka. These personnel are: **CAPTAIN EDWARD J. IRVING, CAPTAIN J. NATHAN ANZER (EJZER), LT. NERD (ORVILLE H. LORD), SGT FRED VENE (FREDERICK A. LANG), CPL ROLAND (ROLAND R. ERNGER), CPL LES NAKE-DENTON (LESLIE K. DENTON, JR./II).**

2. TFR 2-132 is a transmittal document dated 2 oct 47 from the Chief of Staff of the Far East Military District regarding exhumation and transfer of remains described in TFR-2133.

3. TFR 2-133 is an affidavit, marked K9099S and 60, signed by Captain Romashev, dated 6 July 1947.

This document provides details of the exhumation and transfer by ship of the remains of **MATTHEW M. GLADEK**.

4. TFR 2-134 is another affidavit, marked K9099S and 61, signed by Captain Romashev, dated 6 July 1947. This document provides details of the exhumation and transfer by ship of the remains of **PAVEL UTCHEK**.

5. TFR 2-135 is another affidavit, marked K9099S and 62, signed by Captain Romashev, dated 6 July 1947. This document provides details of the exhumation and transfer by ship of the remains of **THOMAS E. RING**.

6. TFR 2-136 is the transfer document, marked K9099S and 63, signed by Captain Romashev, dated 12 July 1947, for the remains of the three Americans, **GLADEK, UTCHEK and RING**, to the steamer "Zyryanin".

7. TFR 2-137 and -138 is a duplicate of TFR 2-130/1 and -131.

8. TFR 2-139 is a duplicate of TFR 2-136.

9. TFR 2-140 is a duplicate of TFR 2-132.

10. TFR 2-141 is a duplicate of TFR 2-133.

b. Observations: These documents indicate that the remains of **RING, UTCHEK, and GLADEK**, were intended to be transferred to US authorities. However, the documents do not indicate that the remains of the airmen listed on TFR 2-132 were transferred to US control.

c. Suggested follow-up: Check US records for receipt of the remains of **RING, UTCHEK, and GLADEK.** Check US records to determine if the remains of the crew of the B-25 that crashed 10 June 1945 were ever exhumed and registered. If not, we should pursue this matter. Check US records of air crews to determine the fate of the service members noted as being transferred to American control through a Soviet camp in Tashkent.

22. TFR 2-143 through -148

a. Titles:

1. TFR 2-143 is a report from the CPSU Central Committee, signed by "M. Konev" which states, "On 27 June 1958 at 18:30 the national border of the USSR was violated by a Douglas C-118A American military transport airplane in an area 30 miles south of Yerevan. It penetrated up to 170 km into USSR territory." The aircraft was forced down by Soviet fighters. The report goes on to say, "On 7 July 1958, the intruder aircraft's crew of nine individuals was transferred by representatives of the USSR border troops to representatives of the U.S. military command in Iran."

2. TFR 2-144, dated June 1953, from "Sokolovsky" and "Yakovlev", mentions that a US C-118A aircraft was commanded by Major **LYLES,** and belonged to the 7405th Squadron of the 710th Military Transport Group from Wiesbaden AF base in West Germany.

3. TFR 2-145 from the USSR Air Defense Forces dated 7 July 1958, addresses the same incident but adds that two of the nine servicemen on board received minor burns. The report goes on to say the, "Aboard the intruder aircraft were: Colonel **BRENNER,** Major **LAILS [LYLES], ALDAN** and [illegible, **PRAMS or PRANS ?], Captain KEIM,** Lieutenant [illegible], a sergeant and two U.S. Army enlisted men." Further, five persons parachuted from the aircraft and four persons landed with the burning wreck.

4. TFR 2-146 is from the CPSU Central Committee, dated 25 June 1963, dealing with a US request to, "facilitate the return of two members of the crew of a US military helicopter that performed a "forced

landing" on the territory of the KNDR [Korean Democratic Republic] on 17 May of this year [1963]. The document is attributed to "A. Gromyko." The document also reveals that the crew was taken to Kirovobad for questioning.

5. TFR-2-147 is a "Secret" (probably Ministry of Foreign Affairs) note instructing the Soviet Ambassador to deliver a note to the North Koreans to "facilitate the return of American citizens Captain **BEN WICKLEY STATTS** [spelling of name uncertain] and Captain CARELTON VOLTZ, crew members of a US military helicopter that performed a forced landing on territory of the Korean People's Democratic Republic" on or about 17 May 1963.

6. TFR-2-148 is a "Top Secret" report from the CPSU, Central Committee to Comrades Syslov, Andropov, Gromyko regarding the American request for support in gaining the release if the two downed crew members in North Korea. The identity of any American service personnel was not presented.

b. Observations: Both the C-118a incident and the helicopter incident are confirmed by the US JCS Summary of Cold War Losses. In both cases the crew members were fully accounted for.

c. Suggested follow-up: None.

23. TFR 2-149/150 through -151

a. Title: TFR 2-149/150 through -151 is entitled "List of US citizens mentioned in documents found in the archives of the Central Committee Politburo." The document is not dated, but it may have been recently prepared in support of the Commission's work. The document contains 18 entries, of which seven were American military deserters or detainees who are described as having been "released to American authorities" or "departed for a European country." These personnel are:

RUNK CARL

PRUSTER, CHARLES

DOW, MICHAEL

BAILEY, RICHARD

ANDERSON, WILLIAM

BERILL, MICHAEL

LINDNER, ANTHONY

We have included this document in its entirety in Appendix D.

b. Observations:

1. Of particular interest in this document is entry #11, **"American parachutist;** Taken into custody on 24 September 1950 in the area of Vladivostok (no further information available)."

2. In addition, while outside the scope of or specific POW/MIA charter, two entries are of interest **ALFRED T. MESCHTER** and **ALBERT WILLIS**, both described as "American officials" who "September, 1949 (were) aboard the commercial vessel "Kimbol R. Smith". Both entries are annotated "Competent authority for this case is the People's Democratic Republic of Korea". While we see our charter as POW/MIA cases, the matters of **MESCHTER** and **WILLIS**, described as American officials, pose the related issue of civilian detainees. We will, unless otherwise directed, pursue such cases when it appears advisable.

c. Suggested follow-up: Check DOD records to determine if the four deserters from the Intrepid and the three other military personnel listed in this document have been repatriated or if they are on any list of unaccounted for personnel. Check with Department of State and other agencies concerning any incident involving the commercial vessel "Kimbol R. Smith" and determine if **MESCHTER** and **WILLIS** have ever been accounted for. Query DOD and non-DOD agencies for any information that could be related to the "American parachutist" who was taken into custody. Confirm from US records that other detainees/deserters mentioned are not carried as unaccounted for.

24. TFR-2-152/153

a. Title: TFR-2-152/3, entitled "Certificate", signed by Colonel G. L. Lezhikov from the State Information Center, dated 14 May 1992, states in part: "A check of a list of 3,752 US servicemen missing in action in Southeast Asia, and other foreigners, against the records in action of the Main Information Center of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Internal Affairs, has established a similarity in the records for 41 individuals who have undergone accounting by last name and who were sentenced for various offenses during the period of 1922 through 1968."

b. Observations: The document lists the 41 individuals by name but does not provide any additional information, other than what may be a file number. Not only is this one of the only documents that possibly pertains to the Vietnam War, but it is also the sole document whose time span extends to the pre-WWII era. We have included this document in its entirety in Appendix D.

c. Suggested follow-up: We should strive to obtain additional information about the 41 persons listed, with our first priority being to isolate which of the 41 persons might conceivably be a match to any of our unaccounted for Vietnam War service members, as well as those who might be associated with the Korean War, the Cold War, or WWII. We should pursue this issue by querying the Russians as follows:

1. What is the status of the 41 identified individuals?

2. Where are the records which were used to generate the document regarding these 41 persons?

3. Will the Russians provide additional facts to be used for cross-reference purposes?

25. TFR 2-154 through -178

a. Title: This document is entitled "List of American Prisoners of War (data from 1950-51)." The originator is not given. The document consists of 510 names and ranks of Americans plus a "List of servicemen, for whom information on nationality is not available" consisting of 25 names and birth dates. We presume that the list is from the Korean War.

b. Observations: As we translated and evaluated these first archives to come into our hands, it was a handicap when we encountered documents for which we do not know the origin or context.

c. Suggested follow-up: What is the source of the list of 535 military personnel with data from 1950-51? Is the list of 535 military personnel from the Korean War? Do the Russians have any records on the status of any/all of the 535 military personnel on the list? Research US military records/archives to learn if any/all of the 535 personnel are accounted for.

26. TFR-2-179

a. Title:

TFR-2-179 (memorandum for record) is a duplicate of TFR-2-95.

Batch TFR 3: GENERAL DESCRIPTION: 82 pages of documentation given by Gen-Col Volkogonov to US representatives in Moscow on 12 Jun 92.

1. TFR 3-1 through -12

a. Titles:

1. TFR 3-1 is a handwritten notation that four"comrades," Suslov, Shelepin, Mazurov, and Voronev voted "for" an unspecified issue and that "Comrade Yu. V. Andropov has been informed."

2. TFR 3-2 and -3 [10 November 1967 Document 2751-A] is a Top Secret memorandum from KGB Chief Yurii Andropov to the Central Committee discussing the situation surrounding four IJS Navy deserters who are seeking transportation to Europe. The major issue discussed is the Japanese pacifist organization "Bejhejren" proposal to get the deserters to the Soviet Union from Japan. Andropov reports that this can be done on the Soviet steamer "Baikal."

3. TFR 3-4 is a note that says, "To the members of the Politburo for a vote" and is dated 15 November 1967.

4. TFR 3-5 and -6 [14 November 1967 Document 2771-A] is a memorandum from KGB Chief Yurii Andropov discussing in additional detail the use of the Navy deserters in propaganda efforts directed against the United States.

5. TFR 3-7 and -8 is entitled "... Against American Aggression in Vietnam." The first page is a routing slip to Politburo members on which the members noted their approval for the steps outlined and suggested by Andropov. The second page, dated 17 November 1967, simply says "to be sent to members of the Politburo CC CPSU for a Vote".

6. TFR 3-9 and -10 [25 November 1967 Document 2874A] is a Top Secret KGB after-action report of the effect of the Navy deserters on world opinion. It is also a proposal for addition psychological operations activities against the war in Vietnam.

7. TFR 3-11 is a "Strictly Secret" Extract from the minutes No. 73 of the Meeting of the Politburo Central Committee CPSU from 11 March 1968 instructing the "Soviet Committee for Solidarity with the Countries of Asia and Africa" to take propaganda advantage of the presence of the four Navy deserters.

8. TFR 3-12 is a routing slip to Politburo members and is dated 29 April 1968.

b. Observations: These documents deal with four US Navy deserters from the USS Intrepid who opposed the war in Vietnam and wanted transportation to Europe where they hoped to gain political asylum. Furthermore, these documents discuss the plans of the Japanese pacifist organization and the Soviet KGB to exploit these desertions for political purposes. The sailors mentioned in this case are:

1. **RICHARD D. BAILEY** 2. **CRAIG WILLIAM ANDERSON**

3. **JOHN MICHAEL BERILLA**

4. **MICHAEL ANTON LINDNER**

c. Suggested follow-up: Confirm that none of the sailors is carried on any lists of Vietnam-era servicemen who are not accounted for.

2. TFR 3-13-16

a. Titles:

1. TFR 3-13 and -14/15 [24 February 1968 Document No. 438-A] is a Top Secret report from KGB Chief Yurii Andropov, dated 24 Feb 1968.

2. TFR 3-16 is a routing slip to Politburo members dated 15 May 1968.

b. Observations:

1. This is a report from Yurii Andropov that the Japanese pacifist organization Bejhejren had three US Army soldiers who had deserted to protest the Vietnam War. The Bejhejren wanted to send them through the Soviet Union to Europe. Unnamed in the letter is another American soldier of Korean heritage who the Bejhejren had sent to Hong Kong in preparation to sending him on to North Korea. The US personnel mentioned are: Corporal **I. L. KNEM**, Private **E. S. ARNEMM [ARNETT]**, and Private **F. E. KOLLIKOM.**

2. One significant statement is contained in the body of the document, "The Committee of State Security should inform the Committee "Peace to Vietnam" IOSOKAVA, that the Soviet Union can not at the present time permit the illegal transfer of American deserters on Soviet transport means." This reflects a change in the Soviet approach from late 1967 when the "Baikal" was used to transport four US Navy deserters from Japan to the USSR. However, the document goes on to say that if the committee is able to find other means (for example, by a Japanese fishing vessel from Hokkaido Island), then the Soviet side will not interpose any obstacles. (See TFR 3-1-13)

c. Suggested follow-up: Check US files on deserters to determine the possible identity of the unnamed soldier who was supposed to go to Korea. What happened to the other three soldiers? A check of newspaper and magazine articles from the period might assist in determining whether the individuals in question moved to Western Europe, returned to the United States, or returned to the Soviet Union.

3. TFR 3-17 through -20

a. Titles:

1. TFR 3-17 and -18 is a Top Secret memorandum from KGB Chief Yurii Andropov to the Central Committee dated 28 April 1968, in which he discusses the plans of the Japanese pacifist group Bejhejren to transport six American deserters to the Soviet Union.

2. TFR 3-19 and -20 is a Top Secret memorandum from KGB Chief Yurii Andropov and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to the Central Committee dated 13 May 1968 on the actions of the six American deserters in the Soviet Union and plans to exploit them for propaganda purposes.

b. Observations: Six military deserters with the help of the Japanese pacifist organization Bejhejren made their way to the Soviet Union and subsequently were sent on to Moscow. Three of the deserters wanted to settle in Finland, one in Sweden, one in Canada. These persons were not identified. One, named as **KENNETH GRIGGS (XIM DZHIN SU)**, who was apparently a Korean-American, expressed a desire to receive a higher education in the Soviet Union or one of the other European socialist countries. He contacted with the North Korean embassy in Moscow.

c. Suggested follow-up: Who were the other five soldiers? Did KENNETH GRIGGS stay on in school in the Soviet Union? Check with US Department of State and DOD records on the status of these individuals. If unknown, then query the Russians.

4. TFR 3-21

a. Title: TFR 3-21 is a Top Secret memorandum from KGB Chief Yurii Andropov to the Central Committee dated 11 June 1968, alerting the reader to the fact that the Japanese pacifist organization Bejhejren was planning to transport three American deserters to the Soviet Union. Andropov suggests in the document that the Soviet Union use these deserters for propaganda purposes.

b. Observations: No names or other details on these three deserters were provided, but it is of interest to note that the document states that "the organization of welcoming and hosting of American servicemen in

the Soviet Union is assigned to the SCSV."

c. Suggested follow-up: Who were these three deserters? What was their fate? Check open sources for possible press conferences held by deserters in Moscow. Check military police records for names of U.S. military deserters. We should query our Russian colleagues on the meaning of the abbreviation "SCSV." The archives of "SCSV" could be of interest to our mission.

5. TFR 3-22 and -23

a. Titles:

1. TFR 3-22 is a "Strictly Secret" cover memo dated 14 Aug 56. It is an extract from the proceedings of the 9 Aug 56 session of the Presidium of the Central Committee, and covers the Soviet response to the US Embassy's 16 July 1956 official query about missing US troops.

2. TFR 3-23 is the response of the Soviet Government to the inquiry from the US Embassy. It is a denial of the "supposition expressed in the Embassy's note regarding the detention of American servicemen in the Soviet Union."

b. Observations: This is a cover note and a copy of the official response to a note from the US Embassy in Moscow asking about the whereabouts of U.S. servicemen in the Soviet Union. The Soviets, in their official response, deny that there are any American servicemen in the Soviet Union. They blame rumors of the presence of servicemen on those who want to destroy US/Soviet relations.

c. Suggested follow-up: It would be useful locate the minutes of any Presidium meetings that were held from the time of the receipt by the Soviet government of the 16 July 1956 US note to the time of the 9 August Presidium session. We cannot (given the Cold War context) accept at face value the reply of the Presidium. Therefore the internal debate within the Presidium triggered by the US note might reveal other information concerning US persons.

6. TFR 3-24 through -34

a. Title: TFR 3-24 through -34 is a list entitled, "List of Military Flight Personnel of the Air Forces of the USA, Who Took Part in Combat Actions in North Korea in 1950-1953, Evidence of Which was Extracted from Documents of the 64th Aviation Interceptor Corps." This is a list of names of US POWs compiled by the 64th Aviation Interceptor Corps.

b. Observations: This is a list of 71 names of US military personnel who were shot down in North Korea. At least three of the 71 names were listed as having been killed. It is unclear how the 64th Aviation Interceptor Corps obtained this information - directly or from the North Koreans. This list, which was compiled in June 1992, does not mention the ultimate fate of the listed airmen.

c. Suggested follow-up:

1. What happened to the listed 71 names? Check US government records to determine if any of the 71 listed personnel are still unaccounted for. Pass the list to DOD for dissemination to those organizations responsible for the Korean War casualty accounting mission.

2. Research with the assistance of our Russian colleagues the "64th Aviation Interceptor Corps." If this was Soviet unit that served in North Korea or contiguous areas and fought with or advised the North Koreans, we should initiate a search for its archives. These archives could be useful in accomplishing our mission.

7. TFR 3-35 through -44

a. Titles:

1. TFR 3-35, is a brief recapitulation of the case of an Army deserter **SIDNEY RAY SPARKS**.

2. TFR 3-36-37 is a handwritten note in Russian from **SIDNEY RAY SPARKS** dated 1 April 1954 in which he describes his defection and subsequent arrest.

3. TFR 3-38-39 is a copy of the court verdict against **SIDNEY RAY SPARKS** dated 27 February 1954.

4. TFR 3-40-41 [Determination No. 91/94] dated 2 February 1954 is a copy of the court verdict refusing to lower the prison term of **SIDNEY RAY SPARKS** from 15 years.

5. TFR 3-42-43 [Determination No. ln-012244] dated 25 October 1955 is a copy of the court verdict lowering **SIDNEY RAY SPARKS** jail term to 5 years in prison.

6. TFR 3-44 [To the Chairman of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR In Regard to 12 li-012244/55/028346] dated 19 March 1956 is a statement from V. Kondrat'ev that **SIDNEY RAY SPARKS** was handed over to American officials.

b. Observations: These documents describe the case of **SIDNEY RAY SPARKS** who in 1951 deserted from the American Army in Germany. He crossed over into East Germany where he asked for political asylum. Later in 1954, he was arrested by the Soviets for spying and sentenced to 15 years in prison. In 1956 he was released and returned to the United States.

c. Suggested follow-up: Confirm with US records that Ray was returned to the United States authorities as Soviet documents suggest. If not, pursue the matter.

8. TFR 3-45 through -54

TFR 3-45 through -54, [Internment of American Flyers, USSR] is a duplicate list of American airmen interned in the Soviet Union from 1942 until 1945.

9. TFR 3-55 and -56

This is a duplicate of TFR 2-143 through -145 concerning the 27 June 1958 force down of a USAF C-118 aircraft.

10. TFR 3-58 through -76

TFR 3-58 through -74 [List of Documentary Materials from Archival Fonds of the Commanders of Defense Points and Transit Camps for 1945 - 1953] is a duplicate of a document found in TFR 2-75 through -92.

11. TFR 3-75/76 is a duplicate of TFR 2-137.

12. TFR 3-76 through -81

TFR 3-76-81 are duplicates of documents found in TFR 2-138 through -142.

Batch #4.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION. 20 pages of documentation. Fourteen pages of the total given by Mr. Barranikov (1st Deputy to Internal Security Head) and Gen-Col Volkogonov to Ambassador Toon, Chairman of US delegation; remaining six pages given by Mr. Kozlov, (Deputy Head of Russian delegation) to Commission member, Ms. Peterson. All documents received in Moscow, 26 Jun 92.

1. TFR 4-1 through -6/7

Titles:

1. TFR 4-1 is a resolution of the Presidium dated 24 January 1961 over the title of the Chairman of the Presidium, L. Brezhnev, which releases Captains OLMSTEAD and MCCOWEN from criminal responsibility and directs that they be handed over to the United States.

2. TFR 4-2 is a statement signed on 25 January 1961 by both U.S. and Soviet officials, verifying that **OLMSTEAD** and **MCCOWEN** were transferred to US custody.

3. TFR 4-3 and -4 is a "Resolution on closing the case," dated 28 January 1961 signed by a senior investigator of the KGB. The resolution recounts the Soviet version of events regarding how **OLMSTEAD and MCCOWEN** fell into Soviet hands. According to the resolution, on 1 July 1961 a RB-47 aircraft violated Soviet airspace to gather military intelligence information about Soviet military facilities. A Soviet fighter shot down the US plane. After parachuting safely, the two Americans were arrested by Soviet authorities. The resolution notes that the men were transferred into the custody of American authorities.

4. TFR 4-5 is a handwritten note in Russian by a "comrade Poliashov" of the trawler RT-194, "Yalta," describing how the remains of one unidentified US airman were found in a trawler's fishing net. The remains - a leg - were tossed back into the ocean. A parachute, documents, and other items were recovered. Date of report is 25 Oct 61. Coordinates are included. The remains, parachute, and documents may relate to the RB-47 shot down on 1 July 1960.

5. TFR 4-6/7 [Act About the Transfer of the Body of Captain, USAF, **PALMA, WILLARD GEORGE]** is the official document transferring the body of **PALMA**.

b. Observations: The JCS Summary of Cold War Losses, associates these persons with incident #30 of 1 July 1960. The JCS summary notes that six people were on the aircraft. The Russian documents mention only three names. These documents do not mention nor account for the other three missing personnel.

c. Suggested follow-up: Obtain the names of the three unaccounted for crew members and query the Russian using the names. Were any other remains of the missing three airmen found? In addition, we should attempt to correlate the trawler report with the loss of this US aircraft. Are the documents that were recovered by the trawler on file somewhere?

2. TFR 4-8 through -13

a. Title: TFR 4-8 through -13 [Act of the Plenipotentiary of the Council of Ministers USSR for Repatriation Affairs 25 March 1953] is an archival report.

b. Observations:

1. Dated 25 March 1953, this document is from the Plenipotentiary of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for the Repatriation of Citizens of the USSR. It is the close-out report of the Plenipotentiary's office on the disposition of equipment and records. The Plenipotentiary's main effort seems to have been directed towards the repatriation of Soviet citizens. Of particular interest is the report's discussion of the disposition of the Plenipotentiary's official papers. Documents were dispersed to four different ministries.

2. Among the documents transferred from the Plenipotentiary's office, there is one set suggestive of possible leads to non-repatriated Americans. This set was sent to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and consists of 70,145 items. Its contents are described as follows:

"Record cards on foreign prisoners of war, interned and displaced citizens who were repatriated through the camps of the organs of repatriation, and also those who were sought out according to requests of the MID SSSR [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] and who died in the camps of the organs of repatriation."

c. Suggested follow-up: This is a useful road map for the research of these selected archival records by our Moscow office archivist and historian.

3. TFR 4-14 through -20

a. Titles:

1. TRF 4-14 [Information from a coded telegram from Mararov to Krymov from 25.6.52 No. 20850/1844] dated 26 June 1952 is the cover letter on the debrief of an American airman **JACK IRVING HARDING** by the Chinese.

2. TRF 4-15/16 through -17, [Data on an American Prisoner of War in Korea] dated 25 June 1952 is a summary of a debrief of an American airman **HARDING** by the Chinese.

3. TFR 4-18a and -18b is a 1951 document that lists intelligence objectives or intelligence information to be gained from captured US airmen along with a note forbidding Soviet advisory group personnel from directly interrogating US POWs.

4. TRF 4-19 [To Comrade Savchenko S. R. At no. 1218/s from 7 March 1951] is a document from M. Shalin assuring S. Savchenko that his personnel are not debriefing US POWs held by the North Koreans.

5. TFR 4-20 [Information from a Coded telegram of Lieutenant General Razuvaev to General Lieutenant Malik] dated 31 January 1951 forbidding Soviet interpreters to participate in the interrogation of American POWs.

b. Observations:

1. Taken at face value, this set of documents suggests that the Soviets did not directly interrogate American POWs in Korea. Any information obtained by the Soviets from POWS was through the Chinese and Koreans. However, more research of a greater number of source documents and field interviews is required before we accept this as fact.

2. The first several items [TFR 4-3 pp. 1-4] in this set of documents concerns the debrief of an American POW named **DJECK ERVING HARDING** probably **JACK OR JAKE IRVING HARDING** in 1952. The debrief was conducted by the Chinese but the results were provided to the Soviets. **HARDING** seems to have told the Chinese wild tales of American spying activity in order to win favor and mislead them. There is no indication in these documents as to the fate of **HARDING.**

3. The next item [TRF 4-3 p. 5] is a list of IOs [Intelligence Objectives] or intelligence questions to be answered. This was apparently supplied to Soviet advisors in Korea with the expectation that their Korean and Chinese allies would gather the information requested. At the bottom of the page is a paragraph entitled "Notice". The following is stated in the paragraph: "The debrief of prisoners of war is to be conducted by KNR [Peoples Democratic Republic of Korea] intelligence. Participation in debriefs by officers of the group of Soviets is categorically forbidden."

4. The third item [TRF 4-3 p. 6] is an item from the 2nd Main Administration of the General Staff of the Soviet Army to S. R. Savchenko. The author assures S. R. Savchenko that his staff section is not participating in debriefs of American prisoners in North Korea.

5. The final item is an information directive that repeats an order not to allow Soviet translators to debrief American or English POWs. One senior Soviet officer had requested the assignment of Soviet translators to assist in the debriefing of American and English POWs. This was clearly denied.

c. Suggested follow-up:

1. Do US archives show **HARDING** as being repatriated? If not, query the Russians.

2. While the documents paint a credible case that the Soviet advisory personnel in North Korea were forbidden to interrogate directly US POWs, we should be sensitive to and explore the possibility that some US POWs might have been transported out of North Korea to be interrogated by the Soviets.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Based upon our experience in the translation and analysis of this relatively small, initial increment of Russian archives, several conclusions can be drawn:

a. Given continuing Russian cooperation and the deployment to Moscow of our archivist and historian, we are probably facing considerable hard work over the long term. Should our efforts on the ground in Moscow yield archives in the thousands of pages, the translation and analytical challenge that this will require will be formidable. We can compensate to a degree by technology (i.e. automated translation), but the analysis required is still time consuming and intense. We note this in particular because the analytical process requires extensive access to and manipulation of US casualty archives, some of which are not automated.

b. We cannot overemphasize to all Commission and Task Force members the importance of obtaining clear copies of all documents, as well as the necessity for rigorous documentation concerning the source of any archives obtained (i.e. by whom passed, from which archive, partial or complete?)

c. In addition, it would greatly assist the Task Force if we were promptly provided copies of all archives when obtained to permit their expeditious translation and analysis.

d. We will sometimes be faced with inaccuracies in American names that tend to creep in as these names are recorded by the Russians in Cyrillic and then translated into English by our translators.

2. Even though these archives did not shed light on the issue of Vietnam-era POW/MIA personnel, we would recommend that the Commission pursue this issue by requesting access to Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Ministry of Defense/KGB/GRU archives that exist concerning relations with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (the Vietcong, whom Moscow recognized as a government), the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and Laos.

3. The Task Force would also welcome specific guidance from the Commission concerning the scope of our mission as we have defined it in this report. For example, we have operated to date under the assumption that US civilian internees, while not "POW/MIA" personnel, are a legitimate focus of our endeavors when they surface in our work. Additionally, we believe it to be appropriate to share with third countries such archives as pertain to their nationals. However, we defer to the Commission's guidance on whether or not this should be done, and by whom.

4. Furthermore, we have formatted this initial report absent specific Commission guidance and would welcome any feedback and suggestions that might enable us to better serve the Commission.

5. Finally, we would appreciate the cooperation of all recipients of this report in adhering to the handling instructions noted in the Executive Summary. As stated, the report is not classified, but should be kept in official channels pending our efforts to identify and notify the next of kin of these personnel whose names appear in its pages.

Archives Reports to the Joint Commission

June 10, 1992 Visit to four Russian Archives: Special

Archives, Archives of the October Revolution,

Ministry of Defense Archives, MVD Archives

June 18, 1992 Follow-Up to Russian Archives visits

June 19, 1992 Research decisions for the Commission plus

preliminary research strategies

June 30, 1992 Discussion with V.I. Kozlov, June 22, 1992

July 1, 1992 Background research in U.S. sources for

MIA/POWs

July 1, 1992 Visit to the two Archives of the Communist

Party, Soviet Union

July 1, 1992 Discussion with V.I. Kozlov, June 25, 1992

July 2, 1992 Interview with Ministry of Security records

officials

July 8, 1992 Interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs

records officials

July 8, 1992 Interview with director of the Presidential

Archives

July 8, 1992 Discussion with V.I. Kozlov and Sergei Osipov

NATIONAL ARCHIVES Washington, DC 20408

Date: Jun 18 1992 Reply to Attn of: NN

Subject: Follow-up to Russian archives visits

To: To the Record

I. Special Archives

1. Read finding aids for fonds of the Repatriation Directorate; select files that appear pertinent; read them; arrange for copies of selected documents or files tRussian agreement to this already obtained).

2. Using list provided by Special Archives of the clusters of records in the section on Interned and POW affairs, select the clusters of records that appear pertinent; read the finding aids to them; select files; read them; arrange for copies of selected documents (Russian specific agreement not obtained, but could be construed from the agreement on 1 above).

3. Copy as many finding aids of the Special Archives section on Interned and POW affairs as possible (no agreement).

4. Obtain copies of documents the Russians identify as pertinent from their search of the files.

5. Ensure that full file citations are on all copies obtained (minimally name of archives, fond number, file

("delo") number, page number; there may be a dossier ("papkan) number preceding the delo; if reference to the delo was found through a finding aid, it may be useful to note that number as well: e.g., Special Archives, fond 489, opis 24g, papka 19, delo 2).

6. Provide electrostatic copying equipment, paper, and toner, as required (U.S. specific agreement).

II. October Revolution

1. Provide copier, paper, and toner and copy the three correspondence files of Lt. Gen. Golikov identified by the archivists and shown to the U.S. side (specific agreement by both sides).

2. Attempt to read finding aids and files in the fond of the Soviet Red Cross Association, the Prison Department sub-fond of the fond of the NKVD, and the fond of the Gulag (grudging agreement by Russian side to reading files; no specific agreement on reading finding aids).

III. Ministry of Defense Archives

1. Read the filing manuals for the Ministry of Defense for the period from World War II through Vietnam (agreement by Russian side). Obtain copies if possible (no specific agreement).

2. Read MOD Archives "reference books" on all pertinent military units (agreement by Russian side).

3. Obtain a copy of the document from the 1950s splitting up the records of the Repatriation Affairs Directorate (agreement to provide "through the Commission").

4. When Russians have completed making card file from the order books of the front line and transit camps, make electrostatic copy of the card file (Russian side agreed).

/signed/ TRUDY HUSKAMP PETERSON Assistant Archivist for the National Archives

NATIONAL ARCHIVES Washington, DC 20408

Date: JUN 19 1992 Reply to Attn of: NN Subject: Research decisions for the Commission To: The Record

The Commission must reach decisions on two critical research issues: focus and acceptable evidence.

I. Focus.

The Commission has two choices of focus for the investigation: (1) to determine the fate of individuals whose names are known to the U.S. or (2) to seek information created by or received by the Soviets regarding any U.S. military personnel who were in a POW/MIA status. While these two thrusts are not absolutely exclusive, they each suggest a very distinct research strategy and a very different timetable.

Many files on individuals are organized by name. Searching such files for particular individuals, even if transliteration of names is required, is a relatively simple matter. Trained staff members can often complete searches for several hundred individuals in a day. For example, assume that we are looking for 2000 individuals in the alphabetical card files of the Soviet Repatriation Affairs Directorate of World War II. In as little as ten work days a staff member could search all the names, working at 200 names per day (a very reasonable pace, given the organization of the files, which the U.S. side has seen). If, however, we ask the Russians to find all persons whose cards indicate their nationality as "U.S.," there are two problems:

First, each of the 4,000,000 cards will have to be examined to see if the individual is "U.S." While more cards per day can be handled in this process because it is a sequential review rather than a skip from one card to another, the Russian archivists estimated that it would take them two and half years with a team of

staff members to search for all U.S. persons.

Second, the search is at the mercy of the person who originally defined the nationality of the individual to whom the card refers. For example, we have had different answers to whether a U.S. citizen captured in a German uniform was identified as U.S. or German. Similarly, there are concerns that U.S. citizens with obvious ethnic surnames were mischaracterized as Italian of Polish or Jewish (the latter may have been used as a nationality).

Let us look at another example. The U.S. side was told that the MVD has a master fingerprint file of all persons who were apprehended by or in control of the MVD, dating back at least as far as World War II. Again, a search ~or specific names is probably relatively rapid. The U.S. does not know whether it is even possible to determine nationality from the fingerprint card; if nationality is listed it would probably require sequential search of all 17,000,000 cards to find all the persons recorded as U.S.

II. Evidence.

In archives in the United States, a researcher is given finding aids to bodies of records that the researcher, assisted by an archivist, has decided may be pertinent to his or her inquiry. From the finding aids the researcher identifies files he wants to read. The files are retrieved by the archival staff and provided to the researcher. The researcher can read, take notes, or obtain an electrostatic or photographic copy of selected pages. It is the responsibility of the researcher to record the full file citation for documents copied or extracted.

It is clear that the Russians are not following this pattern. Instead the archivists themselves are examining finding aids, reading files and making notes; ultimately they seem to be planning to write a report or develop lists to present to us. They seem generally willing to allow us to have xerox copies of documents; they have not provided full citations on the document copies they have turned over this far.

Ultimately the U.S. Commission will have to evaluate the authenticity of the evidence provided by the documents obtained. The U.S. practice of researcher selection and review has evolved to maximize the researcher's information about the context in which the document exists and thereby to provide the best possible position from which to weigh the information contained in it. In other words, the U.S. research process gives the opportunity for both textual and contextual tests of authenticity.

The U.S. side must decide whether it is comfortable with having Russian archival staff members read the files and extract information. Will the U.S. agree to obtaining xerox copies with full citations in lieu of having U.S. citizens read the files? Is the U.S. comfortable with reading files provided by the Russians without reviewing the associated finding aids? Do we want to insist on the right to read finding aids and select files except in the case of security classified information?

Attached is a discussion of preliminary research strategies for each of the four areas of investigation, i.e., World War II, Korea, selected Cold War incidents, and Vietnam. These should be tested against both what U.S. Soviet specialists know about the organization and functions of specific Soviet governmental units and what the Russian archivists have proposed.

/signed/ TRUDY HUSKAMP PETERSON Assistant Archivist for the National Archives

Attachments

PRELIMINARY RESEARCH STRATEGY

KOREA

Background. Unlike World War II, in the Korean conflict the Soviets did not obviously and openly hold U.S. POWs. The recent revelation of the North Korean camp inside the borders of the U.S.S.R. may

suggest that the U.S.S.R. did play a role in running prison camps that may have contained U.S. military captured during the war, but there is as yet no hard evidence to that effect. The U.S. government has a list of names of MIAs from the Korean conflict; it is not clear how refined that list is.

Options. If the U.S. is interested in information on all U.S. military who came into contact, directly or indirectly, with officials of the U.S.S.R., one key question is what records are held by the GRU. If, as is believed, Soviet officials participated in or obtained copies of interrogations of U.S. military personnel, obtaining copies of the interrogations (at least the initial pages where the individual is presumably identified by name, rank, and serial number) would provide evidence that the person was alive on a specific date. It would not resolve the fate of the individual. A second option would be to review the basic records (the equivalent of deck logs or morning reports) of the Soviet units stationed on the Korean border during the period to see if references to U.S. personnel in custody appear. (It should be possible to determine what units were in the border area by examining the reference books on each unit maintained by the archives of the Ministry of Defense.)

It is critical to determine whether the U.S.S.R. either permitted the North Koreans to operate prison camps on Soviet territory or had an arrangement to take individual prisoners from Korean hands into Soviet incarceration. The former may have been a policy decision of sufficient gravity that it would be reflected in the records of the Politburo or the Council of Ministers; they should be searched for such evidence. Conversely, the latter (the transfer of particular individuals) may not have been brought to the direct attention of the top of the government, although significant information derived from interrogation may have reached the top policy makers.

If the U.S. operates on the assumption that some U.S. individuals were in Soviet custody, there are a number paths for research. It is reasonable to assume that in records relating to incarceration the record keeping is both careful (losing track of a prisoner may literally have been a capital offense) and tied to names. Again, logic suggests that searching on a name basis is quicker and easier. As in the World War II strategy, hospital records could be a source, as could fingerprint cards.

If the U.S. is not searching for particular names, the U.S. must assume that there is a logical path of control of individuals in custody and identify and review the records of control. One possibility is that the North Koreans would transfer control of the individual to the GRU unit in North Korea and that transfer would be accompanied by a document signed by both North Korean and Soviet officials. Assuming that the GRU itself did not run detention facilities (an assumption that should be tested), there would be a second document transferring the individual from the GRU to the military hospital administration, the MVD prison-camp- exile administration, or to the NKVD.

Another avenue is to trace the fate of the crews of U.S. military aircraft that crashed in Soviet territory (whether or not shot down by Soviet military). If a plane merely crashed, it is reasonable to assume that local police (MVD) records would document it; almost surely it would be reported to the local military commander and to the GRU, perhaps also to the local NKVD and to the local Communist Party. If the crew was dead, the archivist of the MVD said that the death of a foreigner in iMVD control would be reported to the central MVD files in Moscow, while burial information would be in the local records. If one or more crew members survived, they would have been taken into custody by one of the local authorities, most probably initially by MVD, and documents (card index, file, report to the Moscow headquarters, report to GRU, and so on) would have been created. Again, the simplest way to find documents on these individuals may be through the interrogation reports of the GRU from the Far East (this presumes that the GRU records are maintained by provenance and that the Far East unit files are extant, both quite reasonable assumptions).

If the plane was shot down by Soviet military, there should be a record of the incident in the records of the responsible Soviet military unit (whether Air Force or ground defense). This could be found in the basic unit records in the archives of the Ministry of Defense; this would require determination first of what units were in the Far East during the Korean era. The fate of the crew may or may not be found in these documents, however; the strategy outlined in the paragraph above on crashes would have to be used. It is not clear that the central political or military administration controlled all individual "shoot-

downs; it appears, for example, that the commander of Soviet units in Cuba in the early 1960s had authority to shoot down U.S. planes without getting further authority from Moscow. Whether Far East commanders in the Korean War era had this authority is not known; if they did not, orders to shoot would have had to come from the central command, and it is reasonable to assume there would be a document to that effect. (It is worth noting that General Volkogonov asserted that there were no reports of orders for shootdowns in military records.) In either case, it is reasonable to assume that a report of the shoot-down would have been sent to the central command. Again, the fate of the crew would probably have been reported if known.

PRELIMINARY RESEARCH STRATEGY

WORLD WAR II

Background. In the U.S., scholars believe that between 23,000 and 27,00 U.S. military were in Soviet hands by the end of World WarII. Most were repatriated across the front lines; the largest other locus of repatriation was the port of Odessa. There were individuals who escaped from or avoided Soviet repatriation camps and made their own way to U.S. havens. Because of these variations, a definitive list of names of individuals who are missing has been difficult for the U.S. to develop.

Options. If the U.S. wants a full accounting of all persons who went through Soviet control, there appear to be two principal sources: (1) the records of the Repatriation Affairs Directorate and (2) the Records of the Ministry of Defense's administration of the front line and transit camps. The problem with the former is that the U.S. side was told in March that if the person was transferred from a repatriation camp to the internal prison system the card and file on the person may have been pulled and transferred to the (presumably) MVD, leaving no trace in the records of the Repatriation Directorate. The problem with the latter is that the U.S. has no way to judge how fully and accurately the camp order books recorded the movement of individuals and how consistently nationality is recorded.

If the U.S. is interested in determining the fate of specific individuals, there appear to be several options. If the individual was transferred into the prisons or the labor camps of the old Gulag, the fingerprint file may be the quickest comprehensive source, particularly if the U.S. itself has fingerprint cards on these individuals. Alternatively, the card files of the MVD for internal exile, prisons, and labor correctional camps (apparently three entirely separate card files) might be searched. The U.S. was informed in March that if a person was taken from a repatriation camp and transferred to a prison or the Gulag, there would have been a legal proceeding of some sort (court, court martial, special tribunal, perhaps). The records of these agencies might be a secondary point to check for cases by name of individual MIA.

If the individual entered the hospital system, there appear to be two options. The U.S. side was told that the archives of the Ministry of Defense has the hospital records of military hospitals; there may be alphabetic patient records, although these may be organized by hospital, making the search laborious. Alternatively, if the individual entered the NKVD's special psychiatric wards which, according to General Volkogonov, were parts of the general psychiatric hospitals administered by the Ministry of Health, the patient records may be in either the Ministry of Health archives (and, again, may be organized by hospital rather than a central consolidated file) or in the files of the old KGB. We know nothing at this point about the organization of the KGB files.

It may be a reasonable assumption that in the chaos at the end of World War II, few cases of U.S. nationals held rather than repatriated would have risen to the top political levels of the government. After all, there was no U.S. case as famous as that of Count Wallenburg. While it may be possible to request a search of the records of the Politburo or the Council of Ministers for the period to see if cases of U.S. nationals are mentioned, it may not be worthwhile.

PRELIMINARY RESEARCH STRATEGY

VIETNAM

Background. The list of U.S. military missing in action in the Vietnam War is presumably accurate and complete. If the U.S. side is comfortable with using the list, then a strategy concentrating on names may be in order.

Options. One of the former Soviet military officials interviewed by the U.S. side said that the Soviets obtained copies from the North Vietnamese of the reports of interrogations of U.S. POWs. These, he said, were sent back to eight different parts of the Soviet government. Obtaining copies of these interrogation reports, if only the first pages, would provide evidence that an individual was alive on a particular date. While there are a number of choices of organization from which to request these copies it is likely that the GRU would have carefully maintained its set. Obviously the majority of persons interviewed will long since have been repatriated, but it is possible that there will be interviews with missing individuals.

The sensational report that U.S. POWs were transported to the U.S.S.R. and detained there makes it essential that we attempt to obtain confirming documents. It is reasonable to assume that a document trail exists to show the transfer of individuals from North Vietnamese to Soviet custody and back again; there should be flight records; there should be custody records. Fingerprints might be checked, although it may be that the individuals were kept in military control and did not encounter the MVD. General Volkogonov on June 12 said that "two specialists" have been asked to identify which psychiatric hospitals were used by the "special agencies" to house political prisoners. With that information, the patient records of those hospitals could presumably be searched by name; alternatively, the KGB may have maintained a central file identifying those persons who were held in these institutions. Again, the U.S. side does not know the organization of the records of the KGB.

Finally, it may be productive to look at the records of military advisers to Vietnam. Col. Brilov at the Ministry of Defense Archives would only say that he did not hold those records, that they remained with the "department in which they originated" (presumably Navy, Army, Air Force). Alternatively, the KGB's First Chief Directorate (Foreign Intelligence/Operations) had in the 1980s a Sixth Department for PRC, Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea. It may also be useful to review the records of this predecessor for the period of the Vietnam War.

PRELIMINARY RESEARCH STRATEGY

COLD WAR INCIDENTS

Background. The U.S. side has identified specific incidents during the Cold War period; these incidents involve U.S. military who did not return from missions. Because of the small number of incidents, the specificity of dates, and the apparently good information about the personnel who made up the crews, the easiest search strategy may be to concentrate on the specific names. If, on the other hand, the U.S. believes that the list of incidents given to the Russians is indicative of our interest rather than exhaustive, an entirely different strategy may have to be used.

Options. It seems reasonable that, given the great power politics of the Cold War era, any shooting down or capturing of American military personnel would have been brought immediately brought to the attention of the highest levels of the Soviet government. It is likely that the minutes and backup memoranda of the meetings of the Politburo and the Council of Ministers are kept chronologically and could be searched for information around the dates in question. It would be reasonable that any such report would include information about the fate of the crew. Alternatively, if the U.S. wishes to attempt to make a comprehensive survey of all Politburo and Council of Ministers records to find all mention of both the U.S.-identified and any other incidents, the entire set of minutes could be reviewed; how long that would take is unknown. Further, it is not known whether an index to the minutes of either of these bodies exists; if it does, the search for pertinent information could be relatively quick.

On June 12, 1992, General Volkogonov asserted that there were no reports of orders of shootdowns in the military records because "everything was done along Party, political lines." If that is accurate and if there are no discussions in the Politburo of the incidents, it may be fruitful to look at the records of the military section of the Central Committee Secretariat (in the early Cold War period called the Main Political

Directorate of the Army Forces and later the Chief Political Administration oœ the Army and Navy). The U.S. side has not been into these records and has no knowledge of their organization or finding aids.

It seems reasonable to assume that if any U.S. military were taken alive, they would be interviewed by the GRU. Which directorate would conduct the interviews, with whom the interviews would be shared, and where and in what order they would be filed are all unknown to the U.S. side. Similarly, the KGB may well have interviewed the individuals; the Third Chief Directorate (military counterintelligence) seems in the 1980s to have been the liaison with GRU. Whether that is true for earlier periods, whether the records are filed by directorate, and what finding aids exist are all unknown.

Finally, if the U.S. wishes to concentrate on the names from known incidents, it would again be possible to use the fingerprint files, the MVD card files of prisons and camps, and the military hospital records and the records of the hospitals administered by the Ministry of Health.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES Washington, DC 20408

Date: JUN 30 1992

Reply to Attn of: NN

Subject: Discussion with V.I. Kozlov, June 22, 1992

To: The Record

The U.S. side was represented by Trudy Peterson, Jim Connell, Al Graham, Bill Saxe, Ron Cima, and Larry Gomez. The Russian side was represented by V. I. Kozlov and Tatyana Koltovich. We met at the Roskomarchiv conference room at ul. Ilyinka.

I. Archives Visits.

I opened by stating that the discussion had two purposes: determining the archives visits for this week and discussing research strategy in each of the four areas, beginning with Vietnam. Kozlov replied that tomorrow the Commission is meeting at 4 o'clock with three topics on the agenda: (1) the visit to Pechora; (2) a report on Afghanistan and Ambassador Thomsen!s efforts: (3) the work plan for July and August.

I then reiterated the U.S. side's interest, expressed in March and May, to visit the CPSU, KGB, and GRU archives. Kozlov asked why we wanted to visit these archives. I said that I believed that after we discussed research strategy that the reasons for our interest would be clear. Kozlov replied that the records of the CPSU are in two buildings, one on Pushkin Street holding the records through 1952 and the other, the former Central Committee Building on ul. Ilyinka, holding 1953-91. Kozlov had Iran Nikolayevich Sherchuk, the chief archivist responsible for later CPSU records, join us, and we agreed to a 10 a.m. June 23 visit to the Pushkin Street facility and a post-lunch visit to Ilyinka. With regard to KGB and GRU, Kozlov said that access would have to be arranged with General Volkogonov. Kozlov then volunteered that the Presidential "fond" was located in the Kremlin and it may contain documents of interest; again, Volkogonov would have to secure permission for access.

II. Research strategy, Vietnam.

A. Interrogation reports.

I said that the U.S. side was told that the Soviets obtained from the North Vietnamese copies of the reports of interrogations of U.S. POWs. We believe that access to the first pages of the reports would provide evidence that a specific POW name, rank, serial number) was alive on a particular date. While the majority of these individuals would have been repatriated, it is possible that there will be interviews with missing individuals. I said that we were told that the copies of the interrogations were sent to eight parts

of the Soviet government: the General Secretariat, CPSU; Secretariat of the Presidium; the Secretariat of the Supreme Soviet; the Ministry of Defense; the Commander-in-Chief, Air Defense; the Commander-in-Chief, Air Forces; the Chief of the General Staff; and the Chief, 10th Department, General Staff. I said we wanted access to one set, and since the CPSU records are under the control of Roskomarchiv, I assumed that would be the easiest set to make available. Kozlov agreed to locate a set and provide access.

B. Yeltsin's statement

I said that the statement of President Yeltsin that U.S. POWs had been transported to and detained in the Soviet Union was "sensational." Kozlov said that he and Rudolf Pikhoia had discussed the statement and they think Yeltsin was "confusing" the facts. Kozlov says they think Yeltsin was referring to the four Americans off the aircraft carrier who were transported from Japan to the U.S.S.R. I replied that, irrespective of that supposition, the Commission had to make every effort to investigate all files that may reveal whether any U.S. POWs were transported to and detained in the U.S.S.R.

C. Transport records.

I said that when one government turns an individual over to another government there is normally a document recording the transfer of custody and we should search for these. Kozlov agreed. I said that if persons were transported there may also be transport records.

D. Prison records.

I asked whether military prisons in the U.S.S.R. housed only Soviet military or whether foreign prisoners were housed there. Kozlov said he did not know and made a note to ask. I then suggested that foreign military prisoners might also be kept in civil (MVD) prisons or in KGB control. Kozlov replied that he thought that MVD control in an MVD prison was the least likely scenario in such a case, leaving the clear implication that KGB control was most likely. (Unfortunately, this would eliminate the possibility of using the MVD fingerprint cards.)

E. Hospital records.

I reported that General Volkogonov in Washington on June 12 said that "two specialists" had been asked to identify which psychiatric hospitals were used by the "special agencies" to house political prisoners. Kozlov appeared not to know of that promise. I said that it seemed possible that U.S. POWs were held in military hospitals, regular hospitals, or the KGB "special wings" of Ministry of Health hospitals. Kozlov said the Russian side has "already checked" the records of "psychiatric hospitals of the MVD" (this may have been a misstatement, as it seems most likely that these were KGB not MVD facilities). I asked whether the Ministry of Health hospital officials running a hospital would know the identity of the persons the KGB had installed in the special wing. Kozlov said the top administrators would have known but the identities would likely not be in the hospital records. I said that in that case the KGB must have maintained a record of who was in those special wards and those records would have to be searched.

F. Political authority for transfers.

I asked whether the decision to transport POWs back to the U.S.S.R. would have come before the Politburo. Kozlov replied that he believed the KGB could have done it without going to the Politburo.

G. Military advisers

I reported that Col. Brilov at the Ministry of Defense Archives said he did not hold the records of the military advisers to Vietnam, that they remained with the "department in which they originated" (I suggested Navy, Army, Air Force, GRU). I asked where these records were. Kozlov said he believed Brilov and that he (Kozlov) would need to raise the question with those holding the current operational files. I said that those advisors would have been the on-site military individuals who could have identified people for transport to the U.S.S.R. and we believed their files should be searched.

H. GRU-KGB.

I said that the U.S. had information that the KGB's Third Chief Directorate was the KGB liaison to the GRU. It is plausible that information on transport and interrogations was shared through this channel. We would expect both organizations to have records regarding this liaison and we believe they should be reviewed.

I. KGB general records.

First, I said that we believe the KGB's First Chief Directorate had a very important Secretariat. I requested a search of the records of this Secretariat for records relating to Vietnam. Second, I said that we believe that within the First Chief Directorate was a Sixth Department that handled Vietnam. We believe those records should also be searched for POW information.

In conclusion, I asked whether Kozlov now understood why we needed access to CPSU, KGB, and GRU records. He said he did.

/signed/ TRUDY HUSKAMP PETERSON Assistant Archivist for the National Archives

NATIONAL ARCHIVES Washington, DC 20408

Date: JUL 1 1992

Reply to Attn Of: NN

Subject: Background Research in U.S. Sources of MIA/POWs

To: The Record

Problem: Clarifying the names of U.S. POWs/MIAs for World War II, Korea, and Cold War incidents.

Background: The list of names and incidents that the U.S. side has provided to the Joint Commission (excepting, for this discussion, the Vietnam list) is known to be "soft." The U.S. side also recognizes that the speed of the search in the records in the Russian side's possession will be greatly enhanced if the Russians can search on specific names and specific dates. It is in the interest of both sides to be as specific as possible, recognizing that no absolutely accurate list can be achieved.

Definition of terms: Some of the sensational estimates of MIA/POW numbers appear to be conflating the number of POW/MIAs with the number of military persons who are presumed dead but whose bodies were not recovered (BNR). During World War II, for example, the U.S. military did not itself make this distinction. Consequently, the large number of World War II MIA/POWs--recently reported in the Washington Post as about 78,000--includes all those individuals who went down on ships and whose bodies were not recovered.

In addition to the BNR problem, it is important to be clear about deserters and defecters. Any gross number of U.S. military who did not return may include these numbers. While the numbers are small in terms of the very large numbers of military who were engaged in World War II and Korea, they are large enough to make a difference in the final reconciliation of lists of names. The U.S. side is not seeking information about deserters and defecters, but it is possible that the Russian side will surface their names. The U.S. side needs to have available a good list of such persons.

A third problem, particularly with the Cold War incidents, concerns non-military U.S. government personnel. It is reasonable to assume that not all persons involved in Cold War incidents were military; it is reasonable to assume that some were from civilian intelligence agencies such as the CIA. Similarly, there may have been military personnel lost in incidents that were not purely military in origin. The Commission must be clear about what we will do if names of persons appear as involved in Cold War

incidents and these names do not match official military lists.

In sum, when the lists are prepared, they need to be headed by as clear a statement as possible of who is included, under what definition and with what evidence.

History of lists: In order to produce the best possible lists of names and to provide the Commission with the most defensible possible position to defend those lists, a series of background research steps must be taken. They are:

1. Identify the agency(ies) responsible for maintaining the list of missing, tracing it from the end of World War II to the present.

2. Identify the specific office within the identified agency over time.

3. Identify the structure within the specific office, including the command lines, the relationship to other offices and agencies, whether the office was empowered to make or merely record decisions to add or subtract from the list, and other general authorities.

4. Identify the relevant files extant for the specified office(s) over time and the current custodian of each of those segments of files.

5. Identify the filing system used and the supporting indexing systems, if any.

6. Characterize the nature of the files: the definitions used, the completeness of the files.

At this stage of the research the administrative history of the U.S. military's effort to account for MIA/POWs will be known.

Databases: During the course of research on the administrative history of the MIA/POW administration, many lists of POWs will surface. It may be possible to pick a date for World War II and a date for Korea (for example, 1950 for World War II and 1960 for Korea), establish a database of who was officially MIA/POW at that time, and trace the history of those names thereafter. (We know, for example, that by 1960 the Korea list was around 400 persons whose fate was truly unknown.) Similarly, if the military and the civilian intelligence agencies can come up with an agreed upon list of incidents and crew members, those names could be traced. While the investment of time may seem excessive, money expended on the effort at this stage will save repeated searches for individual names in the future.

Responsibility: The research into the history of the military's MIA/POW administration could be conducted by the history offices of the military services.

/signed/ TRUDY HUSKAMP PETERSON Assistant Archivist for the National Archives

NATIONAL ARCHIVES Washington, DC 2040

Date: JUL 1 1992

Reply to Attn of: NN

Subject: Visit to the two archives of the Communist Party,

Soviet Union

To: The Record

On June 23, 1992, the U.S. side visited archives holding records of the Communist Party.

I. Russian Centre of Conservation & Study of Records for Modern History.

The Modern History Archives was visited by Trudy Peterson, Al Graham, Jim Connell, Ron Cima, and Larry Gomez. The visit was hosted by Kyrill M. Anderson, Director, and Oleg V. Naumov, Deputy Director. The discussions were conducted in English (Dr. Anderson's academic specialty is British and U.S. utopianism, and he speaks English fluently). Anderson pointed out that he had been director for only two months and he did not have deep knowledge of the holdings.

Anderson began by explaining that before the August 1991 coup, this archives was known as the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the CPSU. While it was created to demonstrate the "openness" of the party and was officially open for research, access was governed by the Central Committee and was extremely limited. Despite those limitations, finding aids were never provided to users; instead, the user told the archivist what types of materials were needed and the archivist provided those files deemed appropriate. One positive aspect of this practice, however, was that the finding aids that were produced were accurate, for they were used only by trusted staff and never seen by researchers. Asked if the archives followed the old Glavarchiv practice of "blind" finding aids, Anderson said no. I asked if U.S. representatives could read the finding aids, and he said yes.

Anderson said the archives has about 550 fonds with 6 million file units and about 1300 finding aids. He said that the archives has three main sections:

1. Documents on European revolutionary and socialist

movements of the 18th and 19th centuries,

primarily from the French Revolution to the

Bolshevik revolution. The earliest document is a

1345 charter of French King John. About 100 fonds.

2. Records of the Comintern. About 150 fonds.

3. Records of Russian socialism and communism, about

300 fonds, including

a. Records of the Socialist Revolutionary Party,

Mensheviks, Bund, etc.

b. Records of the Russian Bolsheviks and the

Communist Party to 1952 (one fond is the

records of the Central Committee with 170

finding aids).

c. Records relating to provincial Communist

Party organizations through 1991.

Anderson said that even within the records of the Communist Party, 1917-52, the archives is incomplete. Modern History has the records of the Politburo from 1917-40; records from 1941 on are in the Kremlin archives (Presidential fond). Neither does the archives have what Anderson called the "special secret

files" of the Sixth Section of the General Department of the Communist Party (Merle Fainsod's How Russia is Ruled does not show a General Department in 1948, but by 1968 Leonard Shapiro in The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union noted that a General Department existed and hypothesized that it coordinated the work of the Politburo). Finally, Anderson said that he believed that throughout the Communist Party bureaucracy two sets of files were kept, general files and "special files." While the former were retired to the Modern History archives, the latter were not and were probably in the Kremlin archives. In other words, he said, while he had records of the Central Committee and the Secretariat for the 1917-52 period, he did not have them all.

I asked where the local party records are now held. Anderson said they are now in the oblast level archives under Roskomarchiv control. He said that again there are usually two levels of records--general files and special files--but in this case both are in the oblast archives. Conversely, he said, the information in Modern History archives about the local and provincial CPSU is of the "most general nature."

Turning to the specific question of records relating to MIA/POWs, he said that the staff had searched the fond of "International Connections of the CPSU" and had "found nothing" pertinent to the issue, although there was some interesting information about Germany. (In 1968 there was known to be an International Department of the Secretariat; in 1948 there was Foreign Otdel--it may be that these are the records to which Anderson refers.)

I asked if Modern History archives has the records of the Central Committee Secretariat's Main Political Directorate of the Armed Forces, which was said to function in 1948 as the Military Otdel of the Central Committee Secretariat. Anderson denied that the records were in the archives. Asked where they were, he said that he supposed the records were in the Ministry of Defense Archives in Podolsk, but it was "difficult to be sure." He said that he believed the records of the State Committee of Defense are in the Presidential archives in the Kremlin.

I said that the U.S. side had received information that Soviet officials had known of the movement of U.S. POWs from North Korea to China during the Korean War. I asked where such documents might be located. Anderson suggested the records of the Politburo, the Technical Secretariat that prepared "draft work" for the Politburo, the "special files" of the General Secretariat (the General Secretariat is the department that apparently coordinated the work of the Politburo), or any department with international information. Asked which part of the organization of the CPSU would have received information from and official liaison with the NKVD, Anderson said that the "Administrative Apparatus Department" (probably the Administration Otdel) had the closest relations with NKVD, but that documents from NKVD were "scattered through the fonds."

I asked who would have made the decision to transfer U.S. POWs to the territory of the Soviet Union during the Korean War. Anderson said that such a decision would "reasonably be taken" by the Politburo and that the decision would be recorded in the Politburo minutes in the "special files." I asked where one would find a decision to allow North Koreans to establish POW camps on Soviet soil, and Anderson said the Politburo minutes in the special files.

I asked how reporting would work if a U.S. plane fell into Soviet territory. Anderson said he thought the reporting would go from local military to the Ministry of Defense and from the Ministry to the Politburo. I asked what would be the reporting if a U.S. soldier fell into the hands of Soviet military, say in Korea. Anderson said he believed the report would be sent "to Beria not Stalin." I said that the U.S. had information that interrogation reports of U.S. soldiers in Vietnam were sent back to Moscow and that one copy was sent to the Party. I asked where similar interrogation reports from Korea would be filed. Anderson said that political commissars with the Army in Korea reported to the central political commissars in the Ministry of Defense and then that unit reported to the Central Committee.

I said that it was well known that in Korea there were attempts to convert POWs to communism. I said that it seemed reasonable that reports of the success of those efforts would be forwarded to the Central Committee. Anderson said that the archives staff had looked at the records of the Department of Propaganda (probably the 1948 Propaganda and Agitation Otdel) and that while they had found general

progress reports there were no documents with specific names of individuals.

I said that in the United States the case of Francis Gary Powers is well known. I asked where the decision would be made to use persons captured for propaganda purposes. Anderson said that the decision would be made by the Politburo and executed by either the Department of Propaganda or "technical specialists." Anderson pointed out that the Politburo took general decisions and details were worked out by the "special services".

I asked where reports would be filed, if they came from other communist countries (such as East Germany) that had U.S. military in their hands. Anderson said that he doubted that the Communist Parties in those countries would have had anything to do with that. He surmised that in such a case Soviet authorities in those countries "would have been responsible" for the U.S. military--these Soviets would be representatives of "special agencies." These representatives would have reported to the Chief of the Political Directorate or to the NKVD. Anderson said that there is a fond for "international connections" under the Secretariat and a separate fond for Soviet military administration of Germany. He said they had looked "very attentively" at the latter fond but "didn't find a trace" of U.S. prisoners of war. He said the documents refer "precisely to political or party work."

I asked what role the Communist Party played in the Repatriation Directorate. He said that the Party "controlled" the Directorate but "never mixed into details." I asked who would make a decision at the end of World War II not to repatriate an individual. Anderson said that in the case of a prominent person, the decision would be made by the Central Committee; in the case of a "peasant" then the decision would be made by the NKVD. Anderson said they looked into the decisions of the Party and "found no Americans" considered.

II. Center for the Preservation of Modern Documents.

The Contemporary Archives was visited by Trudy Peterson, Ron Cima, and Larry Gomez. The visit was hosted by Rem Andreyevich Usikov, director, and Ivan Nikolayevich Sherchuk, chief archivist. Vladimir Bondarev, Deputy Director for International Relations of Roskomarchiv, served as translator. We met at Usikov's office at ul. Ilyinka.

The scope of the archives is documents from the Secretariat and the departments of the Central Committee. There are approximately 30 million files dating from 1952-91 in 24 fonds. There are finding aids in list form (opisi) until the 1980s, then there are cards that are being computerized. "As a rule," said Usikov, "information that is kept in our archives deals either with organizational questions or questions dealing with propaganda work." "All documents dealing with very important information went to another archives; this was the archives of the Politburo of the Central Committee which traditionally was at the Kremlin; this is what we call 'the President's Archive', "From June of 1990 this has been called the President's Archive, he said, but it is the archives dealing with the organization of the work of the Central Committee and all the documents of the Political Department were kept there.

Usikov confirmed that the departments of the Central Committee decided whether to send particular files to the archives at Ilyinka or to the Kremlin archives. He also confirmed that the records of the Party at the local level are in the oblast archives controlled by Roskomarchiv.

Turning to the subject of MIA/POWs, he said the archives staff had "done some research but probably some additional work may be needed." He said that the staff "have some traces proving probably that the archives of the Politburo may have documents" relevant to missing U.S. military personnel. He said that in the Party there were basically two types of questions, "political questions and organizational questions." n Organizational questions were a part of the work of the Secretariat" and those records would be in the Center; "political questions would go to the Politburo and the records to the Kremlin archives."

As an example of the difference between organizational questions and political questions he used the case of the four U.S. military deserters from the Intrepid taken from Japan to the U.S.S.R. and on to Europe. The decision to bring the men to the U.S.S.R. was a political question and the records would be in the

Kremlin. The decision to give them each $1000 was an organizational question ("providing material assistance") and the records of that are in the Center.

The archivist showed the U.S. side two cards and three documents relating to the Intrepid defections. The cards showed the file number of the document in the originating agency (in one instance, the document originated in the KGB (KGB PRI S1 USSR) with "2771-A" as the file number; the archivist said the "A" stood for Yuri Andropov and all his correspondence would have an "A" after the file number). The cards also showed the file number the document would bear in the Party files. Finally, the cards provided cross reference numbers to other documents related to the same issue. The documents to which the cards were related bore the numbers the cards suggested they should. The cards had an abstract of the documents; the cards also had notations of decisions made and subsequent actions such as forwarding the documents to another department. In other words, these were much more than mere index cards but were record cards of both documents and decisions.

One card related to a man named Morris Veltman(n) who asked for political asylum on November 27, 1967. This time the card bore no apparent subsequent information. The U.S. side requested a copy of the card.

Usikov claimed that when a "subject went to the Politburo" the paper documents pertaining to it also went to the Politburo. I suggested that that seemed improbable, because bureaucracies usually keep copies of files sent forward in order to protect themselves in the future. Usikov steadfastly denied it, saying the card record was sufficient. The archivist said the first section of the Politburo was the Political Bureau, and when a subject went forward it went there first and then subsequently to the archives of the Politburo. The document from the Deputy Chairman of the KGB to the Central Committee regarding paying $1000 to each of the Intrepid men had no signature blocks for agreement but rather had the signatures of the approving officials along the margin of the document proposing payment. The card for this document reflected the names of the signatories. Based on this single example, it is just possible that the card information was considered sufficient evidence not to require retaining a copy of the actual document when a file went forward.

I asked whether the decisions of the Central Committee were filed by subject. Usikov said no, chronologically. I asked whether this was for all decisions, and he said yes. I said then if someone read all the chronological files of decisions, you should find all decisions to hold Americans? He said yes.

I asked where information would be sent if an American military man had been picked up in Soviet territory. Usikov said the information would have come to the Central Committee, either the "Administrative Authorities or the Political Department."

I asked where a decision to bring U.S. POWs from Korea to Soviet territory would have been made. Usikov said that was a political question and would go to the Politburo; documents regarding that decision would be in the Kremlin archives. I asked if only a single individual was brought into the U.S.S.R. rather than a general policy to bring U.S. POWs, would the decision on a single individual have required Politburo approval. The archivist said yes.

I told Usikov that the U.S. side had information that copies of interrogations of U.S. military POWs by the North Vietnamese had been provided to the Soviets and that one copy of the interrogation reports had gone to the CPSU. He said that he had found absolutely no traces of such reports and he "for sure would know." I asked if they would be part of the Party records in the Presidential fond. He said it was possible, but it was more likely that the reports came to the Central Committee from the KGB and were "sent back to the KGB" after the Party's review.

I asked whether the Center held the records of the military section of the Central Committee Secretariat (Main Political Directorate of the Armed Forces). He said no. I asked where he believed these records were. He said they were probably with the Ministry of Defense. He volunteered that although guidance for the military section came from the Secretariat, the Political Directorate of the Armed Forces was considered a separate body, at least for record-keeping purposes.

The U.S. side then accompanied the archivists into two storage areas, one for documents and one with card files. The files pulled were bound, with a several page finding aid at the front of each volume. The documents seemed to be in strict chronological order rather than broken by subject.

In the storage area for card files, it was apparent that the files were broken by date period (we were in the section spanning the Party Congresses from 1952-76). I asked whether, in addition to breaking by time period there were also separate card files by organization (e.g., a card file for the agriculture department, the heavy industry department, and so on). Usikov said there was a card file for the Secretariat and for "administration." It was unclear whether this meant the Department of Administration, the Department of Administrative Organs, or just general administration.

In the Secretariat card files for 1952-76 there were two drawers of cards labelled "Vietnam" and six drawers of cards labelled "U.S." Each drawer had perhaps three rows of cards within it. I asked if multiple cards were created for each document, and Usikov said yes. I asked how you would index a document reporting that three Americans were picked up in a boat intruding on the Caspian Sea. Usikov immediately said, "Defense of the borders, U.S., KGB." He then commented that "defense of the borders" was always of prime importance. We asked to see a card from the Vietnam drawer, and he reached in and pulled one out that was about Ho Chi Minh. I asked, based on the number on the card, how he could find the document. He said that if the card referred to a document filed in a general chronological run, like the decisions of the Central Committee, he could go straight to the document. Sometimes, however, he could go from the card to the finding aid to the document, a three-step process.

I asked whether there was a classification guide that staff used to decide on index terms to use. He said yes. He said that eight years ago the staff began computerizing the indexes as they were created; he commented that he could tell that the Ho Chi Minh card had not been computerized.

I asked whether the U.S. could see the classification manual to get a better sense of how the classification system worked. Looking straight down and not making eye contact, Usikov then denied that such a manual existed.

/signed/ TRUDY HUSKAMP PETERSON Assistant Archivist for the National Archives

NATIONAL ARCHIVES Washington, DC 20408

Date: JUL 1 1992

Reply to Attn of: NN

Subject: Discussion with V. I. Kozlov, June 25, 1992

To: The Record

The U.S. side was represented by Trudy Peterson, Jim Connell, Al Graham, Ron Cima, and Larry Gomez. The Russian side was represented by V. I. Kozlov and Tatyana Koltovich. We met at the Joint Commission office at ul. Ilyinka.

I. Tambov.

I informed the Russian side that NBC news had sent a crew to Tambov. NBC reports that residents say that Tambov was a camp for 2500 Japanese and European detainees; that residents further report that they do not believe that people were freed from the camp and that there are mass graves in the camp area; that one document relating to Tambov camp was located at Tambov but that NBC was told that the rest of the documents "are in Moscow." Kozlov asked whether the U.S. side "acknowledged" that we had been given a document relating to Tambov by the Russian side. I said that I did not know, that I had been asked by the U.S. Embassy press office to make sure that the Russian side was aware of the interest of the news media.

II. Yeltsin's letter.

I asked Kozlov to clarify the third paragraph from the end. In particular, I said the U.S. side wanted to know whether the first two sentences referring to aircraft shot down related to the last two sentences referring to American citizens held in Soviet prisons and special psychiatric clinics. Kozlov said no, that the first two sentences should be one paragraph and the second two sentences should be a separate paragraph.

Kozlov said the information regarding the first two sentences on aircrews had already been given to the U.S. side. He said the information came from the Ministry of Defense, General Staff archives. Of the nine aircrews, two crews perished completely; two crews were taken prisoner; and no information was available on the remaining five crews where the planes "fell into international waters." Of the two crews taken prisoner, one was an air crew of nine people, all of whom were repatriated to U.S. authorities; the other crew crashed in the region of the Bering Sea, the two crew members were named Olmsted and McCone, and information on their fate is not in Ministry of Defense records searched thus far. Kozlov indicated that the search for additional information would continue.

Turning to the last two sentences regarding eight Americans in prisons and four in clinics, Kozlov said documents in the Archives of the October Revolution provided the basis for the report. Kozlov had a May 1992 document from the October Revolution archivist that contained the information; I asked for a copy of the document and was promised one. Reading from the document, Kozlov reported the following on the eight Americans in prisons and prison camps:

Special Camp 2 - 1 American

Special Camp 3 - 1 American

Special Camp 6 - 2 Americans

Camp at Peschani (?) - 1 American

Upper Urals prison - 1 American

Vladimir Special Prison of Ministry of State Security -

1 American

The U.S. side quickly noted that this totalled seven, not eight, Americans. The Russian side agreed. I emphasized that this discrepancy was very serious, because the figures had officially been passed from President Yeltsin to Senators Kerry and Brown. Kozlov agreed and promised to clarify the numbers.

With regard to the four Americans reported to be in special psychiatric clinics, Kozlov said that the report from October Revolution Archives showed only that they were in "MVD Special Prisons and Branch Hospitals." He again promised to follow with further information. I requested that the U.S. side be given copies of the archival documents supporting the numbers and Kozlov agreed.

III. Division of the records of the Repatriation Directorate.

I told Kozlov that Col. Brilov at the Ministry of Defense archives had said that he had a copy of the order dividing the records of the World War II era Repatriation Directorate among various archives and had said that the U.S. side could have a copy of the order "through the Commission." Kozlov promised to look into it.

IV. Records of the CPSU Chief Political Administration of Army and Navy.

I told Kozlov that the U.S. side believed that the records of the Communist Party's Chief Political

Administration of the Army and Navy might contain relevant information. Neither of the archives holding the records of the Communist Party claimed to either have or know of the location of these records. Kozlov said he would find out who had custody.

V. KGB records.

I said that there had been reports that Roskomarchiv had taken over the records of the KGB. Yet in our discussions with the representatives of the Ministry of Security and in the continuing unavailability of the representatives of the External Intelligence Service to meet about their records, the U.S. side was hot clear what degree of control Roskomarchiv actually exercised. Kozlov said, "That's our pain and an object of great polemics with us." Continuing, he said, "in fact, at this stage the resolution of Boris Yeltsin" transferring the KGB records to the control of Roskomarchiv "has not been carried out." He suggested that there were two reasons for this failure: first, the Russian Federation KGB alone had four million files and Roskomarchiv has no resources to store and administer them; second, there is "of course a certain amount of opposition on the part of those respected institutions" of state security.

Kozlov volunteered that on the day that the Commission went to Pechora, Roskomarchiv had been informed that some files on "certain matters" will be transferred. The files deal "with those subjects that have been filtered: mainly documents that deal with people imprisoned by fascists, Russian soldiers captured abroad, persons who were repressed" and so forth. Kozlov said these files are from the whole of the USSR and are "tens of millions of files reflecting the life of tens of millions of people." He predicted that those files are going to raise a great number of inquiries and "an incredible amount of work."

I asked whether Kozlov knew how the KGB records were divided at the time the KGB was split. He said he did not.

VI Center for the Preservation of Modern Documents.

I asked whether there was a list of fonds in the Modern Documents Center. Kozlov said that the finding aids to all 24 fonds in the Center will be filmed in the course of a microfilming contract with the Hoover Institution/Chadwick- Healy. It seems reasonable that U.S. researchers can have access to a list of fonds and associated finding aids.

VII. Hospital records.

I said that although General Volkogonov was in Washington he said that two specialists were preparing a list of psychiatric hospitals used by the "special agencies" to house prisoners, I had not yet encountered anyone who seemed to be responsible for preparing the list. Kozlov confirmed that it was going to be prepared.

I then said that the U.S. side believed that relevant records might be found in the Chief Medical Directorate of the Ministry of Defense and we asked whether those records had been identified as part of the research strategy. Kozlov replied that a check was done of those records but he had "no proof of the quality of the search" and believed it may have to be repeated.

I asked whether regular military hospital records at the Ministry of Defense archives had been searched. Kozlov replied that they are being searched and he had "no doubt of the work by the military people." He volunteered that the Ministry of Defense had located a copy of the interrogation of a pilot shot down in Korea in 1954 and that document will be delivered to the U.S. side.

/signed/ TRUDY HUSKAMP PETERSON Assistant Archivist for the National Archives

National Archives Washington, DC 20408

Date: JUL 2 1992

Reply to Attn of: NN

Subject: Interview with Ministry of Security records officials

To: The Record

On June 24, 1992, Anatoliy Afanasevich Krayushkin, Section Chief, Ministry of Security, and Vladimir Konstantinovich Vinogradov, Deputy Section Director, were interviewed in the presence of Tatyana Pavlovna Koltovich. The U.S. side was represented by Trudy Peterson, Al Graham, Jim Connell, Ron Cima, and Bill Saxe. The meeting took place in the Joint Commission office. The interview was difficult and the following information may be unreliable.

I. Division of KGB records.

I asked how the KGB records were divided after the recent split of the KGB. Krayushkin said there was no division of the files. He said that the First Chief Directorate (external intelligence) was always separate for record-keeping and archival purposes, so that unit simply maintained control of these records after the split. Except for the First Directorate, the records of the directorates were sent to the central KGB archives. The archives organized fonds around each structural division, e.g., secret service protecting the president, border guards. (In other words, the KGB files are organized at the gross level by provenance.) Krayushkin pointed out that the records of military intelligence (GRU) have never been under the control of the KGB, that these records are under the control of the Ministry of Defense.

II. Nature of KGB records.

Vinogradov said that the "structural system of archives" was different from the American system. He said the main principle is to arrange the documents chronologically. He said there is a correspondence "system" (series), a "system of subjects, plans, and reports," "special operational files based on names." He said the "archives is created as we get in materials." He appeared to be talking about the central file in this discussion, for he also said each "ministerial subdivision of the KGB" has its own filing system. I asked if there was a system of dossiers and Krayushkin said no. I asked about the organization of the records of the KGB Secretariat. Krayushkin said the "main part is correspondence with entities outside the KGB," by which I understood him to mean other parts of the

Soviet government.

III. Local and regional KGB records.

Krayushkin said each oblast, krai, and republic KGB maintained its own records. A file could be opened at either the local or central level. He said it was "not unusual" to have a duplicate file at both the local and central level "but of course information would be sent to central control." I asked how much duplication of information there is between the central and local files on a particular case. Krayushkin responded that you would "have to ask at the krai, republic or oblast level to know what's going on." Vinogradov interrupted and twice said, "That's not an archival question."

IV Destruction schedules.

Krayushkin said there is a destruction schedule for both regional and central files. The time period until destruction generally is measured from the date the case is closed. There are retention periods of 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, or 15 years; there are also files scheduled for permanent retention.

V. Fingerprint file.

I asked whether the KGB maintained a fingerprint file separate from the MVD fingerprint file. Krayushkin said no, the KGB did not have a "central fingerprint file" and KGB could send prints to MVD for matching.

VI. KGB hospital records.

I reported that General Volkogonov had said that two persons were preparing a list of hospitals used by the special agencies to detain people. Krayushkin said that is a "worthless undertaking" because he had "never found that there were special hospitals under KGB." Some of the activity of the Commission is "useless." He said he wanted to postpone discussion of this issue because he was not ready to discuss it.

VII. Attitude to Volkogonov and research.

Krayushkin said that "with respect to what the General said" about special hospitals, the General is a military historian and "far removed from the reality of things." He said he thinks that a number of members of the Joint Commission understand the problems of how to search for POW/MIA cases better than others. He noted that people because of political currents go back and forth in their opinions on this issue. Krayushkin acknowledged that the U.S. has the "highest stimulus" to search for MIAs.

Krayushkin said he thinks that General Volkogonov has a tendency or desire to reveal as much as he can that is contained in the archival system, but due to the complicated history of US-Soviet relations "such an approach can pose difficult problems foe us." Krayushkin said he was glad that at the Joint Commission meeting on June 23 the U.S. side said there was no need to make a big deal of the Hamilton case (the incarceration of the U.S. deserter in a psychiatric hospital). Krayushkin went on to say that information relating to shooting down of aircraft inside the Soviet Union or over territorial waters "cannot today be revealed" because "there are forces" who "would use this information" to force apart or thwart the coming together of the U.S. and Russia.

VIII. Documents on Cold War incidents.

Krayushkin said that he was convinced that in all instances when planes were shot down, the crew perished. He immediately contradicted himself and said that when persons survived the crash, they were returned to the U.S.

"While Yeltsin was in the U.S." the Ministry of Security staff continued to review documents and found the records of one plane shot down over the Bering Sea. Two persons survived and were arrested; a criminal case was brought against them; a year later, as a result of improved relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the felony charge was commuted and they were returned to the U.S. This repatriation is attested to by the signature of a U.S. representative on a document transferring control. Later fisherman found the bodies of three other crew members and these were returned to U.S. control also.

Krayushkin then said he believed no further information could be revealed.

IX. Request for information from U.S.

Krayushkin said the U.S. must change its approach to the search for MIAs. He said the Russians need much more specific information on Cold War incidents, such as information on the date of the flight, etc. He outlined three areas where he believed more information or assurances are required:

A. Make a statement "more accurately and precisely" explaining that the U.S. is not interested in the facts of espionage or cases like Hamilton. Krayushkin suggested that this statement could be made at a "confidential level, even with Volkogonov or Yeltsin."

B. Provide more information with respect to reconnaissance flights, including the names of whom the U.S. believes might still be alive and living on the territory of Russia.

C. With respect to Vietnam and Korea, acknowledge that Vietnam said the Soviets had no contact with U.S. POWs. Krayushkin said he thought the U.S. "was correct" at the Joint Commission meeting saying that there were no Americans in camps in the territory of the old Soviet Union. He claimed that this is "more obvious" to the U.S. than even to the Russians, and by not acknowledging it there is a continuing

"lack of confidence in the American public" that the Russians are "doing a good job" of checking files. Krayushkin stated that the U.S. "should look of your relations with the Vietnamese."

X. Research strategy for Cold War incidents.

I asked Krayushkin to describe the steps that had been taken to find the documents on the Bering Sea incident as a model of the research strategy for Cold War incidents. Krayushkin replied that it is a difficult search because the files do not have a "system" (probably means an index) by race, nationality, citizenship, etc. The Bering Sea research began when they discovered a note from the Central Committee, CPSU, saying that a plane had been shot down over the Bering Sea and giving the names of two crew members. Then through card files and finding aids other documents were found.

I asked Krayushkin if it was easier to research by date or by name. Krayushkin said that it is easier to find a case by name of individual. I asked if a card was created for each crew member; Krayushkin said, "If alive and convicted." I asked, "If the crew member is dead?" Krayushkin said, "No card." I asked how names of dead would be identified, and Krayushkin said they would have to page through chronological files.

Krayushkin said that when they originally checked the more than 3000 names the U.S. side had provided they got almost no hits, so they began to look for incidents by "paging through fonds." He said they are looking at files "one by one" and claimed "this shows our sincere efforts." He said they "looked at the files of military counterintelligence," territorial counterintelligence, and "counterintelligence among our military."

I asked who would be notified when a plane was shot down and the crew was dead; I suggested Ministry of Defense, GRU, CPSU, KGB. Vinogradov said all of those plus probably also the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Vinogradov further said the U.S. should "understand that the people who are undertaking the research are not specialists in these topics." Krayushkin then said that the local border guards may not have information on the crash but the local military would inform GRU who would tell the Central Committee and the Ministry of Defense.

Krayushkin then said that the Joint Commission should "try to avoid the negative consequences from this picture" of intelligence planes being shot down. He said we should not concentrate on how information was communicated. Any concrete information should be shared with the US in confidential sessions, either between Volkogonov and Toon or even President to President but not at our level and not in an open manner.

Finally, Krayushkin reiterated that, although he could not be 100% certain, he thought that if Cold War incidents were treated like the Bering Sea crash, the U.S.S.R. would not have held the bodies.

XI. Research strategy on World War II.

Krayushkin confirmed that the World War II repatriation camps were under NKVD control and that, if a decision was made not to repatriate someone and that person was sent to another camp, that camp was also under NKVD. Krayushkin further confirmed that in the 1950s the control of the camps went to what is now MVD but he said the files would be with the "security organs" but Vinogradov said case files for criminals would be in the KGB files. I asked if there were then two files, one on the crime and one for prison life. Krayushkin said yes, the file on the crime is with KGB and the file on prison life is with MVD. There are criminal files on persons working for or assisting the Fascists. He added that if a person dies in camp the file is never destroyed and if the person is a foreigner the file is also preserved permanently.

I asked who is responsible for burial records for camps. Krayushkin said he was not sure but it was not important because the USSR repatriated bodies "even in 1960 which was not a good year in US-USSR relations."

XII. Final remarks.

I reiterated that the U.S. does not wand the details of any particular case; what we want is to determine the fate of U.S. POW/MIAs. In effect, we want the last paragraph of the last page of the dossier. In addition, if there are any buried bodies, the U.S. will want to recover the remains.

In order to satisfy the U.S. public that the Russian side has thoroughly examined the records, I continued, the U.S. side will need to understand the research strategy the Russian side has used and be able to explain it to the interested public. This includes understanding where in the government the relevant records are located, what systems of files and dossiers exist, how they are organized, and what finding aids lead the researcher to the files. I am convinced, I said, that archivists can describe the research process without giving away national security information.

In addition, I said, it would help the U.S. side develop confidence if we could understand the level of effort the Russian side is making, such as the extent of files searched, the number of personnel engaged in the search, the time expended, and so on.

Finally, I said that I understood the request for more specific information and I promised to convey that information to Ambassador Toon.

In response, Krayushkin returned to the theme of additional information. With respect to aircraft shot down, he said he was sure the intelligence agencies of the U.S. Defense Department must have "sufficient information" on the flights because every plane which belonged to SAC of the US Air Force had equipment that allowed a fix on the position of the aircraft. Krayushkin said that it was not a situation of the "Russian side denying information to your side--we are continuing to do the work" but the task would be easier "if we could limit the scope of the search."

Krayushkin also said that by "analogy to the US" he believed the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) will have the most relevant information.

Krayushkin complained that the task "first posed by the American side" was to find MIAs of Korea and Vietnam. Now the task has been broadened to include Cold War and World War II. It is "very difficult to check conviction records without names;" there is not a separate file section or file code or color code for foreigners; it is further complicated because U.S. names are "from many nationalities." The Ministry of Security traced the list of 3,752 names the U.S. provided in March. They did not find information on **any** of those names in the card files (unspecified), so they started a project to look at files (also unspecified) one by one.

As to the level of effort, Krayushkin said ten people are doing this search as "regular work" full time. In addition, in January 1992 the Ministry received a telegram addressed to all "security organs" in Russia from the "First Deputy" which instructed them to take a look at all inventories and all archives and to question retired personnel. They were also instructed to look at "organs of internal affairs at the local level." According to Krayushkin, no information on living Americans was found, including in the territories where there "are or were" prison camps. Krayushkin said he believes if there is any information about Americans it would be found in the central archives of the government departments, not in the local archives.

Krayushkin concluded by asserting that they are "checking even oblique information" if it occurs regarding camps in China and if they find any information it will be turned over to the U S.

/signed/ TRUDY HUSKAMP PETERSON Assistant Archivist for the National Archives

National Archives Washington, DC 20408

Date: JUL 8 1992

Reply to

Attn of: NN

Subject: Interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs records

officials

To: The Record

On June 25, 1992, Vladimir Anatoliovich (name and patronymic uncertain) Lebedev, director of the Department of History and Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Vladimir Vasiliyevich Sokolov, Deputy Director of the Documents Division of the Department, were interviewed. The U.S. side was represented by Trudy Peterson, Jim Connell, Bill Saxe, and Ron Cima. The meeting took place in Lebedev's office in the Ministry; the interview was conducted in English. Lebedev was formerly deputy head of the Division of U.S.A. and Canada and has just joined the Department of History and Archives within the last several months.

I. General characteristics.

The Department of History and Archives both publishes on foreign affairs and administers the archives. There are two archives under the Department's control:

A. Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire, 1720-1917, occupying 8 kilometers of shelving.

B. Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (formerly the Archives of Foreign Policy of the USSR), 1917-present, occupying 26 kilometers of shelving, 1300 "units of storage" and 800 fonds.

The archives are housed in an eight-story building adjacent to the Ministry that was built for the purpose of holding the Archives.

II Scope of the records.

The archives holds all records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It does not hold the records of the military attaches; these attaches have a "separate central authority" and their records go to the Ministry of Defense. Nor does the archives have the records of the International Department of the Communist Party.

The archives holds the records of the embassies abroad. There is a separate fond for each embassy, and records are retired from each embassy to the archives every two years.

III. Filing system.

All files are classified in a subject scheme that has ten main classes: political, economic consular, bilateral, etc. There are subclasses within these ten. They said there is not a number associated with the class or sub-class. The filing plan is reviewed and revised annually, and Lebedev and Sokolov estimated that-over a five year period a third of the filing topics would change. They used as examples the need for categories for global warming and religious activities. They said that most of the change occurs below the level of the ten big classes and that it is a major decision to change one of the ten.

Lebedev said that the document level controls (apparently lists not cards) are created by the operating unit, such as the U.S. desk. Because these controls, which function as finding aids, were for internal "service" use, they were not "blind." The finding aids are now being computerized.

Sokolov said that records are maintained in the archives by provenance. For each department of the Ministry, incoming documents are in one file and outgoing notes in another file. "Chronology is obligatory," he said. I suggested that embassies often have two channels of communication with their

central ministry, one for official reports and one for unofficial notes. Lebedev agreed and seemed to say that the archives gets both channels, which are filed separately but both using the same filling classification system. There are also separate finding aids for documents from both channels.

The filing system would be much easier to understand if a U.S. archivist could tour the storage areas. It is not clear, for example, whether the documents are filed by classification category and thereunder chronologically or the documents are filed chronologically in two year blocks and the finding aids are used to identify all documents on a single topic. It is even possible that all documents are listed in a register when created or received and there is an index to the register, making a search a three step process (index to register to document). What is clear is that each document is classified and the control is at the item level. I suggested that on the next visit a tour would be useful, and Lehedev said that would be Possible if declassification had occurred in the records.

IV. Records relating to U.S. deserters.

In explaining the classification system, Lebedev said that the case of the deserters from the Intrepid would be classified as an "incident." He went on to say that the documents relating to deserters are probably still classified but can surely be opened now. He suggested that the "normal line of traffic" in such cases would not include the embassy. I asked where an official note from the American embassy inquiring about the fate of these individuals would be filed. Lebedev said that it would end up in the American section or the Japanese section. He suggested that there would probably be more interesting records in "other services" and a request for information on deserters would be forwarded to the Communist Party, KGB, GRU and Ministry of Defense.

V. Records relating to POWs in Vietnam.

Lebedev said that records written by the Soviet military in Vietnam and reporting Vietnamese information on POWS would not have come to the U.S.S.R. through embassy channels.

The U.S. side reported that General Abramov told us that a doctor attached to the Soviet embassy in Vietnam treated an American POW. Lebedev said that medical staff in an embassy are not required to make reports to the Foreign Ministry except to report on the state of health of the personnel of the Embassy, such as a report if someone had fallen ill and could not fill his job in the Embassy. Lebedev said that medical staff are "simply technical employees" and the medical attention that General Abramov reports would only occur if the doctor was "officially requested to do so." He said that most of the medical reporting would have been destroyed in Vietnam but correspondence might survive. He suggested that the "best way" to check the story would be to meet the doctor.

VI. Records relating to Cold War incidents.

Lebedev said that when, in the wake of a Cold War incident, the U.S. would give the Soviet Union an official request for information on the fate of Americans, the request would be reported up the line of authority and a complete search of the files would be made "because of the humanitarian nature" of the request. Turning to the current research, Lebedev said that several diplomats have come to the archives to search for relevant documents (he said the Division of USA and Canada does not employ archivists on its divisional staff) and the diplomats were assisted by his staff "in all proper ways." Lebedev said the diplomats "relied essentially on" the archivists to bring "cases" to the diplomats who would review the records and declassify them. As a result of this process, the review generally covered (i.e., documents could be identified on) all cases but one. He said that Secretary of State Baker was given 37 "or so" documents that were declassified as a result of this process. He said these documents showed correspondence between the KGB and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, among others.

Lebedev then said that one of the cases about which information had been requested was one in which the person had been returned to U.S. control in 1953 and there was documentation to prove it. Lebedev said he could not understand why the Americans did not know that their own man had been returned.

Using the case of Francis Gary Powers as an example, I asked when the Ministry would become involved after a plane had crashed and an individual had been found alive. Lebedev said that the Ministry would get involved when it was instructed to do a draft note to the U.S. on the incident. (Lebedev then said that his father was an aide to Khrushchev, and Ogonyok magazine recently published a photograph of his father whispering in Khrushchev's ear delivering the news that Francis Gary Powers had been shot down.) I asked whether he could imagine a situation in which an American plane crashed within the borders of the Soviet Union and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would not know. Lebedev said yes, if the plane landed, nobody knew, there was no reaction abroad, there was no news report, then the Ministry of Foreign Affairs probably would not know. "Important events in history didn't bring attention of contemporaries, I can tell you as an historian," said Lebedev. As an example, he said that the archives had recently searched for information on foreign reaction in 1954 when the Crimea was incorporated into the Ukraine and they found there was none.

VI. Records relating to Korean War POWS.

I asked where information from the Chinese (or the Soviet Embassy in Beijing) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the Korean War would be filed. Lebedev said that "every document was typed in several copies" so if Beijing informed Moscow about an American one copy would go to the U.S. desk and be filed in their files. He said the desk executing the decision would be responsible for maintaining the record of the decision and the action taken.

As to the specifics of American POWs in Korea, Lebedev said the ministry would only have "secondary information, a trace of communications" because "other organs would handle" the issue. He also volunteered that documents containing such information would generally be considered so important that they would "attract the attention of higher authorities" than the Ministry. Lebedev said flatly that the Ministry would not have been involved in a transfer of Americans out of Vietnam or Korea.

VII. Transaction logs.

Saxe asked whether there is a central communication desk that keeps a 24-hour log of events. Lebedev confirmed that there was such a log. For information relating to military events, he said the military service provides information to the head of the Ministry of Defense, Defense passes it to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and if the information involves the U.S., the Ministry's communications desk passes it to the head of the U.S.-Canada division. (If the U.S. can come up with a definitive list of Cold War incidents, this may be one important place to check.)

VIII. Resources required.

Lebedev said that the archivists at the Ministry have identified 700-800 files at 30-100 pages per file that may be relevant to the work of the Commission. He said that he needed money to process these files for declassification and release. He said that General Volkogonov has the specific authority to declassify for the Commission and Lebedev himself can make certain declassification decisions; "we can handle it ourselves," he said, because the MIA/POW documents are a government "issue."

The problem, he said, is that the Ministry has reduced declassifiers by 20 FTE since last year. Declassifiers are former ambassadors and "our law permits them to get parttime government employment." The Ministry has no money to pay them out of its budget and last year the Ministry received funds through "certain non-profit organizations" interested in having documents declassified. Lebedev suggested that the American side of the Commission funnel money for declassification to the Ministry through a foundation. He said that the Ministry cannot take money from Roskomarchiv (apparently there is a prohibition on inter-agency transfer of funds) and since the Joint Commission is organized through Roskomarchiv, he feared that if the Commission provides money directly it will go to Roskomarchiv. I said that, if the U.S. decided to fund the declassification, it would be something that the diplomats of both governments should be able to work out.

I asked exactly what resources would be required. Lebedev said that he needed 2-3 declassifiers for half a

year at a salary of 5000 rubles per month each and 2 xerox operators for a half year at 3000 rubles per month. I asked if machines, paper, and toner are required. Lebedev replied that on July 1 the Ministry is closing its xerox laboratory because of lack of funds; the copier equipment there needs repair. He said copiers, paper, toner, and repair service all are needed. I asked if it would be easier if, after declassification, the U.S. provided the copier operators and made the copies using U.S.-supplied equipment and supplies. He said that the Ministry's regulations say that copies can only be made by Ministry employees, so he needs to have the copier operators on the payroll. He said that he could accept copiers, paper, and toner as a gift, but he needs to have the salary dollars. Finally, I asked whether the records once declassified would be open for research use by nongovernmental researchers (such as historians) from both the U.S. and Russia, and Lebedev said yes.

/signed/ TRUDY HUSKAMP PETERSON Assistant Archivist for the National Archives

National Archives Washington, DC 20408

Date: JUL 8 1992

Reply to Attn of: NN

Subject: Interview with director of the Presidential Archives

To: The Record

On June 26, 1992, Aleksandr Vasilyevich Korotkov, Director of the Archives of the President of the Russian Federation (also known as the "Kremlin Archives" or the "Presidential fond"), was interviewed. He was accompanied by V. I. Kozlov and Tatyana Pavlovna Koltovich. The U.S. side was represented by Trudy Peterson, Jim Connell, Ron Cima, and Larry Gomez. The interview took place in the Joint Commission's office.

I. General characteristics.

President Yeltsin signed a resolution establishing the archives on December 31, 1991. The archivists began work on the records in March 1992. The archives basically consists of the records of the Presidents of the USSR. It holds two major groups of documents:

1. Archives of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (because the President of the USSR was also the Secretary of the Party).

2. Documents "which fell under the President himself and the apparatus supporting him."

Korotkov said that the archives will "of course" now be "structured for the new organization of the Presidency."

A special commission was established to set up the archives; the commission was composed of people who were concerned with the preservation of the documents. The commission will work out the date of the transfer of the Presidential archives to the custody of the State Archives. At this stage Korotkov said that he can say "with certainty" that the documents of the Politburo will be transferred. There are two important factors to remember: first, the "historical part" of the Politburo records will probably be split between and transferred to the two existing archives of the Communist Party (probably in accordance with the 1952 date split), and second, the Kremlin Archives was a closed and working archives and when the records are transferred the public archives "will open them up." In addition, he said, a new archives of the President must be set up.

II. Scope of the records.

Korotkov said that he could not give an exact number of fonds in the archives, but it is about fifty. Most,

he said, are "personal fonds" in the sense that the documents "belong to individuals" such as Gorbachev, Brezhnev, Khrushchev, Stalin, etc. Alongside these personal fonds are the records of the Plenums of the Communist Party, the records of Congresses, and special committees (like the one that studied Chernobyl). Related documents are stored in other archives. The archives does not have the records of the Chief Political Administration of the Army and Navy.

The date span of the records is 1918-present, with about 100,000 files. The archives has finding aids in both list (opis) and card formats; there are multiple card files. According to Korotkov, the finding aids permit the staff "to adequately seek out the information we need." The archives is studying the potential for automating the finding aids.

III. Filing system.

The records are arranged on the basis of provenance. Documents are controlled at either the item level or the file level. (Kozlov commented that the system is "based on Peter the Great.") At present the archives is facing a "great outpouring" of documents from Yeltsin's office; they are "registering" as many as 3000 documents per day. The finding aid system is excellent for government purposes, and inquiries from the government can be "fulfilled in a matter of minutes."

The U.S. side was shown the filing plan; in a future visit it should be carefully reviewed. The plan is a subject classification scheme with 15-20 general classification categories; there are subclasses and sub-subclasses within each of these. (It appears to be much like the scheme at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; it also appears to be the scheme used in both Communist Party archives.) Korotkov said it is a system arranged "thematically by subject" and Kozlov added that the scheme was "based on Marxist-Leninist principles." One category of particular pertinence to the Joint Commission's work is "defense of national borders."

IV. Destruction of records.

Both archivists agreed that in both the Stalin and Khrushchev periods there was some "cleaning up" of the records; i.e., destruction. Asked what was the character of the records destroyed, Korotkov said he did not know. I asked if it was reasonable to assume that the records destroyed related to domestic politics; Korotkov said yes, probably to internal Party matters. He said he believes nothing was destroyed that would shed light on MIA/POW matters.

V. General records relating to MIA/POW matters.

Korotkov said that he believes only one fond, that of the Politburo, relates to MIA/POW affairs. ~e does not believe there will be relevant information in the Party, plenum, or personal fonds.

Korotkov said that the archivists have turned up some documents in the Politburo records, but he said that the records will be searched again. "You can just imagine the responsibility laid on us" by Yeltsin's statement, he said. Korotkov said he had talked about this responsibility with General Volkogonov, and the General will personally work in the archives--in fact, began that morning at 9:30. According to Korotkov, Volkogonov "has Yeltsin's permission to look at ~y document" held by the archives.

I asked whether the minutes of the Politburo had been searched. Korotkov said his "coworkers" had looked at these and said they did not find anything. I suggested that there are often three series of documents: official minutes, that are a cleaned-up version; full, unofficial minutes; and background papers that were used to support the meeting. Korotkov said there were no full or "steno minutes" to either the meeting of the Secretariat or the Politburo. There were "steno minutes" for the Plenums and Congresses. I asked whether it was easier to search the minutes by date or name. Korotkov said that there is a card index to both the minutes and the background papers and it provides "thematic" classification. It is, therefore, easier to search by subject than by date or name.

VI. Records relating to World War II.

I asked Korotkov to define a research strategy for locating information about U.S. servicemen not repatriated after World War II. He replied that any relevant records "would in general probably not be in the Presidential Archives and would be found in the Archives of the October Revolution. I asked whether the decision to retain U.S. servicemen in the post-World War II years would have come to the Politburo for decision. Korotkov said that he believed it would have.

I noted the statement in Yeltsin's letter that eight persons were held in camps and four were in psychiatric hospitals; I asked Korotkov if the decision to retain these individuals had been found in the Politburo records. He said no. I then asked whether Stalin could have personally made the decision to retain them, and Korotkov said yes. I then said that Stalin's "personal fond" should be searched. Korotkov promised that that search would be done to get even "oblique" references to detained U.S. persons. I then asked whether a person could be held without either Stalin's or the Politburo's agreement. Korotkov said, "Yes, probably," and went on to say that the detention of an individual private soldier would probably not require consultation.

VII. Records relating to Korean POWS.

I asked whether the Politburo would have been involved in a decision to transfer U.S. POWs to the territory of the Soviet Union during the Korean War. Korotkov responded by saying that the U.S. will be given some GRU documents that say that the Soviet military was forbidden to even interview U.S. prisoners in Korea, much less take physical custody. He commented that they will be searching again for Korean War era information in the Politburo archives.

VIII. Records relating to Cold War incidents.

I asked what the channel of information to the Politburo would be in the case of a Cold War incident. Korotkov said the KGB had a "direct line" to the Politburo; Kozlov said that a second channel would be the GRU. The information, Korotkov said, would be collected by local authorities and turned over to the local KGB, who would report to the central KGB and they would report to the Politburo. I asked whether names would be reported if the persons were dead. Korotkov said in that case the names probably would not be reported to the Politburo, just the fact of the incident. I asked whether, if the person was taken alive such as was Francis Gary Powers, the Politburo would make the decision to use him for propaganda purposes. Korotkov said no, that would probably be the decision of one of the Politburo members, the one responsible for propaganda work.

IX. Records relating to Vietnam POWs.

I asked if the Presidential Archives had the set of interrogations of U.S. prisoners in Vietnam that General Andronov had said was sent to the Communist Party. Korotkov said no.

/signed/ TRUDY HUSKAMP PETERSON Assistant Archivist for the National Archives

National Archives Washington, DC 20408

Date: JUL 8 1992

Reply to Attn of: NN

Subject: Discussion with V.I. Kozlov and Sergei Osipov

To: The Record

On June 26, 1992, V.I. Kozlov and Sergei Osipov, aide to General Volkogonov, met with Trudy Peterson, Jim Connell, Ron Cima and Larry Gomez, in the Joint Commission's office. Tatyana Pavlovna Koltovich was also present.

I. Yeltsin letter.

Kozlov said that he had no final answer to the question of whether seven or eight U.S. citizens were held in the camps, nor did he have an answer to the location of the camps. He said that in 1953 the entire system of camps was the responsibility of the NKVD, which later divided into the KGB and the MVD. Kozlov said the Russian side was "taking steps to force our colleagues in KGB to disclose this information."

Kozlov also said that the Russian side believes that 1052 Soviets were convicted of working for Americans, i.e., espionage.

I reminded Kozlov that we need copies of the background documents as well as the report from the October Revolution Archives on the seven/eight problem. He agreed.

II. Division of Repatriation records.

Kozlov gave me a copy of the order dividing the Repatriation Directorate records. (The document is with the Army for translation.)

III. Records of the Chief Political Directorate of the Armed Forces.

These records are located in the Archives of the Ministry of Defense in Podolsk, where they comprise one fond.

IV. Records of special psychiatric hospitals.

Kozlov said "one colleague" is working in the Institute of Psychiatric Expertise, and later that day Kozlov hoped to have an answer on the list of special hospitals. He commented that the hospitals are now under the direction of the Ministry of Health but previously were "under our respected colleagues whom you know."

Osipov said the Russian side is making an effort to find the psychiatric hospitals; there were probably seven or eight such psychiatric hospitals previously subservient to the KGB. He said General Volkogonov asked him to go personally and work on the question. He said he looked for hospital records for 1953 and found a relatively large volume of files and card files. He said that the General asked that records of 1951-55 and 1967-69 be reviewed. Osipov said, "My colleagues are looking at the other years and I looked at 1953 personally." He said they will try to pick up even oblique references. Osipov said nationality is indicated on the card files he reviewed, but the reviewers haven't found "U.S." yet. He mentioned that to go into the files themselves and get the details of psychiatric illnesses would require a court order.

V. Records of the Central Military Medical Directorate.

Kozlov promised that these records would be re-reviewed starting Monday.

VI. Records of GRU.

Kozlov said he thought it very significant that Ambassador Toon met with the director of the GRU. He said the GRU categorically denies taking part in interrogating U.S. military prisoners.

VII. Records of External Intelligence Service.

By Monday, June 29, the External Intelligence Service will give the Russian side its signed statement regrading live U.S. military personnel in the territory of the old Soviet Union.

VIII. Records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Kozlov assured the U.S. side that the degree of openness in that archives and ln the discussion with the directors was very high, "the best" that the U.S. side has had.

IX. Document copies.

Kozlov said that additional documents would be ready for the U.S. side by 2 p.m. that day.

X. Pechora case.

Kozlov reported that he is told that Bugaev, a possible confirming source, has disappeared again. Bugaev is said to work in the forest, and the Russian side will try to locate him by Monday, June 29.

XI. Archives of the Red Cross.

Osipov reported that the archivists have reviewed the archives of the Soviet Red Cross but have found no references to U.S. POWs .

/signed/ TRUDY HUSKAMP PETERSON Assistant Archivist for the National Archives

JOINT STAFF ACTION PROCESSING FORM

TO /initials/	CLASSIFICATION	ACTION NUMBER
DJS	UNCLASSIFIED	J-5 2578/485-00

THRU		ORIG
		SUSPENSE

SUBJECT SECDEF Request for Joint Staff Response to Questions Re: Yeltsin Report of Live POWs in Former Soviet Union	ACTION APPROVAL X SIGNATURE INFORMATION	SJS SUSPENSE J SUSPENSE 19 Jun 92

ACTION SUMMARY

1. Purpose: To obtain DJS signature on Memorandum (TAB A) forwarding information requested from the Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense on US Cold War Losses from 1946 to 1991.

2. Background: SECDEF requested (TAB B) Joint Staff research and compile available interagency data on US Cold War losses from 1946-1991. Face-to-face coordination with pertinent representatives of all agencies holding information on this subject was accomplished. All agencies contacted were responsive and forthcoming with their available data. Attached package reflects compilation of current Joint Staff, OSD, CIA, NSA, DIA and The Services holdings on Cold War losses. The data provided is the most accurate available given the suspense and the fact that most of the incidents are 30 years, or more, old. We will continue to refine (word unclear).

3. Discussion: Compiled information (TAB C) conforms to the parameters of air and sea losses in proximity to Communist territory associated with the Cold War era, 1946 to 1991. It does not address incidents associated with Hot War conflicts or combat. The total of 39 incidents fitting the above parameters involved 363 individuals, in the following four categories:

- 193 RECOVERED ALIVE

- 27 RECOVERED DEAD

- 11 NOT RECOVERED, BUT FATE KNOWN

- 132 NOT RECOVERED, FATE UNKNOWN

Material presented further delineates the 13 Fate Unknown incidents that involved the 132 individuals. For privacy reasons we are not providing names of individuals in this package.

ACTION OFFICER/DIV/PHONE LTC Jim Caswell/APAC/POW-MIA/5-8135 INDOWP #390

DATE PREPARED 19 Jun 92 CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED CLASSFIED BY DECLASSIFY ON

//LIBRARY OF CONGRESS EDITORIAL NOTE: The original document, a copy of which is available on microfilm from the Photoduplication Service, had a 1.5" x 4.25" rubber box stamped across the rightmost 1.5" of words along the right margin. The top lines read "ARMY JACO"; "JACO 1; and "ACTION DAPE." The rest of the stamp is illegible eexcept for the last three lines, which read "DASG"; "FILE"; and "DATE."//

UNCLASSIFIED

Joint Staff is continuing to pursue, with State, information on official government-to-government diplomatic exchanges with respect to the Fate Unknown incidents. State is still researching. DASD (ISA) for POW/MIA Affairs is sending a representative with Ambassador Toon, and other members of the US-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, to pursue information disclosed by Russian President Yeltsin during the recent summit. The delegation will be leaving on 20 Jun 92. In this regard, a copy of the Cold War incidents has been provided to the delegation for their use.

4. Recommendation: DJS sign the Memorandum attached.

Attachments

UNCLASSIFIED

THE JOINT STAFF

Washington, DC

/Dept. of Defense logo/

Reply ZIP Code: 20318-0300

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SENIOR MILITARY ASSISTANT

TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: U.S. Cold War Losses from 1946 to 1991

1. Pertaining to your request of 17 June 1992, concerning U.S. losses incurred from the Cold War, 1946 to 1991, the attached information is provided. The data provided is the most accurate available given the suspense and the fact that most of the incidents are 30 Years, or more, old. We will continu~? tn refine.

2. Talking Paper and enclosures presents data that reflects a compilation of all available material gathered from the Joint Staff, OSD, CIA, NSA, DIA and The Services.

Enclosures

SJS 2578/485-00

17 June 1992

DISTRIBUTION: DJS PLUS J-2, J-3, J-5, DOCDIV, OCJCS/LC

SECRETARY, JOINT STAFF DIRECTIVE

on

SECDEF REQUEST FOR JOINT STAFF RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS RE: YELTSIN REPORT OF LIVE POWs IN FORMER SOVIET UNION

1. SECDEF has requested Joint Staff response to the following questions:

How many airplanes were shot down or otherwise lost

during the Cold War? What happened to the crew?

(Must sort the obvious cases where the aircraft crashed into the Sea of Japan with all hands lost, for example, from the unknowns.)

2. J-5 is requested to prepare the reply for DJS signature, in collaboration with J-2, J-3, DOCDIV, and OCJCS/LC.

3. The suspense date for this action is 1200, 19 June 1992.

Joint Secretariat

SJS 2S78/485-00

TALKING PAPER 19 June 1992

Subject: U.S. Cold War Losses from 1946 to 1991

1. Purpose. To present a current compilation of available information on U.S. Cold War Losses.

2. Talking Points.

* Attached data on Cold War losses was compiled from information received from the Joint Staff, OSD, CIA, NSA, DIA and The Services.

* Parameters of the search included: air and sea loss incidents that occurred in proximity to a Communist territory associated with the Cold War era, 1946 to 1991. Incidents associated with Hot War conflicts or combat are not addressed.

* ENCLOSURE A presents an overall summary of 39 incidents, involving 363 individuals, in the following four categories:

- 193 RECOVERED ALIVE

- 27 RECOVERED DEAD

- 11 NOT RECOVERED BUT FATE IS KNOWN

- 132 NOT RECOVERED, FATE IS UNKNOWN

* ENCLOSURE B presents a summary of 13 problematic incidents, in which, at least some of the individuals involved in the incident were not recovered and their fate is not known and the possibility of their having fallen into Communist control can not be ruled out.

* ENCLOSURE C contains summary sheets on these problematic incidents.

* Joint Staff has requested State to provide, from their archives, official government-to-government diplomatic exchanges with respect to problematic incidents. State is currently researching.

* DASD (ISA) for POW/MIA Affairs is sending a representative with Ambassador Toon, and other members of the US-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs meeting in Moscow, to pursue information disclosed by Russian President Yeltsin during the recent summit. Delegation will depart 20 Jun 92. Regarding this trip, a copy of this Cold War information has been provided to the delegation for their use.

Prepared by: LTC Jim Caswell, USA

Asia-Pacific Division/POW/MIA/5-8135 SUMMARY OF COLD WAR LOSSES - INDIVIDUAL
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TOTAL INCIDENT DATESOULSTOTALTOTALTOTAL NOT TOTAL NOT RECORD OFOPERATINGONRECOVEREDRECOVEREDRECOVEREDRECOVERED NUMBER LOSS TYPE PLATFORM AGENCY TYPE MISSION LOCATION BOARD ALIVE DEAD FATE-KN FATE-UNK

2 08/09/46 C-47 USAF TRANSPORT YUGOSLAVIA 5 5 0 0 0 1 08/19/46 C-47 USAF TRANSPORT YUGOSLAVIA 5 0 5 0 0 3 04/08/50 PB4Y2 USN PATROL BALTIC SEA 10 0 0 0 10 4 11/06/51 P2V USN PATROL SEA OF JAPAN 10 0 0 0 10 5 11/18/51 C-47 USAF TRANSPORT HUNGARY 4 4 0 0 0 8 06/13/52 RB-29 USAF RECON SEA OF JAPAN

NORTH OF HOKKAIDO 12 0 0 0 12 6 10/07/52 RB29 USAF RECON KURILE

ISLANDS NORTH OF HOKKAIDO 8 0 0 0 8 7 01/12/53 B-29 USAF LEAFLET DROP MANCHURIA 14 11 0 3 0 9 01/18/53 P2V USN PATROL FORMOSA STRAITS 13 7 0 4 2 10 03/10/53 F-84 USAF INTERCEPT GERMANY 1 1 0 0 0 11 07/29/53 RB-50 USAF RECON SEA OF JAPAN 17 1 2 1 13 43 08/17/53 T-6 USAF PATROL KOREAN DMZ 2 1 0 1 0 13 09/04/54 P2V USN RECON SEA OF

JAPAN

NORTH OF HOKKAIDO 10 9 0 1 0 14 11/07/54 RB-29 USAF RECON SEA OF JAPAN

NEAR HOKKAIDO 11 10 1 0 0 15 01/19/55 ? USA TRAINING KOREAN DMZ 2 1 0 1 0 16 04/17/55 RB-47 USAF RECON NORTHERN

PACIFIC NEAR KAMCHATKA 3 0 0 0 3 17 06/22/55 P2V USN RECON BERING STRAITS 11 11 0 0 0 18 08/17/55 LT-6 USAF TRAINING KOREAN DMZ 1 1 0 0 0 20 08/22/56 P4M USN PATROL NORTH OF

FORMOSA NEAR WENCHOW CHINA 16 0 4 0 12

22 09/10/56 RB-50 USAF RECON SEA OF JAPAN 16 0 0 0 16 23 12/23/57 T-33 USAF LOGISTICS ALBANIA 1 1 0 0 0 24 03/06/58 F-86 USAF TRAINING NORTH KOREA 1 1 0 0 0 26 06/27/58 C-118 USAF TRANSPORT SOVIET ARMENIA 9 9 0 0 0 27 09/02/58 C-130 USAF TRANSPORT SOVIET ARMENIA 17 0 4 0 13 28 02/01/60 U-2 CIA RECON SOVIET UNION 1 1 0 0 0 29 05/25/60 C-47 USAF TRANSPORT E. GERMANY 9 9 0 0 0 30 07/01/60 RB-47 USAF RECON BARENTS SEA

OFF SOVIET UNION 6 2 1 0 3 31 10/27/62 U-2 USAF RECON CUBA 1 0 1 0 0 12 05/17/63 HELICOPT. USA PATROL KOREAN DMZ 2 2 0 0 0 36 08/06/63 LT. PLANE USA UNKNOWN NORTH KOREA 6 6 0 0 0 32 01/24/64 T-39 USAF TRANSPORT E. GERMANY 3 0 3 0 0 33 03/10/64 RB-66 USAF RECON E. GERMANY 3 3 0 0 0 42 12/14/65 RB-57 USAF RECON BLACK SEA 2 0 0 0 2 34 01/23/68 SHIP USN RECON OFF NORTH KOREAN

EAST COAST 73 72 1 0 0 41 06/30/68 DC-8 USAF TRANSPORT KURILE ISLANDS 17 17 0 0 0 35 04/15/69 EC-121 USN RECON NORTH KOREA 30 0 2 0 28 25 08/19/69 OH-23 USA UNKNOWN KOREAN DMZ 3 3 0 0 0 38 10/21/70 U-8 USA RECON SOVIET ARMENIA 4 4 0 0 0 40 07/14/77 CH-47 USA TRANSPORT NORTH KOREA 4 1 3 0 0

GRAND TOTAL: 363 193 27 11 132 TOTAL NUMBER OF INCIDENTS: 39

--End of Report--

..AS OF 19 .. 92 AT 1536L , ENTERED BY APAC DIVISION, J-5, THE JOINT STAFF, POC: LTC...

TOTAL TOTAL INCIDENT DATE TYPE TYPE SOULS NOT RECVD RECORD OF OF OPERATING OF ON FATE NUMBER LOSS PLATFORM AGENCY MISSION LOCATION BOARD UNKNOWN

3 04/08/50 PB4Y2 USN PATROL BALTIC SEA 10 10 **LOSS REMARKS: SHOT DOWN BY SOVIET FIGHTERS.

4 11/06/51 RB-29 USAF RECON SEA OF JAPAN N. OF HOKKAIDO 10 10 **LOSS REMARKS: SHOT DOWN BY SOVIET FIGHTERS.

8 06/13/52 RB-29 USAF RECON SEA OF JAPAN N. OF HOKKAIDO 12 12 **LOSS REMARKS: BELIEVED TO BE SHOT DOWN BY SOVIETS.

6 10/07/52 RB-29 USAF RECON KURILE ISL. N. OF HOKKAIDO 8 8 **LOSS REMARKS: AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN BY SOVIET FIGHTERS.

9 01/18/53 P2V USN PATROL FORMOSA STRAITS 13 2 **LOSS REMARKS: DITCHED AFTER HIT BY CHINESE BATTERIES.

11 07/29/53 RB-50 USAF RECON SEA OF JAPAN 17 13 **LOSS REMARKS: SHOT DOWN BY

SOVIET MIG FIGHTERS

16 04/17/55 RB-47 USAF RECON N. PACIFIC NEAR KAMCHATKA 3 3 **LOSS REMARKS: PROBABLY SHOT DOWN BY SOVIET FIGHTERS.

20 08/22/56 P4M USN PATROL N.OF FORMOSA NR. WENCHOW CHINA 16 16 **LOSS REMARKS: SHOT DOWN BY CHINESE FIGHTERS.

22 09/10/56 RB-50 USAF RECON SEA OF JAPAN 16 16 **LOSS REMARKS: POSSIBLE SHOT DOWN OR DOWNED BY A TYPHOON

27 09/02/58 C-130 USAF TRANSPORT SOVIET ARMENIA 17 13 **LOSS REMARKS: SHOT DOWN BY SOVIET MIGS AFTER STRAYING INTO SOVIET AIRSPACE.

30 07/01/60 RB-47 USAF RECON BARENTS SEA OFF SOVIET UNION 6 3 **LOSS REMARKS: SHOT DOWN BY SOVIET MIGS.

42 12/14/65 RB-57 USAF RECON BLACK SEA 2 2 **LOSS REMARKS: AIRCRAFT WENT DOWN FOR UNKNOWN CAUSES.

35 04/15/69 EC-121 USN RECON NORTH KOREA 30 28 **LOSS REMARKS: AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN BY N. KOREANS IN THE SEA OF JAPAN.

TOTALS: 160 132

TOTAL NUMBER OF INCIDENTS: 13

--End of Report--

FATE UNKNOWN INCIDENT SUMMARIES

INCIDENT SERIAL NUMBER 3

ON 8 APRIL 1950 AN UNARMED NAVY PB4Y-2 FROM VP-26 WAS SHOT DOWN BY SOVIET FIGHTERS IN THE BALTIC SEA. THE ENTIRE CREW OF 10 WAS LOST, BUT FATE WAS NEVER FACTUALLY DETERMINED. A PRESUMPTIVE FINDING OF DEATH IS THE OFFICIAL STATUS.

INCIDENT SERIAL NUMBER 4

ON 6 NOVEMBER 1951 A US NAVY P2V FROM VP-6 WAS SHOT DOWN BY SOVIET FIGHTERS OVER INTERNATIONAL WATERS OFF THE COAST OF SIBERIA. THE ENTIRE CREW OF 10 WAS LOST BUT FATE NEVER FACTUALLY DETERMINED. A PRESUMPTIVE FINDING OF DEATH IS THE OFFICIAL STATUS.

INCIDENT SERIAL NUMBER 6

ON 7 OCT 1952 A USAF RB-29 WAS SHOT DOWN BY SOVIET FIGHTERS IN THE VICINITY OF HOKKAIDO, JAPAN AND CRASHED NEAR RUSSIAN HELD YURI ISLAND. THE ENTIRE CREW OF 8 WAS LOST BUT FATE NEVER FACTUALLY DETERMINED. A PRESUMPTIVE FINDING OF DEATH IS THE OFFICIAL STATUS.

THE US PROTESTED TO THE SOVIETS. THE SOVIETS ADMITTED FIRING ON THE AIRCRAFT CLAIMING IT HAD VIOLATED THEIR AIRSPACE. THEY REPORTED SEEING NO PARACHUTES AND CLAIMED NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE FATE OF THE CREW.

INCIDENT SERIAL NUMBER 9

ON 18 JANUARY 1953 A USN P2V FROM VP-6 WAS HIT BY CHINESE COMMUNIST SHORE BATTERIES. THE AIRCRAFT WAS FORCED TO DITCH IN THE FORMOSA STRAITS. ELEVEN OF THE 13 CREWMEMBERS WERE INITIALLY RESCUED BY COAST GUARD HELICOPTER. UNFORTUNATELY THE HELO CRASHED DURING WATER TAKE OFF AND 4 ADDITIONAL CREWMEN WERE LOST. 2 CREWMEN WERE UNACCOUNTED FOR AND THEIR FATES NEVER FACTUALLY DETERMINED. A PRESUMPTIVE FINDING OF DEATH IS THE OFFICIAL STATUS.

INCIDENT SERIAL NUMBER 8

ON 13 JUN 1952 A USAF RB-29 ON A RECONNAISSANCE MISSION DISAPPEARED FROM RADAR 100 MILES NORTH OF HOKKAIDO, JAPAN AND 120 MILES FROM THE SOVIET COAST. AN EMPTY SIX MAN LIFE RAFT SIMILAR TO THE TYPE CARRIED ON RB-29'S WAS SIGHTED NEAR THIS LOCATION. HOWEVER, NO WRECKAGE OR SURVIVORS WERE EVER FOUND. THE ENTIRE CREW WAS LOST BUT FATE WAS NEVER FACTUALLY DETERMINED. A PRESUMPTIVE FINDING OF DEATH IS THE OFFICIAL STATUS.

INCIDENT SERIAL NUMBER 11

ON 29 JULY 1953 A USAF RB-50 ON A RECONNAISSANCE MISSION O~ER THE SEA OF JAPAN WAS SHOT DOWN BY SOVIET FIGHTERS APPROXIMATELY 50 MILES SOUTH EAST OF VLADIVOSTOK. INITIAL SEARCH EFFORTS LOCATED 4 SURVIVORS AS WELL AS AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE AND WHAT APPEARED TO BE ADDITIONAL SURVIVORS IN TWO GROUPS. A LIFE RAFT WAS DROPPED BUT DUE TO DARKNESS AND FOG SURVIVORS WERE NOT SEEN TO BOARD THE RAFT. NINE UNIDENTIFIED SMALL BOATS, PRESUMED TO BE RUSSIAN, WERE SEEN HEADING TOWARD THE WRECKAGE. THE FOLLOWING DAY A USN SHIP LOCATED THE LIFE RAFT WITH A LONE SURVIVOR. THE SURVIVING CREWMAN STATED THAT ONE CREWMAN WAS KILLED IN THE FIGHTER ATTACK. TWO ADDITIONAL BODIES LATER WASHED ASHORE IN JAPAN. THE REMAINING 13 CREWMEN WERE LOST AND THEIR FATE NEVER FACTUALLY DETERMINED. A PRESUMPTIVE FINDING OF DEATH IS THE OFFICIAL STATUS.

THE US REPEATEDLY DEMANDED INFORMATION ON THIS INCIDENT. THE USSR DENIED ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THE SHOOTDOWN OR THE FATE OF THE CREW.

INCIDENT SERIAL NUMBER 20

ON 22 AUGUST 1956 A USN P4M WAS SHOT DOWN BY CHINESE FIGHTERS OFF THE CHINESE COAST NEAR WENCHOW WHICH IS 160 MILES NORTH OF FORMOSA. FOUR OF THE 16 CREWMENS BODIES WERE RECOVERED. THE REMAINING 12 WERE LOST AND FATE NEVER FACTUALLY DETERMINED. A PRESUMPTIVE FINDING OF DEATH IS THE OFFICIAL STATUS.

INCIDENT SERIAL NUMBER 22

ON 10 SEPTEMBER 1956 A USAF RB-50 ON A RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHT OVER THE SEA OF JAPAN DISAPPEARED FROM RADAR 200 MILES WEST OF NIIGETA, HINSHU, JAPAN. NO FURTHER CONTACT WAS EVER MADE. THERE WAS AN ACTIVE TYPHOON IN THE AREA WITH WINDS OF 70-80 KNOTS. THE PLANNED ROUTE OF FLIGHT CAME NO CLOSER THAN 120 FROM COMMUNIST TERRITORY. IT IS POSSIBLE THE AIRCRAFT WAS FORCED DOWN BY HEAVY WEATHER, BLOWN OFF COURSE OR WAS INTENTIONALLY FLOWN TOWARD UNFRIENDLY TERRITORY FOR WEATHER AVOIDANCE. THE POSSIBILITY OF ENEMY ACTIONS CAN NOT BE RULED OUT. THE ENTIRE CREW OF 16 WAS LOST AND THEIR FATE NEVER FACTUALLY DETERMINED. A PRESUMPTIVE FINDING OF DEATH IS THE OFFICIAL

STATUS.

THE US REQUESTED INFORMATION FROM THE USSR ON THE INCIDENT BUT THEY CLAIMED NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE INCIDENT NOR THE FATE OF THE CREW.

INCIDENT SERIAL NUMBER 27

ON 2 SEPTEMBER 1958 A USAF C-130 INADVERTENTLY CROSSED INTO SOVIET AIRSPACE NEAR THE TURKISH BORDER AND WAS SHOT DOWN BY SOVIET FIGHTERS. THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED IN ARMENIA NEAR THE CITY OF TALIN. IT APPEARS THAT THE AIRCRAFT WENT DOWN QUICKLY AND ALL ABOARD WERE KILLED. SOME REPORTS OF PARACHUTES APPEARED IN A SOVIET MAGAZINE. THE SOVIETS RETURNED 6 SETS OF REMAINS BUT ONLY 4 COULD BE IDENTIFIED. ALL SHOWED SIGNS OF A HIGH SPEED IMPACT. SINCE ONLY 4 CREWMEN WERE IDENTIFIED THE REMAINING 13 ARE LOST BUT FATE NOT FACTUALLY DETERMINED. A PRESUMPTIVE FINDING OF DEATH IS THE OFFICIAL STATUS.

THE US PROTESTED THIS INCIDENT AND EVEN RELEASED THE TAPED COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ATTACKING FIGHTERS. THE SOVIETS DENIED SHOOTING DOWN THE AIRCRAFT AND CLAIMED NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE CREW OTHER THAN THE REMAINS THEY RETURNED.

INCIDENT SERIAL NUMBER 30

ON 1 JULY 1960 A USAF RB-47 ON A RECONNAISSANCE MISSION IN THE BARENTS SEA WAS SHOT DOWN BY SOVIET FIGHTERS. TWO CREWMEN WERE RESCUED BY A SOVIET TRAWLERS, A THIRD BODY WAS RECOVERED SEVERAL DAYS LATER. THE REMAINING THREE WERE LOST AND FATE NEVER FACTUALLY DETERMINED. A PRESUMPTIVE FINDING OF DEATH IS THE OFFICIAL STATUS.

THE SOVIETS CLAIMED AIRSPACE VIOLATIONS AND ADMITTED SHOOTING DOWN THE AIRCRAFT. THEY THREATENED TO TRY THE SURVIVING CREWMEN. AFTER MUCH PROPAGANDA THEY RELEASED THE 2 CREWMEN AND RETURNED THE REMAINS OF THE DEAD CREWMAN. THEY CLAIMED NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE OTHER THREE.

INCIDENT SERIAL NUMBER 42

ON 14 DECEMBER 1965 A USAF RB-57 ON A RECONNAISSANCE MISSION IN THE BLACK SEA WAS LOST FROM RADAR AFTER BEING OBSERVED FLYING ERRATICALLY AND LOSING ALTITUDE. THERE WERE NO SOVIET FIGHTERS NEAR THE AIRCRAFT WHEN IT DISAPPEARED. THE CRASH SITE WAS LOCATED BUT THE CREW WAS NEVER FOUND AND THERE FATE HAS NEVER BEEN FACTUALLY DETERMINED. A PRESUMPTIVE FINDING OF DEATH IS THE OFFICIAL STATUS.

THE US AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW WAS SUMMONED BY THE SOVIET DFM ON 24 DECEMBER TO BE CAUTIONED ABOUT RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS. THE SOVIETS INDICATED THEY KNEW OF THE RB-57 LOSS BUT CLAIMED NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OR THE STATUS OF THE CREW.

INCIDENT SERIAL NUMBER 16

ON 17 APRIL 1955 A USAF RB-47 ON A RECONNAISSANCE MISSION IN THE NORTH PACIFIC NEAR THE KAMCHATKA PENINSULA WAS LOST. SOVIET ACTIONS CANNOT BE RULED OUT. THE CREW OF 3 WAS LOST AND THEIR FATE WAS NEVER FACTUALLY DETERMINED. A PRESUMPTIVE FINDING OF DEATH IS THE OFFICIAL STATUS.

INCIDENT SERIAL NUMBER 35

ON 15 APRIL 1969 A USN EC-121 ON A RECONNAISSANCE MISSION IN THE SEA OF JAPAN WAS SHOT DOWN BY NORTH KOREAN FIGHTERS AT A POINT 82 MILES FROM THE NORTH KOREAN COAST. THE ENTIRE CREW OF 30 WAS LOST AND TWO BODIES WERE RECOVERED. THE REMAINING 28 CREWMAN WERE LOST AT SEA AND A PRESUMPTIVE FINDING OF DEATH IS THE OFFICIAL STATUS. INITIAL PRESS REPORTS INDICATED CREW SIZE WAS 31, BUT NAVY CONFIRMS ONLY 30.

ACTION TASKER AND CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT CONTROL

Generated June 17, 1992 at 1:35 PM

SUBJECT: SECDEF REQUEST FOR JOINT STAFF RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS

RE: YELTSIN REPORT OF LIVE POWS IN FORMER SOVIET UNION

DOC NO: 2578/485-00 DATE: 06/17/92 DIR: J-5 ORIG NO: CALL FROM MA ORIG: SECDEF/MA

??W REFERRED: DJS REPLY SUSPENSE: 06/19/92

ACTION DIV/AO: APAC PHONE:

COLLAB

J-2

J-3

LC

REMARKS: 6/17: REF TO J-5 FOR DJS REPLY W/J-2,J-3,DOCDIV, AND LC COLLAB (FWD). 6/17(1207): TO EUR FOR ACTION. (GWV) 6/17: FWD TO JOD FOR AA (AW). 06/17(1335): ACT CHANGED TO APAC (LTS)

SIGNATURE: _____

//illegible signature//

_____ _____

MILSEC DATA

?OW COMPLETED: DATE: / /

_____ _____

CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY

NUMBER DIVISION DATE NAME DATE RTD DISPOSITION

VANCE APAC 06/17/92 (ACTION) VANCE DDPMA 06/17/92 (INFO) VANCE XO 06/17/92 (INFO) VANCE MILSEC 06/17/92 (FILE) VANCE EUR 06/17/92 (COLLAB)

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[Translator's note: The following is a translation of TFR3, p. 24. It contains the heading and a key for unit abbreviations that apply to pages 24-34 of TFR3. In addition, the original document contains eight columns. Column one (# of individual listed) and column eight (Remarks, which is empty in this document) have been omitted in the translation for space reasons.]

LIST

of US Air Force crew members participating in military activities in North Korea in 1950-53, and about whom information has been found in documents of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps.

[Key to abbreviations:

FAG = Fighter Air Group

BAS = Bomber Air Squadron translator's

BG = Bomber Group notes

FBS = Fighter-Bomber Squadron

FBG = Fighter-Bomber Group

AS = Air Squadron

BAC = Bomber Air Corps

FPG = unknown

AA = Air Army

SRS = Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron

GAC = Group Air Corps [?]

FAC = Fighter Air Corps [?)

BC = Bomber Command [Corps?]

AG = Air Group

FAS = Fighter Air Squadron

TFR 3- p.24a

Last name, first, middle	Unit in which served	Job, rank, specialty	Year, of birth, Nation-	Address of fam- rela-	Date of capture death

		ality	tives		
CHARLES, Jan 52, Eugene down Stool aerial l/z AO-1911688 Qingisyu	52nd FAG	Pilot, 2nd lt.	1923, American	Father, wife, daughter reside in Pel-leng, OH	7 shot in near
HAROLD Jan 2, Britislav taken Kubicek prisoner	93rd BAS, 19th BG, 20th AA	Radar spotter, captain	--	None	22
CHARLES, Jan 52, Wayne down Molteby AA near Kunuri	35th BAS, 19th BG	Pilot, 2nd lt.	--	None	5 shot by fire

THOMAS, Jan Allyullin cap- tured l/z B after 0695638 plane crash, of Dzyngsan	93 BAS, 19th BG	Navigator, 1st lt.	1922, American, (white)	None	23 52 area
HENDERSON Aug Jack shot by fire	8th FAG, 8th FAC	Pilot, 2nd lt.	None 25 years of age	None	31 51, down AA
WILKINS Jul Jennis shot by fire	42 AS, 33 AG, First Marine Wing	Captain None		None	31 51, down AA

MacCLELLAN, 729th AS, Comman- 33 years None No date
Donald J. 452nd BAC der 729th of age and month

AS

Lt. Col.

SMITH, J.B. 8th AS, Pilot, 32 years None Shot down

543rd (67) captain of age, by AA, 25

Tac.Recon. American Dec 51,

Group Pyenyan

VERNON 25th AS, Aviator, b. 1929, None Shot down
L. Rait 51 FPG 2nd lt. American 16 Jan 52

near

Kunuri

DANIEL, 51st FPG Aviator, b. 1927, None 17
Jan 52
Delong 2nd lt. American near
Peterson
Teysyu

KENNETH, 8th BAS, 1st lt. b. 1925 H.D. 13
Jan
Aloyd Inok 3rd BAG Inok, 18 52,
near S. Osborn,
Teysyu

Yngstwn, OH

JOHN, S. 8th BAS, Aviator, b. 1922, Married, AA
fire, Queen [?] 3rd BAG 1st lt. American 1
child, 13 Jan 52

Sacramen-

to, St.

Altadena,

CA

WILLIAM, J. fire, Tresh l/z 05141	33rd AG 1st AC	Comman-der, Lt. Col.	b. 1917, American	Married, 2 ch. Family resides Bissary[?], Ni GA	AA 21 Dec 51, Samong-
JADSON fire, Ch. Richardson	513th AS, 12th GAC marines	Chief of staff, Major	b. 1920, American	No infor-mation	AA 14 Dec near Singosan

ROLEN, Sep 192	51st FAC,	Aviator,	1 Nov	Married,	4

William 5th AA 2nd lt. 2 child-
picked up
Parks ren, Re-
Sinchagou sides in
territory

Rennolge,
(1062)

Josephine
Para-
chuted

VANS, R. 4th IPAG, Aviator, b. 11 May None 21
Jun
Frick 336th AS 2nd lt. 28 in 52,
shot

Leneigton, down
10-

American 15 k
n.w.

Vikhen

MAIK, 4th IPG Aviator, 10 May None 21
Apr
Edward 1st lt. 1928 52,
shot Dermond American down
in air

battle

near

Syukusen

ROLAND, 16th AS Aviator, 22 years Shirley Shot
down William 51sr AG 2nd lt. of age,
St., 4 Sep 52,
William American Omaha,
taken Nebras-
prisoner

ka

JOHN, 36th AS, Aviator b. 1927, Father Shot
down Wesley 8th FAG American Swiss, in
air

Swiss Mother
battle 30 descent American. Apr
52

Wife's near

128 12
St.,Kaisen

NE,

Oklahoma City

TFR 3-p. 26

JOHN 336th AS, aviator b. 1927 Mother 20 Jul 52
J. Ellis 4th IPG 1st lt. and fa- shot down
l/z 2222083 ther re- in air

side in
battle Virginia near
Singisyu

ARNOLD, l/z 581st Wing -- Father: 12 Jan 53
1212 A Communicat commander, gov em- [x wds

tions colonel ployee,
missing]

supply 8709
downed

wing Droth B-29

Silver near

Springs,

Ulumbey MD

JOHN, 91st SRS Airman 21 years -- 13

Jan 53

Welker 2nd of age

captured

Thomson class,

engine

observer

JOHN, W. 91st SRS Bombadier 33, -- 13

Jan 53

Back l/z navigator American

captured

787245

ELMER, Fred 91 Recon Navigator 27, Married, 13

Jan 53

Allewelin Squadron captain American one son.

captured

l/z AO Family

20723360 resides 308

[Kaut?] 6th

St. Missoula,

Montana

EUGENE, T. Jan 53 Wady Captured l/z AO-82500	91st Strategic Recon	Aircraft comman-captain	31 years of age	Married, father a farmer. Clayton, NY	13
DANICK, Sh. Jan 53 Schmidt Captured A. E. 1939147	91st Strategic Recon Squadron	Engine observer	20 years of age	Father a farmer.	13
HERRY, Jan 53 Martin fireman. Benjamin l/z A.E. 2734582	91st Captured Recon Squadron	Private, Strategic observer	20 years engine	Father a of age 1124 Sher-wood, Worthington	13

Minnesota

STEVE, E. 91st Airman 20 years Father 13
Jan 53
Kiba Strategic First of age Swiss
Captured

Recon Class Ohio
Squadron

WILLIAM G. None Major 30 years Refused to
Bomer l/z of age complete
A0 733786 questionnaire,

citing
International

regulations

on
BRAUN, None Technical -- prisoner
Howard W. sergeant treatment
l/z 368099

WOLLES, L. Brown l/z AO 2221g2	None	2nd lt.	25	Refused to complete questionnaire, citing intern. prisoner regulations	
HART	None	Airman	--	Killed, details unavailable	
BISS	None	Airman	--	--"--	
BORIS	None	1st lt.	--	--"--	
BRAZIL Jul 52	Radar op on	1st lt.	None	None	4

near

airplane
Hakusen

MacKENZIE, 51st IPG, Aviator, 32, Married, 15
Jun 52 Andrew 5th AA major Canadian 4
children 10 km SE
Robert children, of
Supun who reside
hydro-

in England
electric

station

OSBORNE, 311th AS, Aviator, 33, None 19
Sep 52 John Arthur 58 FBG captain American AA
fire
1/z 796188 in
area of
Bonsan

Genzan

ELWIN, 16th AS, Lt. Col. None None 23
Jan 53
Louis 51 AG
Heller

EDWARD, J. 336th AS, Aviator, 25 Father Shot down
Izbiki [?] 4th IPG 2nd lt. Frank in air

Izbeki, N.
battle 19

Kaiser Feb
53 Ave, near
Chicaqo,IL Sanchau

DONALD L. 25th AS, Wing com- b. 1929 None 1 May 53
mander, shot down
1st lt. in air
battle
near;

mouth of					Yalu
JURADO,	25th AS,	Comman-	DOB 2 Oct 1312 Pal-		16
Jun 53					
John, l/z	4th Fighter	25th AS,	1923 in	micto,	AA
fire					
A-16292	Interceptor	Lt. Col.	Califor-	Phoenix,	near
	Group		nia	AZ	
Long-					
			American	Fr 60,Mr	56
Dongll.					
				Br 17.	
				Married, 2	
				children	
STEFAN,	4th	Aviator,	28 Apr	Father,	Shot
L. Bet-	Interceptor	major	192,	mother,	down
in tinger	Wing		American	4 bros,	air
				sis,	
battle					
				wife-Ellen 20	
Jul 53					
				Bettiner-	

reside 1219

Leiden

Denver, CO

Robert, A. Cowry [?] AA l/z AO 20 68768 53 | 12th AS, 18 th Fighter [x wds missing] | Aviator, captain | 22 Jan 1923, American | Married, 2 child- ren, daughter 7, Jun son 4. | Shot by on

ALBERT, down Hodger wife AO 224077 53 | 36 AS, 8th l/z by AA 19 bomber group | Aviator, Fighter | 24 Dec 1st lt. | Fr, mr, 1928 resided at: | Shot br, Jun

Worton Ave.

Natley, NJ

EDWARD, 12th AS, Aviator, Catholic Father, Shot down Dillon 18th lieutenant 64, 4 AA 15 Jun
AO2225458 Fighter sisters, 53,
Bomber 2 bro-
Captured
Group thers, by
N.
421 N.
Korean
Spring,
soldiers Neuchetok
CT

DONALD, 77th AS Aviator, b. 1928, -- Shot down Pinkstown sergeant Sydney 15 June William 53 by
AA

FORNES, William L.	69th AS, 58th IBG	Aviator, 1st lieutenant	b. 1928, Afax	-- near Hunqon	6 Aug 52, shot down
SCHWEIBEL Fran H.	1st Marine Wing	Chief of Staff, colonel	b. 1908, Virginia	-- by AA	8 Jul 52, shot down
JOHANSON	--	Photo op, RB-29, Sgt.	--	-- shot down	4 Jul 52
GABRIEL,L.	334 AS	Chief, ops depart	b. 1923	-- by	18 Oct 52 shot down

fighters

10

Jan 53

downed

B-29

JOHNSON 307th BC Senior -- -- 10

Jan 53

sergeant

downed B-29

ABRAHAMSON 28th BAS Operator -- -- 29

Jan 53 shot

down

near

Phemyan

TFR 3-p. 31

VANSLAIKA 28th AS, radio op -- -- 30

Dec 52 19th BAG

captured

HAROLD, Edward Apr 53, Fisher down	39th AS, 51st AG	aviator, flight	--	--	7 shot
	commander				
HAMILTON, Dec 50, Bruschev taken [possibly prisoner last name]	8th reserve flight	aviator, 2nd lt .	--	--	1 near
Singisyu					
CHALSA, Dec 50, Mactonata down	5th AS, 363rd Det.	aviator, captain	--	--	4 shot
FRANK, [illeg S. Denstech Nov Dec]	B-29 airplanes	aviator, captain	--	--	10 Oct, or 50,

shot down

HERN, --"-- navi- -- -- 12
Apr 51 Joseph 371st AS shot
down
Samuel 307th AG near

Singisyu

OLWICH, --"-- gunner, -- -- 12
Apr 51 Daniel senior shot
down
Henry sergeant near

Andun

METU --"-- gunner, -- -- 12
Apr 51
[Matthau?J senior shot
down
Henry Xavier sergeant

KING, B-29 gunner, -- -- 4
Dec 51,
Marvin airplane airman shot
down

first class

during

descent,

seriously

injured

KNEDO,	--"--	navi-	--	--	4 Dec 51, George Joseph Andun	gator, lieutenant	shot down near
MORY [spell?], Leonard Larry	371st AS, 307th AG	operator, sergeant	--	--	4 Dec 51,		shot down
GENT, John K.	B-29, 93rd AS, 19th AG	gunner, sergeant	--	--	4 Dec 51,		shot down

near

Singisyu

MILWORD, 93rd AS, gunner, -- -- 4 Dec 51,
George 19th AG sergeant shot down
Eliason near

Singisyu

BERGMAN, 93rd AS, radio -- -- 4 Dec 51,
Louis Henry 19th AG operator, shot down

sergeant near

Singisyu

ULRICH, aviator in -- -- -- 4 Apr 51,
Holbert B-26 shot down

aircraft, at

Hakusen

Hakusen.

Perished.

TFR 3-p. 33

VESLEY	39th AS	flight	--	--	22 Apr 51
[spell?]	35th AG	commander,			shot down
Dean		captain			
OBNEY (14)	40th AS,	deputy	--	--	12
	35th AG	commander,		Aug 51	
		40th AS,			
		major			
HOWARD P. Miller [last name possibly Miller]	336th AS, 4th AG	aviator, 1st Lt.	--	--	22 Jun 51 shot down

HARM B-29 from gunner, -- --

September

307th BAG sergeant 52

Acting Chief, Fourth Department Major [singnature] A. Lebedev

[day illegible] June 1992

TFR 3-p. 34

MEMORANDUM on the repatriation of military personnel and interned U.S. citizens freed from captivity by forces of the Red Army, 1944-1946.

On the basis of archival records it has been established that the agencies in the Soviet Union responsible for repatriation of liberated military personnel and interned citizen~ of the allied states, including the United States of America, were:

-- in the central region -- the directorate of the authorized USSR SNK [Soviet of Peoples Commissars] representative for repatriation affairs (General-Colonel Golikov, F.I.);

-- on the fronts, groups of forces and some military districts -- directorates for repatriation affairs;

-- in the armies -- departments of repatriation affair~.

The Red Army rear area staff and its local organs provided materials, meals and financial support, as well as medical services.

Assembly point~ and transit camps ~ere form~d in the fronts, groups of forces and some military districts for tho immediate reception and subsequent evacuation of military personnel and interned citizens of the allied forces, including the United States.

The functions of the departments for repatriation affairs in the front military soviets, the military districts and group~ of forces and the commandants of the assembly points were governed by appropriate instructions.

The evacuation of repatriated military personnel and interned citizens of the allied states, including the Americans, was conducted basically in three days:

1. By sea via transit camps ~o. 138, 139 and 186 in the city of Odessa, on vessels of the US, England, Holland and other nations.

2. By rail

3. By direct transfer from assembly points (after the end of hostilities).

As of 1 March 1946 a total of 1,016,588 individuals, including 22,479 U.S. citizens, were returned to

their homelands.

TFR 1-28a

Some lists of repatriated and interned U.S. citizens who passed through transit camps No. 138, 139 186 in Odessa are and stored in the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense.

Photocopies of the archival records related to this issue are attached.

Deputy Chief, Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense [Signature] LUCHKIN, Colonel

24 January 1992

OFFICE OF THE AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE ON REPATRIATION ISSUES OF THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MOSCOW, KROPOTKINSKY LANE, 7 TELEPHONE; G-6-11-00

No. 005085 2 December 1946
========== ===== To the Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces Marshall of the Soviet Union comrade A.M. Vasilevsky

Report No. 54 for 1 December 1946

1. Information on the Results of Registering and Repatriating USSR Citizens

TOTAL CIVILIAN POWs

POPULATION

Partial data have established that the enemy captured and carried off the following numbers of individuals 6,834,702 4,829,60 2,005,648

(only those

found registered)

from among them, the 5,715,162 3,709,514 2,005,648 number found and taken to be registered

From those found, 5,415,925 3,582,358 1,633,567 the number repatriated

Including:

Those who were assigned a location 5,382,990 3,551,324 1,831,666 Those who were located at the battle or front zone: 32,935 31,034 1,901

Those due to be repatriated from foreign governments: Soviet citizens from the Baltics, Westerners and "defectors," all of whom are under Anglo-American command: 299,237 127,156 172,091

Those who have not been found from among those captured by the Fascists. Evidently most have perished 1,119,546 1,119,546 unknown

[handwritten] 3-959 [stamp]

TFR 1-29a

NUMBER OF LINERATED, INVENTORIED AND

REPATRIATED ALLIED AND FOREIGN POWs AND

INTERNED CITIZENS, as of 3/1/46

No.	Nationality	Total freed	Of them		
			Repatriated/ transferred to home-land forces	Incl. across front-lines and in-groups	In USSR territory
1	2	3	4	5	6
1	Americans	22,487	22,479	19,013	8
2	British	22,468	22,465	20,006	3

3	French	311,254	310,030	277,062	1,224
4	Italians	166,531	166,263	159,869	268
5	Poles	173,826	173,749	-	77
6	Yugoslavs	127,646	127,182	71	464
7	Belgians	35,043	34,846	30,457	197
8	Czechoslovaks	44,573	43,312	-	1,261
9	Dutch	35,668	35,032	33,773	636
10	Norwegians	1,156	1,151	1,062	5
11	Luxembourgians	2,373	2,295	2,164	78
12	Danes	1,017	968	963	49
13	Swedes	36	30	15	6
14	Rumanians	29,029	28,907	41	122
15	Hungarians	23,113	22,823	-	290
16	Greeks	7,940	7,929	36	11
17	Bulgarians	2,009	1,998	1	11
18	Swiss	847	822	820	25
19	Spaniards	212	149	91	63
20	Albanians	9	9	6	-
21	Turks	50	26	-	24
22	Austrians	11,801	11,766	65	35
23	Finns	100	95	-	5
24	Palestinians	13	13	-	-
25	Chinese	3	-	-	3
26	Brazilians	19	17	17	2
27	Argentinians	3	3	3	-
28	Panamanians	22	22	22	-
29	Serbs	25	25	-	-
30	Scots	4	4	4	-
31	Egyptians	6	6	6	-
32	Polish gypsies	170	170	-	-
33	Hindu	1	1	1	-
34	Iranians	1	1	1	-

1,021,455 1,016,588 544,569 4,867

TFR 1-29b

[left side illegible] Entry No. 7504

2 [illegible]

4 Dec 1946

18:40

[left side illegible] Entry No. 8898

2 pages

4 Dec 1946

16:50

TFR 1-29c

US Ambassador Harriman delivered this to V. M. Holotov on 2 January 1945

Translation from the English

A telegram from Roosevelt to Harriman about Pierson' 6 articles on American air~en interned in the USSR who fled. _____ _____

The director of censorship was given instructions by me to take steps to avoid the future publication of any information on interned Americans fleeing from neutral or Allied countries.

Translator: [signature] Potrubach

Distribution: Comrades Stalin

Voroshilov

Mikoyan

Beria

Malenkov

Vyshinksky

Dekanozov

US Department

[handwritten] 8-m

TFR 1-30

To: Deputy Chief, Red Army Rear Echelon

General-Colonel VINOGRADOV

[Tr. Note: Handwritten entry in upper left: DN (ag2?) Sat (34?)

Yu. Ch. (initials)

REPORT on the organization of transit camps and a transfer point in the city of Odessa as of 22 March 1945

I. BILLETING

Four sanatoria, four schools and one residential building, a total of nine buildings with area of 11,330 square meters, have been allotted by Gorispolkom for transit camps. These buildings can accommodate 8,500 persons, 800 of them officers. All rooms have been readied and equipped with all necessary furnishings. All buildings have been provided with plumbing, electrical power, dining facilities. However, there is an insufficient number of wash stands and field latrines.

The officers are to be housed in separate rooms, four to a bed; plank beds are being constructed for enlisted personnel. As of 22 March 1945, two-tiered plank beds for 500 persons have been constructed. Small metal stoves have been installed in the rooms.

Premises of the former Infantry School have been prepared for the transfer point, with a total living area of 15,061 square meters. The military housing area has been re-equipped with plumbing and electricity; dining facilities have been built and equipped and washstands and field latrines installed. People are being accommodated on the floor on straw mats.

Accommodations in transits camps and in the transfer point are satisfactory, but require a number of improvements.

II. PASSAGE OF CONTINGENTS

As of 22 March a total of 11,711 Allied prisoners had arrived; of them:

British 2,163 Americans 2,486 French 7,062

Departed on three vessels from March 7 through 15:

British 1,837 Americans 1,709 French 2,839 ----------

TFR-2-117

Total departed 6,385

Remaining in camps:

British 326 Americans 777 French 4,223 ----------

Total remaining: 5,326

On 22 March at 1900, 89 individuals arrived; of them:

British 6 Americans 8 French 75

Expected to arrive on 23 March: 435 individuals; of them:

Americans 20 British 415

Two military transport ships were expected to arrive on 22-23 March:

1. "Sarkasha" with 1,641 persons 2. "Deutschestofriechmand" with 3, 702 persons

A total of 7,740 former prisoners of war of the Red Army arrived at the transfer point and all were sent on before 22 March.

III. MEDICAL SUPPORT

The Odessa Military District medical section allotted 300 beds in hospital No. 1266 and 200 beds in hospital No. 1777, as well as 50 beds in a hospital for infectious diseases, to prepare for the reception of Allied prisoners of war and to provide medical support for the special contingents.

Medical units were created in the camps and in the assembly transfer point to provide medical and sanitation support.

Resources sufficient to conduct medical activities (Bathing laundry and disinfectant train No. 72, ODR [unknown acronym] No. 100 and a garrison bathing facility. If needed, bathing and laundry train 433 can be made available.

The required amount of medicines and soap has been allotted.

No outbreaks of infectious diseases occurred during the time the contingents were located in the transit camps and at the assembly-transfer point.

The medical and sanitation resources allotted are fully

TFR-2-118

The medical and sanitation resources allotted ar~ fully sufficient to support the transfer point and transit camps.

IV. CLOTHING AND RELATED SUPPLIES

There is a complete supply of bedding -- filled mattress covers for the enlisted and a full set of bedding for the officers.

Of the British and American allied POWS arriving nearly all have a full issue of clothing, few require additional items. The majority of the French arriving are poorly outfitted and as of 22 March up to 2,500 sets have been expended to outfit them.

The problem of towels must be solved. The district has only coarse calico towels, which should not be issued to this contingent as they frequently discard them. The District cannot provide thick towels because they are not available. The District must be regularly resupplied in order to ensure a constant flow of these materials.

V. FOOD SUPPLIES

All Allied POWS receive three hot meals per day from their rations and from additional supplies from the Military Missions. The officers take their meals individually in mess facilities, the enlisted from cookpots in their rooms. The District has food supplies, but there is an insufficient variety of grain products, almost no vegetables and an incomplete range of seasonings. There have been no complaints about the food either from the POWs or from the Missions, only positive comments.

VI. MILITARY EXCHANGE

Retail outlets are open, but not everywhere, and demand cannot always be met due to the limited selection of goods and low quality. Barbershops are operating, but again, not all of them. Assistance is required from the Central Military Exchange and Narkomtorg People's Commissariat of Trade].

CONCLUSION:

1. Camp operations may be considered satisfactory, which has been pointed out repeatedly in the national press, but I have had difficulty in achieving this, for the District did not begin implementing Directives NO. 1/1240645 and 1/124064 until my arrival. It bears mentioning that for 15-20 days the District's Military Soviet and the entire staff of the Deputy Commander for Logistics were engaged exclusively in preparing the camps.

2. In April it would be advisable to move the camps from municipal buildings into a tent encampment, at least with respect to the schools. To do so, it will be necessary to make available to the District tents for 5000-6000 persons and up to 300 cubic meters for equipment and supplies.

3. To ensure uninterrupted supplies of clothing, bedding, etc., order the maintenance of a constant stock for 10,000 persons, including women and children. It would desirable to issue the POWs thick towels, duffel bags and items needed to clean footwear.

4. The question of improving the nutritional standards of the officers, including field grade officers, must be addressed.

5. Also address the problem of financing the POWs in the camps.

6. Four groups, each numbering up to 50 persons, were sent from Moscow for the purpose of monitoring and assisting the district: the first from the Rear Area Chief and three separate groups from the Commissioner for Repatriation. All of them, acting independently and without coordination, frequently did not help, but rather hindered the District. A single management structure should be established.

Control from the Rear Echelon Chief is needed, since the District has several missions other than its primary functions, including providing for the camps. The District considers this a burden, and thus many things have been done only at my insistence.

General-Major [Signature]

/Karavayev/

[21?] March 1945

TFR-2-120

LIST

of U.S. citizens mentioned in

documents found in the archives of

the Central Committee Politburo

1. SELLERS, Peter, Detained 31 JUL 1949 Released to
American student U.S. authorities on 28 Sep 1949

2. OELSNER [WELSNER?] Detained 31 JUL 1949. Released to
American student U.S. authorities on 28 Sep 1949

3. PANTILO, Peter, Detained in September, 1949
American student Released to American authorities in 1949

4. RUNK, Carl, Detained in September, 1949
American soldier Released to U.S. authorities in 1949

5. PRUSTER, Charles Detained in September, 1949.
American soldier Released to U.S. authorities in 1949.

6. Michael DOW [DOE?], Picked up in Pacific on 28 Sep

	American officer	1973. Released to U.S. naval vessel.
7.	Richard BAILEY, carrier military seaman.	Deserted from the aircraft "Intrepid" in November, 1967. Departed for a European country
8.	William ANDERSON, carrier military seaman	Deserted from the aircraft "Intrepid" in November, 1967. Departed for a European country.
9.	Michael BERILL, carrier military seaman	Deserted from the aircraft "Intrepid" in November, 1967. Departed for a European country.

10. Anthony LINDNER,	Deserted from the aircraft carrier "Intrepid" in November, 1967. Departed for a European country.	
11. American parachutist	Taken into custody on 24 Sep 1950 in the area of Vladivostok. [To right of above: "No further information available"]	
12. Alfred T. MESCHTER	In September, 1949 was aboard	

American official	the commercial vessel "Kimbol

		R. Smith" [To right of above:
		competent authority for this
		case is the People's
		Democratic Republic of Korea]
13. Albert WILLIS, American official		In September, 1949 was aboard the commercial vessel "Kimbol R.
		Smith" [To right of above:
		"Competent authority for this
		case is the People's
		Democratic Republic of Korea"]
14. Homer COX, U.S. citizen		Released from incarceration. Returned to U.S. authorities
		in Berlin in 1953 or 1954
15. Lilend [Leland?] TOWERS, U.S.		Released from incarceration. Returned to U.S. authorities

in Berlin in 1953 or 1954

16. Marchuk, V.T., Arrested in Germany in 1949 and
Russian interpreter sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. for American Expelled from USSR in 1954 or 1955.
intelligence agency
in Berlin.

17. VERDIN, U.[prob. W] E., Arrested in Germany in 1949 and
police squad radio sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. operator Expelled from USSR in 1954 or 1955

18. NOBLE, D. [Alternate Arrested in 1950 and sentenced to
spelling of "Noubl" 15 years of imprisonment. Expelled
given], businessman. from the USSR in 1954 or 1955.

TFR-2-151

CERTIFICATE

A check of a list of 3,752 U.S. servicemen missing in action in Southeast Asia, and other foreigners, against the records of the Main Information Center of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Internal Affairs, has established a similarity in the information recorded for 41 individuals who have undergone accounting by last name and who were sentenced for various offenses during the period of 1922 through 1968. These included the following sentences:

1. Espionage - 10 persons

Filinov, Peter Mikhailovich, listed as Fellon, Patrick M. (F057)

Gaider, Rolf, listed as Geiter, Ralph Ellis (G045)

Grauert, Hans Georg Ludwig, listed as Groert, Hans Herbert (G383)

Hill, Daniel Davidovich, listed as Hall, Donald J. (H004) Mayer [Maier?], Theresa, listed as Kerber, Maria Theresa (K733)

Stefan, Leopold, listed as Leopold, Steven Rider (L049)

MacDonald, William Lionel, listed as MacDonald, Joseph

William (M172)

Thomas, Robert, listed as Thomas, Robert J. (T067)

Wano (Ueno?], Tomaso, listed as Thomas, William Z. (T064) Washington, Leroy, listed as Washington, Bobby (W149)

2. Heinous crimes in the occupied territory and collaborating with the fascists -- 14 persons

Clifford; this is Braun, Charles, listed as Braun, Charles A. (B198)

Daniel, Herbert, listed as Herber, Daniel A. (G600)

Dewitt, Martinas, listed as Martin David Earl (M365)

Meyer, Benno Edward, listed as Meyer, Elton Benno (M065) Miller, Carl Davidovich, listed as Miller, Carl D. (M062) Niko, Felix, listed as Neko-Kuinones, Felix B., (N021) Ernst, Arthur, listed as Olds, Ernst Arthur (0004)

Ernst, Arthur, listed as Olds, Ernst Arthur (0004)

Parra, Richard, listed as Perry, Richard Clark (P378) Herold, Robert, listed as Roberts, Harold J. (R106)

Thomas, Robert, listed as Thomas, Robert J. (T067)

Leisten, Fritz, listed as Lestien F. (L751)

Thomas, Paul, listed as Pail, Thomas Show [Shaw?] (R073)

3. Counter-revolutionary activities -- 6 persons

Holland, Arnold Mikhailevich, listed as Hollend, Melvin

Arnold (H189)

Holinger-Hullinger, Edwin Henrikhovich, listed as Hollinger, Greg Neimen (H402)

Jans [?], Georges, listed as Jones, George Emerson (J372) Gere, Robert, listed as Lenrn [?], Gary Robert (L092)

OSIA/DXL TFR-2-152

Herber, Bernard Samuelovich, listed as Plassmeyer, Bernard Herber (R097) Thomas, Paul, listed as Pail, Thomas Shaw [Show?] (R073)

4. Criminal offenses -- 8 persons

Un-Bon-A, listed as Cho Un Ban (C746) Herbert, Lange, listed as Lanford, Herbert L. (L036) Maider, Kurt Max, listed as Meider, Kurt (M742) Parsons, Michael James, listed as (P102) Peterson, William-Jay, Listed as Petterson, James Kelly (P057) Francis, Robert Fridrikhovich, listed as Praiss, Robert Francis (P407) Kurt, Frederich, listed as Waisman [?], Kurt Frederick (W374) Worren, Dale, listed as Worren, Grey D. (W081)

5. No indication of articles of indictment -- 3 persons

Un-Bon-O, listed as Cho Un Ban (C746) Pepper, John Wilhelm, listed as Pepper, Anthony John (R375) Roper, John Thomasovich, listed as Roberts, Harold J. (R106)

Chief, State Information Center Colonel, Internal Services Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs

[Signature] G.L. Lezhikov

14 May 1992

TFR-2-153

[Letterhead] RSFSR Supreme Court Kuibyshev Square, dom 3/7 Moscow, USSR 10389 [handwritten] 29 May 92 No. 891

TO: D. A. Volkogonov, Chairman of the Joint Commission on

Elucidating Information on US Citizens Who Went Missing in Action on USSR Territory During and After WW II.

The following information was established after an examination of the materials which are located in the Russian Federation Supreme Court Military Board:

1. A special commission was created by a decree of the CPSU CC Presidium. The decree was dated 15 April 1953 and was entitled, "The-Possibility of Repatriating from the USSR Foreign Citizens who are Serving or have Served their Sentences." This decree examined the issue and concluded that it would be possible to free 16,547 foreigners from their place of incarceration and repatriate them. The majority of these convicted individuals were from among German prisoners of war.

According to the Commission's materials, there were 8 US citizens among those foreigners convicted by 1 August 1953 and located in prisons in the USSR. Two of them were scheduled to be released, and six were supposed to remain in prison to continue serving their sentences. Individuals who were convicted of petty crimes and did not pose a threat to society were scheduled for early release (or amnesty). Those individuals who were convicted of felonies (espionage, heinous crimes on occupied territory, collaborating with the fascists, etc.) were not scheduled for release.

While the commission was in session, it compiled lists of individuals who were scheduled for release. The lists were sent to departments involved in this issue, including the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (28 September 1953).

Because of the fact that the Military Board was only tasked with this issue yesterday (i.e., 28 May 1992), it is not possible to provide other information at this time. As we elicit other facts, each and every one will be presented to the commission in a timely manner, including data from the lists mentioned above. A certain amount of time will be necessary to study this information.

It seems to us that the lists should contain~f~1~ information on each convicted individual (short autobiographical information, by which court and for what criminal activities, duration of sentence, and prison where sentence was served).

2. The Military Board has studied the inquiry of the Ministry of Internal Affairs State Information Center dated 14 May 1992). The list of foreign citizens (41 individuals) who were convicted in Soviet courts from 1922-1968 was checked with the card file.

It was found that the personal information was similar to that of three of the convicted individuals.

1. Among those convicted of espionage, there is one Thomas, Robert (He appears on the American list as Thomas, Robert, Jr.).

According to the materials of the Military Board, the German subject, Thomas, Wolfgang-Robert-&ustav, born 1926 in Berlin, a German, is listed as being convicted of espionage on 12 July 1952.

2. Among those convicted of heinous crimes on occupied territory is one Meyer, Benno Edward (appears on the American list as Meyer, Elton Benno).

The materials of the Military Board list Meyer, Benno (case of Hertzog and others) as being convicted (along with 19 others) of heinous crimes on the occupied territory of the Pskov and Novgorod regions [oblast'] by a military tribunal from 7-18 December 1947.

3. Among those convicted (charges were not listed) appears one Roper, John Tomasovich (Roberts, Harold J. on the American list).

In actual fact Roper, John Tomasovich was convicted on 4 March 1939 for "ties to English intelligence." He was born in 1901 in the city of Tweedmont (England), and is an Englishman. Since 1934 he has been a citizen of the USSR. Until his arrest he was an English teacher. He was rehabilitated by the Military Board on 29 September 1960.

The Military Board does not possess any other information about the conviction of others listed on the list.

The Military Board has a card file of those convicted by the Military Board and by military tribunals whose verdicts were appealed to the Military Board, i.e., the card file only contains information on those individuals about which the Military Board itself made decisions (they were convicted by the Military Board, or their case was reexamined on appeal or as a result of the legal review process).

The cases of others convicted by military courts are being sought out by us in the archives, based upon inquiries received from the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs State Information Center.

[Signature]

N. Petukhov

CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY BOARD,

SUPREME COURT OF THE RUSSIAN

FEDERATION

TFR-2-73

Main Archive Directorate under Council of Ministers USSR

Central National Archive USSR

125212 Moscow, Viborgsky Street #3 phone 159-73-83

_____#_____

On # _____

The Central State Special Archive preserves documents of the Main Directorate on POW and Interned Affairs (GUPVI) of the MVD [ministry of internal affairs] of the USSR. These include the following holdings:

- Central GUPVI organization;

- Special GUPVI information bureau;

- GUPVI political section;

- Anti-Fascist section;

- Political section of POW camps in republics, areas and counties;

- Camps, special hospitals, labor battalions of the interned;

- NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] departments on POW affairs;

- Files on released and dead POW of former Western armies, Japanese Army;

- Files on released and freed interned individuals;

- Files on POWs deployed to form Hungarian, Romanian, Czechoslovakian, Yugoslav and Polish units.

The archive also contains part of the holdings of Authorized Directorate of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union on repatriation affairs.

Deputy Director of the archives, [signature] V.E. Korotaiev

TFR-2-74

CERTIFICATE

according to the documents of the collecting faciltiies and transit camps directorate from 1945 to 1953 about the presence of POW and interned US citizens.

As a result of work on documents of above mentioned facilities an alphabetical list was compiled on US citizens. According to the data contained in the lists we have information on 2,901 US citizens including 60 individuals who either died, went to their homeland on their own, departed for other installations and also 25 individuals whose fate is unclear.

1. DECEASED

#	Last name, first name, social data	Date of death	Name of facility	Location of facility
1.	Iehoniho, Paurauma Born 1923, New Zealander, private, was a POW in Germany-camp XX-B, city of Marienborn. Sent to Odessa by 13Oth command of 1st VF[possibly naval flotilla](city of Rembertov) in echelon[train] #50561. Died in	Reported by escort 16 April 45. Place of burial is not identified	139th transit camp.	City of Odessa.

	route. Killed by			
	security guard			
	while trying to			
	enter a forbidden			
	train car.			
2	Ted Yates,(Yeite)	19 March	- " -	- " -
	born in 1916,	45		
	sergeant (soldier)	Odessa		
	Was killed by a	City		
	wall of a	cemetery.		
	collapsing			
	building.			
3.	Timmeran, Lyle	- " -	- " -	- " -
	born 1921, private			

(corporal)

Was killed by a

wall of collapsing

building

OSIA/DXL TFR-2-75

Based on TSAVIS [expansion unknown, possibly: Central Archives pf Armed Forces] op725508, d. 11; 11 145,153;11 578,579;f.40, op. 11549,d.265.1.190.

2. LEFT CAMP WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION

#	Last name, first name, social and demographic data	Date	Name of facility	Location of facility

1. Jackson, Fred Missing 138th city of

born 1918 since 28 transit Odessa.

After his disappearance May 45. camp.

from camp measures were

taken to find him, but

were fruitless.

Considering that he was

determined to go home by

ship, it is possible

that he got on a ship

and went overseas.

Based on TsAVS, op.725510, d.38, 1.33;

[op=inventory; d=file or case; l,l=sheet or sheets;ob=back od sheet, other side; these apply throughout the document]

3. SENT FOR TREATMENT IN MILITARY HOSPITALS.

#	Last name, first name, social and demographic data	Date of departure for treatment	Name of hospital	Name of facility	Location of facility
1	2	3	4	5	6
1.	Becks, Arthur born 1918, private.	Is being treated for his condition	Not indicated, possibly	138th transit camp	city of Odessa
		07 Mar			

2. Banks, Robert - " - - " - - " - - " -

born 1922,

sergeant

3. Biken, Willy

(Vegin, Willy) - " - - " - - " - - " -

born 1918, 1st Lt

4. Victor, Charles - " - - " - - " - - "

(Wintor, Charles)

born 1917, 1st Lt

5. Vogl, James - " - - " - - " - - " -

born 1920,

corporal

6. Ger[Jer], Jo - " - - " - - " - - " -

born 1916, 1st Lt

7. Gibson, Charles

born 1909, - " - - " - - " - - " -

Captain

Diagnosed with

granulating

[illegible,

missing]

TFR-2-77

8. Danielson, Is in Not 138th city of

Morgan treatment indi- transit Odessa

(Danson, for the cated, camp

Marvin) condition possibly 3421

born 1919, 07 Mar 45

Lt.

Diagnosis:

paratraumatic

eczema.

9. Joyce, Ray - " - - " - - " - - " -

sergeant

Diagnosis:

trauma of the

talocrural

joint.

10. Janet, Edgard - " - - " - - " - - " -

lieutenant.

Diagnosis:

malaria.

11. Carligen, - " - - " - - " - - " -

Robert

private

Diagnosis:

symptoms of

bronchial

pneumonia.

12. Kitt, Donald - " - - " - - " - - " -

(Jonald)

private.

Diagnosis:

post angina.

13. Kolesin, - " - - " - - " - - " -

Mashen

(Kolosan,

Margen)

born 1916

lieutenant.

14. Masoncheimer, - " - - " - - " - - " -

Franklin

(Meisin,

Fran)

born 1918,

lieutenant.

1	2	3	4	5	6
15	Menten, Aaron born 1919 lieutenant	Is in treatment for the condition 07 Mar 45	Not indicated (possibly #3421)	138th transit camp	city of Odessa
16	Monahen, James,(Monagen, James) born	- " -	- " -	- " -	- " -

	1921, Lt.					
	Diagnosis:					
	long term					
	non-healing					
	popliteal					
	wound					
17	Nash, Robert	Is being	Not	139th	city	
	born 1919	treated	indi-	transit	of	
	sergeant	for the	cated	camp	Odessa	
		condition.				
		07 Mar 45				
18	Neige(Naich)	- " -	Not	138th	city	
	Robert		indi-	transit	of	

	sergeant		cated	camp	Odessa
	Diagnosis:		(possibly		
	Bruised		#3421)		
	wound of the				
	shin (crus).				
19	Reid,				
	William				
	born 1912.	- " -	- - " -	- " -	- " -
20	Stephens,	- " -	- " -	- " -	- " -
	Franscis				
	(Franscis				
	Stevens)				
	born 1921,				
	1st Lt.				

Diagnosis:

wounded

TFR-2-79

1	2	3	4	5	6
21	Stutferd, Gonne private. Diagnoses: bronchi- primanla	Is being treated for the existing condition 07 Mar 45	Not indi- cated	138th transit camp	City of Odessa
22	Toyner, Edgar	- " -	- " -	- " -	- " -

born 1918,

lieutenant

23 Toyce, - " - - " - - " - - " -

Anthony

corporal.

Diagnosis:

post flu

24 Tom, Mahcul Is being Not 138th city of

born 1917 treated indi- transit Odessa

1st Lt. cated camp

(possibly

#3421)

25 Tugems, Bogl - " - - " - - " - - " -

						private.
						Diagnosis:
						post
						inflammation
						of lungs.
26	Schnaider,	- " -	- " -	- " -	- " -	
						Charles
						(Shneider,
						Karl) born
						1918, Lt.
						Diagnosis:
						2 degree
						frostbite of
						both feet

27 Edvals, - " - - " - - " - - " -

Tomas

TFR-2-80

1 2 3 4 5 6

28 Eder,(Yeresh) Is being Not 138th city

Charles treated indi- transit of

private for cated camp Odessa

Diagnosis: existing (possibly

carbuncle of condition #3421)

the left hip 07 Mar 45

29 Yanko, Edvald - " - - " - - " - - " -

(Yanga,

Edward)

	born 1917. Lt				
	Diagnosis:				
	3 degree				
	frostbite of				
	right foot				
	toes				
30	Yartser,	- " -	- " -	- " -	- " -
	Thomas				
	born 1917				
	private				
31	Schmidt,	Is being	Not	- " -	- " -
	Robert	treated	indicated		
	born 1914.	for			

captain existing

Diagnosis: condition

exit wound of 13 Mar 45

left ankle

with damage

to tibia

32 Leshly, Jessy Departed Not 139th - " -

private for indi- transit

treatment cated camp

17 Mar 45

33 Toll, Sydney - " - - " - - " - - " -

lieutenant

34 Shtauden, - " - - " - - " - - " -

Wanda[Venda]

1	2	3	4	5	6

TFR-2-81

35	Berg, Franyus sergeant	Sent for treatment on 18 Mar 45	Not indicated (possibly #1266)	- " -	- " -
36	Grey, William born 1921 1st Lieutenant Arrived to transit camp 139 from	Sent for treatment on 18 Mar 45 according to order #12	- " - and	138th 139th	- " -

evacuation dated19 Mar

hospital #1266 45 for 139th

and diagnosed transit

with: post camp.

flu condition.

He was on a

list of people

sent home on

25 Mar 45 from

camp 139

aboard English

ship

"Syrcassia"

but his name

was crossed

out. He was

also on a list

of people sent

home on 25 Mar

45 from camp

138 on same

ship. On list

it is marked

"hospital"

37 Chestin, Sent for - " - 139th city

(Chesteib) treatment on transit of

Tomas born 18 Mar 45 camp Odessa

1920 private according to

Listed among order #12

ones sent home dated 19 Mar

25 Mar 45c 45 for

from camp 139, transit camp

marked 139.

"hospital"

38 Arnold, Derold Sent for - " - - " - - " -

sergeant. treatment on

19 Mar 45

39 Bening, Wayne - " - - " - - " - - " -

corporal

40 Smith, Rolly - " - - " - - " - - " -

soldier

41 Frigal, - " - - " - - " - - " -

Rolland

born 1920 Sgt.

TFR-2-82

1 2 3 4 5 6

42 Check, Hugh Sent for

born 1924, Sgt treatment

Arrived to 19 Mar 45

camp 139 from

evac hospital

1266. Was

diagnosed

with chronic

colitis

Listed among

people sent to

homeland 25

Mar 45 from

camp 139, but

crossed out.

4 Dally, Wayne Sent for

sergeant. treatment

22 Mar 45

44 Neighbors, - " -

Arsa

45 Fellans Sent for

(Fellois) treatment 22

Henry, born Mar 45.

1918, private According to

Arrived to order #13

transit camp dated 21 Mar

139 from 1266 45 for 139

evac hospital. transit camp.

Diagnosed

with: "post

flu condition"

Name on list

of people sent

home on 25 Mar

45 from camp

139, but

crossed out.

46 Robertson, Sent for

Frank treatment 23

private Mar 45.

TFR-2-83

1 2 3 4 5 6

47 Dowell, Warren In Not 139th city

born 1912, treatment indi- transit of

MSGt for cated camp Odessa

existing

condition

25 Mar 45

48 Paynes, Frank - " - - " - - " - - " -

born 1918

sergeant.

149 Wilson, Robert - " - - " - - " - - " -

born 1922

sergeant.

50 Revenkis, Sent for - " - - " - - " -

Jules treatment

private. 11 Apr 45

51 Emma, Aaron - " - - " - - " - - " -

private.

Based on :op 725510, dl3, 11.59-61. o3, 94, 96, III(ob) op 725508, d2, 11. 5,6,7,12(ob) op 725 508, dll,

11.9, 156, 163, 234; [expansion unknown, see page 2 for possible meanings]

TFR-2-84

4. INDIVIDUALS SENT TO OTHER FACILITIES

#	Last name, name, social and demographic data.	Date of departure	Destination	Place of departure
1	Marchanu, Rene born 1917, french, Sgt. Listed as departed for homeland 11 Mar 45, but marked"left behind by mission"	11 Mar 45	Mission (what kind of mission is not indicated)	138th transit camp, city of Odessa.
2	Schtorch, Werner Alfred born 1898,	03 Aug 45	city of Pilsen	- " -

Vienna, Austria.

Interned in Hamburg,

Germany from 12 Jul 42

to 10 Mar 43. From 43

worked in Eastern

Prussia. Arrived

commandant's office

(CO) 149 from CO 151.

From CO 149 sent to

transit camp 138.

There is a stamped

document which

confirms his arrival

to transit camp 138 on

2 May 45. There is

contradictory

information on his

departure from camp.

3 Schtorch, Elli, Ukhan 03 Aug 45 city of - " -

born 1903 in Pernov Pilsen

Estonia(female). From

1917 to 21 Jan 45

lived and worked in

Shtablak, Germany,

Eastern Prussia.

Arrived to CO 149 on

11 Apr 45 from CO 151.

Sent to transit camp

138 from Co 149 which

is documented with

stamp dated 2 May 45.

[the rest illegible]

TFR-2-85

1	2	3	4	5
4	Carpenten, Boren born 1926	03 Aug 45	city of Pilsen	138th transit camp, city of Odessa

5	Gursthiemer,[possibly Gerstheimer] Iohann Philipp, born 1926 german technically], place of birth St. Louis, America. Arrived to 186th transit camp on 04 May 47 from Ministry of Internal Affairs camp 159, city of Odessa.	01 Jul 47	Syget city of	Camp #304 186th transit camp, village of Lusterdor ? Odessa region.

Based on:

op.177030, d.1, l.475;

op. 616238s, d.1,1.286;

op. 725510, d.14, 1.104, 239;

op. 192400s, d.5,11.73,79;

op. 725510, d.13,1.85(ob).

[op=inventory; d=file, case; l=sheet(s);ob=back of sheet, other side]

5. NO FURTHER INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS

#	Last name, first name, social and demographic data	Name of the facility in who's documents the individual is	Circumstances under which the individual is mentioned

mentioned

1	2	3	4
1	Smith, Robert captain	138th transit camp, city of Odessa	Listed among individuals sent home from camp 138 on 11 Mar 45 on British ship "Countess Bertford", but marked "N" and not checked like the rest during boarding.
2	Trainer, Charles, born	- " -	- " -

1920, lieutenant

3 Blomberg, Clevens born 139th transit Listed among

1918, sergeant camp, city of individuals who

Arrived to transit Odessa departed camp 139 on

camp 139 from evac 25 Mar 45 on British

hospital #1266 with ship "Syrcassia",

diagnoses "wound in but crossed out

the area of left foot"

4. Levite, James, born - " - Listed among

1919, private Arrived individuals who

to transit camp 139 departed camp 139 on

from evac hospital 25 Mar 45 on British

#1266 with diagnosis ship "Syrcassia",

"symptoms of dry but crossed out.

	pleurisy"		Note reads"on general list".
5	Lestin, Thomas, born 1920, sergeant Arrived to transit camp 139 from evac hospital [remainder illegible]	139th transit camp	Listed among individuals who departed from camp 139 on 25 Mar 45 on British ship "Syrcassia", but crossed out.

1	2	3	4
6	Neighbors, Arzi	139th transit	Listed among

	born 1918, sergeant Arrived to 139th transit camp from evac hospital #1266 Diagnosis "post flu"	camp	individuals who departed from camp 139 on 25 Mar 45 on the British ship "Syrcassia", but crossed out.
17	Percy, William born 1924, private	- " -	[same as above except marked "N".]
18	Ritchy, Jim, born 1924, lieutenant Arrived to transit camp 139 on 25 Mar 45 by airplane from	- " -	Listed among individuals who departed camp 139 on 26 Mar 45 on British ship "Syrcassia",

	Evac hospital 1266.			but crossed out.
	Diagnosed with			
	"Shrapnel wound in			
	right hip with bone			
	damage.			
9	Reily, Robert	- " -		Arrived to camp
	born 1924, corporal			139 on 25 Mar 45 by aircraft from
				Lublin.
10	Lassora, William	139th transit		Arrived to 139th
	born 1915, sergeant	camp		transit camp 11 Apr
	place of birth New			45 from Warsaw.
	York City, USA.			
	Was a prisoner in			

Kustrin, Germany,

camp 3-s.

11 Willymila, Emde, Krist, born 1882, place of birth place Alenstein, East Prussia. Arrived to Co 149 from CO 151.

149th command office, Rostemburg on 27 Apr 45,

Listed among individuals sent to 139th transit camp but document say he was admitted to camp 138 [illegible, possibly 02 May 45].

TFR-2-88

1 2 3 4

12 Jackon, Fred, born

149 CO city

Listed among

	1919, place of birth New York City, USA. Interned from 1940 to 15 Apr 45 in the city of Kensingberg at the post office [very unclear]. Arrived to Co 149 on 22 Apr 45. from gathering facility #47.	of Rostemburg.	individuals sent to 139th camp on 27 Apr 45, but papers say that he was received at 138th camp on 2 May 45.
13	Vargung(Vorgung) Ksavie Milian, place of birth: Acron, USA.	183rd CO, city of Broniftsy,	Appears on a list as having been sent to 138th transit camp.

	Interned in Leihnitz, Germany. Arrived to CO 183 on 29 Apr 45 from city of Lodz.	Moscow region.	On the list there is a note about receiving Mr. Vargung, K at 138th transit camp (there is no date).
14	Dominicaisters, William (Dominicaitist, Dimicantet, Viniamin) born 1908 place of birth Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA. Was a prisoner from	138th transit camp, city of Odessa.	Arrived at transit camp 138 on 04 Aug 45.

1944 to 1945 in

Lyden, Germany.

Departed on 29 May 45

to 138th transit

camp. At train stop

Shorz he escaped and

was apprehended at

Shorz Bel[unknown]

railway and sent to

138th transit camp

via the police

station at Bahmach

train stop on 06 Jun

1	2	3	4
15	Langel(Lanbel) Laslo Shaume, born 1920, private.	186th transit camp, village of Lustdorf, Odessa region.	Arrived to 186th transit camp on 30 Jan 46 from 110th POW camp, city of Korosten in echelon #98072.
16	Bagdanyi(Bogdany), Stephan Stephanovich, born 1910(1901), Hungarian, place of	- " -	Arrived to 186th transit camp on 20 Dec 46 from 159th MVD camp, city of Odessa.

	birth: Bridgeport, USA.		[MVD-Ministry of Internal Affairs] Is at transit camp 186 from 03 Jan 47.
17	Koltsun, Joseph Josephovitch, 1913(1915) slovak. place of birth: Wimber, Pennsylvania USA.	- " -	- " -
18	Nesler, Dominic, Yusufich. born 1901, German, place of birth: Tomnatic,	- " -	- " -

Timishtorotl,

Romania.

TFR-2-90

19	Nesler, Eva Domenikovna, born 1925, german[female] place of birth: Chicago, USA	18 transit camp, village of Lustdorf, Odessa region.	Arrived to 186th transit camp on 20 Dec 46 from 159th MVD camp, city of Odessa. Is at 186th camp from 03 Jan 47	
20	Grosl-Eteni Iohann Iogann. born 1905, Hungarian, place of	- " -	Arrived to 186th transit camp on 17	

	birth: New York, USA		Jan 47 from camp
	Military rank:		159.
	feldfebel.		
21	Chander(Shander) Frans Hans, born 1915, interned	- " -	Arrived to 186th transit camp 11 Feb 47 (15 Feb 47) from camp department #60 of UPVE [directorate on POW and interned affairs] MVD, Moscow region.
22	Katerinchuk, Stephan Grigorevitch, born 1913, Czech,	- " -	Arrived to 186th transit camp 12 Feb 47 from 159th MVD

	interned, place of birth: New York City, USA.		camp.
23	Gortich, Ron Chared. born 1927.	- " -	Arrived to 186th camp on 15 Feb 47 from camp department #60 UPVE MVD.
24	Bort, Sebastian (Port Sebastian Mikhailovich), born 1920.	- " -	Sent to 186th transit camp on 25 Mar 47 from 1223 labor battalion.

1	2	3	4
25	Hartel, Suzanna Josephna (Yusef) born 1913, german [female] place of birth: Baltimore, USA, interned in Romania Timishhora region.	- " -	Arrived to 186th transit camp 04 Oct 47. from 1008 separate work battalion, city of Yenalievo, Stalin region. Is located in 186th transit camp from 18 Oct 47.

Based on TsAVS [expansion unknown, possibly Central Archives of Armed Forces], op. 725510 d.13,11.77,111;

op. 725508 d.11,11.160, 231, 233, 234,241; 242,250, 287;

op. 192400s, d.5, 11.74,75,76,78,79;

op. 79951s, d.3, 11.105,107;

op. 79950s, d.8, serial number 1356;

op. 725510, d.14, 1.169;

op 464810, d4, 11.79,80;

op. 177030, d.1, 1.40;

op 464810, d.2, 1.389

op. 764207, d.2, 11. 34, 35, 71, 119,120,142-145 304,306,

433-436

op 616238s d.1, 1.78

op. 764207, d.11, 1. 64;

op 764207, d.9,11.122-127;

op. 764207, d17, 1. 15(ob);

op. 177030, d.2, 11.151,152;

op 764207, d.3, 1. 378;

[Translators note: possible expansion, op=inventory; d-file or case; 1.1=sheets; ob=back of sheet, other side.

5th DEPARTMENT CHIEF

Lt. Colonel [signature]

/GONCHAROV/

TFR-2-92